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Preface
This study offers a frame of reference for analysing the ong1ns and
outcomeof late industrialisation attempts. It us es elements of institutional
and comparative historical analyses to work out an explanation of Turkey' s
development trajectory from the early 19th to the mid-20th centuries.
Developed through critical reflection on the literature of historical sociology
and sociology of development, the analysis sketched here is meant to be
amenable to further research on divergent paths of industrial transformation.
Particular emphasis is placed upon the ways in which the nature of inter-
relations between the international development context, socio-institutional
relations in industry and agriculture, the conditionsof nation-building, and
the subsequent political regime prove d detrimental to the outcome of the
late industrialisation attempt in Turkey.
ChapterOne introduces the argument and puts the study of Turkish
development intocontext using the polarization of the modernisation theory
and the dependency approach as a polemical device. In Chapter Two, the
social and political development background of the Ottoman economy is
traced back to its origins in the 13th century. In the specification of the
international context in Chapter Three, a periodisation of the international
system between the early 19th and the mid..20th centuries is developed on
the basis ofcjiscussions focusing on the long waves of development,
technological paradigms in industrial production, national modes of
development in dominant countries and institutionalised power relations in
the international trade, monetary and security regimes. At the most abstract
level a central concern in this chapter is to explore the dialectic of structure
and agency in the context of the global economy - the extent of
independence, which can be accorded to national economies and polities
during' their adaptation to the'constraintsof internationalecorromy:.To .
investigate this dialectic a heuristic division between external and internal,
and between international and national development contexts is employed,
and the groundwork for further discussions of the impact of international
structuring conditions on Turkey is delineated.
Chapters Four, Five and Six are devoted to the analysis of the Turkish
development path in the 19thcentury, the 1908-29 nation-building phase,
and the 1930-46 state-led industrialisation period under one-party rule
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respectively. While observing the interrelations between the international
and national contexts, the exposition in these chapters emphasises the
partially independent nature of national development. In Chapters Four and
Six, the origins and outcome of the industrialisation dynamics are discussed
with respect to the interplay between three set of factors intrinsic to the
socioeconomic structure of Turkey: (i) the socio..institutional relations in
agriculture (property relations, organisation and mobilisation pattern of
agricultural classes); (ii) socio-institutional relations in industry and
commerce (organisation of labour, organisation of merchant, banking and
industrial capital, forms of entrepreneurship); (iii) the ro le of the state
(administrative and educational reform capabilities, the bureaucracy's
nation-building, efforts, the increasing scale of state intervention in
promoting industrialisation). Chapter Four locates the aborted
industrialisation attempt of the 19th century in the particular nexus between
Anatolian agriculture and industry, and the role of the imperialOttoman
state dependent upon the pattern of social and political mobilisation within
the Empire. Chapter Five takes the discussion from the final crisis of the
Ottoman regime prompted by the defeat in the First World War and
proceeds to analyse the nation-building effortsof the nationalist
revolutionary leadership and the structures and activities of the new state
organisation as a radical continuation of the 19th century Ottoman reforms.
In Chapter Six attention is directed to the initiation and subsequent outcome
of state-led industrialisation attempts under the impact of World
Depression. The roots of the deadlocked Turkish development before the
post-1945 boom in the world economy are found in the specific set of
circumstances constituted by the prior evolution of Ottoman state and
society, the.interwar world economy, socio-institutional relations in
agriculture and'industry, the nature of the nation-building effort, and the
political regime of the new Republic. Finally in Chapter Seven, some
lessons are drawn from the particular path of "unsuccessful" industriali-
sation represented by the Turkish case, for the purpose of generatinga
multicausal explanation of the outcome of industrialisation attempts.
This study grew' öutof the experiencesil1 my formativeyearsduring the':
convulsive decade after 1975 in Turkey. My initial interest in this conflict-
ridden period culminating in the 1980 military coup and the subsequent
economic and social transformations in the 1980s was supplemented by an
interest in comparative history after I resumed my studies in another
periphery of Europe -Norway. Through research on development theory
and studies of comparable contemporary countries I came to see the crisis
in the latter half of the 1970s in Turkey within the broader context of a
transition from one development strategy -Import Substitution
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Industrialisation (ISI)~ to 'another -Export OrientedIndustrialisation (EOI).
This report was originally thought of as an attempt to sketch a framework
for understanding the Turkish development trajectory through the origins
of the ISI regime in the 1960s and the economic decline in the 1970s to the
protracted growth in the 1980s.
A preliminary analysis of the last 30 years of Turkish industrialisation,
however, revealed that the roots of the 1970s crisis lay in the constellation
of social forces given by the prior evolution of the Turkish society. This
was especially true for the parallels between the 1960-79 ISI period and the
étatiste'policies of the 1930s and 1940s. The economic policies
emphasising the protection of the internal market under the aegis of a
strong interventionist state had a definIte forerunner in the state-led
industrialisation phase between 1930 and 1946. Thus, the initial aim was
to explain the watershed of 1980 by analysing the two distinct periods
preceding andpostdating 1980, and to devise a theoretical framework
looking at the interrelations of class and state structures and the complex
interplay over time of domestic and international developments. This
necessitated the application of a similar framework to the late Ottoman and
early Republican period, and more historical research concentrating on the
"deep structures" of the Turkish social formation. However, the historical
elaboration . soon grew in scope and finally took the form presented in the
following pages, postponing the initial concern to a later study.
The following pages do not reveal new data; instead they attempt to
make an overall argument about the Turkish development trajectory, using
sociological theory in general and elements of development theory and
historical sociology in particular, by drawing evidence mostly from
"secondary sources". As the bibliography indicates, I have been able to
draw extensively upon the recently growing body of literature on Ottoman
and Turkish economic and social history. Apart from finding the necessary
sources, or bre aking with the dogmatic assumptions of Kemalist
historiography dominating the Turkish education system, or considering the
slimness of research on the p articul ar are as of OttomanfTurkish
development, one major problem has been to dissociate the narrative from
the points debated by specialists about particular areas not relevant to the
concerns of this study, and to adopt the evidence presented in these works
to my analytical. purposes and thereby present a coherent argument. The
extent to which I have succeeded in accomplishing this task is for the
reader to decide.
The treatment of Ottoman/Turkish historical development here is
symptomatic and suggestive rather than systematic and exhaustive.
Different phases and facets of Turkish development are given unequal
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weight dep ending on their relevance to my theoretical and analytical
concerns; the account attempts to shed light on the particular areas of the
socioeconomic history of Turkey in so far as they provide clues to the basic
problemstellung of this report: the interrelations between economic
development and sociopolitical struggles and structures, between
international and national development contexts.
I have tried to write a text which will be accessible to readers not
familiar with Ottoman/Turkish history. But while do ing that I have also
attempted not to lose the interest of those readers familiar withthe Turkish
case. In order not to disrupt the continuity of the historical exposition, I
have tried to keep the references to comparative cases and to theoretical
remarks and controversies in the notes at the end of each chapter. At most
places these notes can be read as a parallel text discussing the theoretical
sources and the comparative context of the points referring to Turkey. The
text below is, thus, the result of a compromise between at times conflicting
objectives of historie al narative and historical sociological exposition, and
aims to take both those readers who are familiar with and those who are
unacquainted with Turkish history along the tracks of sociological
approaches to industrial development. A guiding light throughout the report
was the firm belief that the study of the Turkish case will contribute to and
will benefit from development theory and that the Turkish development
pattern will eventually provide a litmus test for the various standpoints in
the central controversies of development theory.
The analysis attempted here is situated midway between the historical
and the political, the sociological and the economic; it is, therefore, only
natural that it . satisfies neither. It is provisional, inevitably fallible,
nevertheless expectant of criticism and further development. Jf it still seems
worth attempting, it is because of the expectation that this hybridisation will
lead both to a better analysis of Turkish development and to the enrichment
of the particular disciplines. Thus, most of the sections below have a
tentative, exploring character and they must be seen as rudimentary
elements ofa research programme to be developed at a later stage rather
than a detailed report studying the p articul ar areas of Turkish political'
economy.
XlI
1. Introduction: Late development and the
Turkish state
1.1 Turkish development and major controversies in
development theory
Much of the scholarship on the Turkish development path has been located
at the extreme ends of the spectrum of development theories represented by
dependency and modernisation theories. The modernisation approach to the
study of the 19th century Ottoman and early Republican periods of Turkish
development (Lerner 1958, Lewis 1968, Mardin 1969a and 1969b,
Huntington 1968, Eisenstadt 1987) sees a unilinear-progression from the
golden age of the 14th to the 16th centuries to the period of imperial
decline in the i 7th and 18th centuries and then to a refashioning on
Western models in the 19th and early 20th centuries. In the explanation of
the "stagnation" of the Ottoman Empire prior to the 1 9th century, the
modernisation perspective stresses the role of "traditionalist" Islamic
cultural properties (law, moral code, and customs) which inhibit the
development of "modern" Western attitudes and institutions. The driving
force behind the reform of institutions is explained as a desire to meet the
new requirements under the modernising influence of the West. The process
of modernisation is said to have started with the military reforms at the end
of the 18th century, continued through the administrative and educational
reforms of the mid-19th century Tanzimat period and finally achieved the
culmination of its 1789 French Revolution ideals in the formation of the
Turkish Republic in 1923.
The modernisa.tion perspective's emphasis when analysing the efforts of
the Ottoman state to fill the gap created by its persistent decline and to
catch up with the Western imperial powers, is on the ideological borrowing
of "Western ideals" , and institutional and legal reforms. Neither the impact
of the industrialised capitalist economies in general nor the structural
position of the Ottoman economy within the world economy in particular
is theorised. In the analysis of the tensions within the Empire itself, the
emphasis is on the conflicts between reformists and Islamic reactionaries
in the bureaucracy. With respect to the relations between the agrarian and
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commercial classes, and the state the modernisation approach is aga1n
silent.
The dependency approach on the other hand, pulling the pendulum too
much in the opposite direction, subordinates the role of state and class
formationand economic structures inside the Ottoman Empire to the
exigencies of centre states and bourgeois classes. According to this view,
the Ottoman state becomes a peripheral state, a passive medium without
any autonomy; its industrialisation attempts are seen as half-hearted and the
19th century refotms are regarded as attempts to facilitate foreign capital's
imposition. Suchimposition is said to have started as early as in the 16th
century with the Capitulations - the easing of restrictions on trade
benevolently granted to France - and to gain momentum with the 1838
Free Trade Treaty with England. In this account, late Ottoman bureaucratic
reformism introducing political guarantees concerning minority rights, and
legal reforms introducing Western jurisdietion is explained through the
intervention of foreign capital or foreign states, and is closely correlated
with the loss of the fiscal autonomy of the Ottoman state. The
predominantlynon-Muslim bourgeoisie of the Empire is seen as an
extension of the interests of metropolitan capital and regarded to be a
"comprador" bourgeoisie.
Withinthis dependency tradition, there are diverging views concerning
the nation-building period. In one vers ion (Avc10glu 1973), the 1908-18
¥ oung Turk rule ,of the Commttee of Union and Progress Party (CUP)
leads to aconfrohtation with imperial powers and compradors, and
culminates in'a nationalliberation struggle under the leadership of Mustafa
Kemal. The formation of the Turkish Republic and the Kemalist bureau-
cratic reformism of the early Republican period are seen as an anti-
imperialist struggle effecting a fundamental break with the Ottoman past,
and state-led industrialisation as a model of self-reliant development
representing a progressiveattack on imperialism and even a step towards
socialism. Another version regards Kemalism as a continuation of 19th
, century reformism and rejects its claim to be a radical departure from the
earlier dependencyrelationship (Baskaya 1991). ¥et another version ofthis
dep endene y ,approach views. theYoung Turk and Kemalist bureaucrats not
as part of the bureaucracy of the old regime but as representatives of a
rising ,"national bourgeoisie" against the comprador faction of the
bourgeoisie composed of Greeks and Armenians (Aksin 1980, Tanör 1992,
Ahmed 1988).
There are several problems associated with this "simplistic" dependency
approach to OttomanfTurkish development. As a result of its one-sided
emphasis on external determinism, it views the Turkish trajectory as an
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underdevelopment associated with a transfer of surplus to the European
core rather than a nondevelopment structured by class and state relations
within the Ottoman Empire itself. It basically neglects the barriers the
Ottoman state erected against private property rights and capital
accumulation prior to the 19th century. In the ~nalysis of the 19th century,
this dependency approach gives undue emphasis to "integration with the
world economy", and neglects the fact that the Ottoman state was not
subjected to direct colonial rule and kept its autonomy vis-à-vis foreign
powers by playing their inter-imperialist rivalries against each other.
Moreover,an excessive focus on the impact of external trade diverts the
attention from the internal social structure and undermines the role socIo-
institutional relations in agriculture played in promoting the non-
development of industrialisation, which were again inextricably related to
the nature of the Ottoman state.
With respect to the ¥ oung Turk and Republican period, the dep endene y
tradition either sees a simple continuity with the 19th century dep endene y
pattern or acomplete revers al of fortune effected by an anti-imperialist War
of Independence and a state-led industrialisation. In both cases, it under-
mines the changednature of the world economic and political context in the
first half of 20th century which created a strategic vacuum to be filled by
the newlyemerging nations and states. This position is accompanied by a
"class-reductionist" approach which sees a" "national" bourgeoisie, whose
mobilisation chron,ologically and causally prior to the nation-building phase
is implausible and unsubstantiated, as inciting and dominating the Y oung
Turk and Kemalist movement. A central weakness in this interpretation of
Turkish nation-building is an unqualified application of the English or
French bourgeoisi e-state relationship to the Turkish case, and a reversal in
the society-state relation in the Ottoman Empire whose agrarian structure,
characterised by an absence of the West European hereditary feudal tenure,
meant a dominance of state over social classes.
A more nuanced variant of the dependency approach aims to overcome
the weaknesses associated with theabove simplistic application of the
dependency paradigm to Turkish development and to solve the problem of
conceptually . synthesising the external and 'internal factors' affecting the
development trajectory. It tries to resolve the problem of applying a
rigorousclass analysis to non-capitalist and non-feudal societies (Keyder
1987, 1988: 159-63, Wallerstein, Decdeli and Kasaba 1987), by using a
genealogy of concepts deri ved from Althusser and Wallerstein. This
"revised" dependency approach studies the Ottoman society as a social
formation characterised by a dominant Asiatic Mode of Production (AMP)
in which the central authority of the state controls the appropriation of the
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surplus produced by independent peasants and imposesstrict limitations on
the accumulation of land in agriculture and wealth in commerce. With the
impact of the "world-economy" from the 16th century onwards, the rise in
international trade and the activities of the merchant capital lead to a
dissolution of AMP. Given the cruciallocation of trade in providing the
link between AMP (composed of the surplus appropriation of tax -collecting
state officials from peasant producers) and petty commodity production in
the urban guilds, the weakening of the administrative controls on intern al
and external trade results in the disarticulation of the Ottoman system, and
its "peripheralisation" within the world-economy.
The pull of world-capitalism in the 17th and 18th centuries leads to a
change in agricultural relations of production; the emergence of powerful
landlords, tax-farmers, producing for export entailsenserfment of the
peasantry (Wallerstein, Decdeli and Kasaba 1987:90-2). According to this
approach then, under the impact of world trade from the late 16th century
onwards the Ottoman system loses its internal integration and becomes
"incorporated" into the world-economy as a supplier of raw materials and
importer of manufactured goods (islamoglu and Keyder 1987:47-53).1 Inte-
gration into the world circuit of capital brings with it the commercialisation
of agriculture and.1he emergence of a de facto landed upper class of tax-
farmers. controlling large commercial estates, employing an enserfed
peasantry and share-croppers.
Although the 19th century witnesses a decline in the influence of tax-
farmers as a result of the centralIsation drive of the Ottoman state, the
growth of commercial agriculture and growing imports of European manu-
factured goodsgain momentum andleadtoadeclineof petty commodity",
production in urban guilds and destruction of proto-industrial activity in the
countryside, whose development is considered to be an essentialpre-
requisite for successful industrialisation (cf. Mendels 1972, Köymen 1971).
Meanwhile, the increasing foreign debt of the Ottoman state and the
growing strength of the merchant capital of foreign origin in collaboration
with the native capital of non-Muslim minorities further undermine the
economic and political integration of the Empire, and effect the transition
of the Ottoman Empire from astatemechanism of Asiatie type to a
colonial state serving the needs of merchant capital (islamoglu and Keyder
1987:61).
This revised dependency perspective, too, has the danger of falling into
simplistic arguments subordinating the ro le of the state to the exigencies of
the world ,economy. Thus, Wallerstein, Decdeli, and Kasaba (1987:95)
equate the "intern al" - in relation to social classes - and "external" - in
relation to other states - weakening of the Ottoman state, and claim that the
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internally "strong" state apparatus of the Empire until the end of the 16th
century was prögressively transformed into the "weak" state apparatus
typical of the states located in the peripheral zone of the world economy.
What the modernisation approach sees as the creation of a more efficient
state apparatus in the 19th century becomes in their view the creation of
one which facilitated the operations of the world-economy.
One version of the revised dependency approach (Keyder 1988) regards
the bureaucracy as a social class by virtue of its position in the surplus
extraction relationship in AMP (cf. Baily and Llobera 1981). Contrary to
the account of what we called the simplistic dependency approach, the late
Ottoman and early Republican reform drive is regarded neither as an
expression of foreign interests, nor as an anti-imperialist attempt.
Bureaucrats are not considered to be representing the interests of a rising
bourgeoisie either; bureaucratic reformism is rather interpreted as areaction
to the new conflicts generated by the growth of a new bourgeoisie - a
development resulting from greater incorporation into the world capitalist
system. In order to safeguard their social position - to keep their surplus-
appropriating status and perpetuate their ability to politically dominate the
economy - the bureaucracy opposes the economic power of the increas-
ingly influential merchants and money lenders. The CUP and the
Republican regimes are interpreted as the culmination of a bureaucratic
re action against the ascendency of the bourgeoisie. This perspective, too,
suffers from a kind of class-reductionism. Giving priority to the
determining character of relations of production, the state bureaucracy is
regarded as a dominant class anchored in AMP. Thus the opposition
between the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie is purported to derive from
their conflicting class interests: the bureaucracy is increasingly bent on
restricting the growth of market processes, which the bourgeoisie benefits
from. The hostility of the nationalist bureaucracy to the non-Muslim
bourgeoisie is explained in the context of a general conflict of interest
between the bureaucratic class and the bourgeoisie -- Muslim or non-
Muslim (Kasaba 1988a:226).
Contrary to the "productivist" accounts common to dependency
approaches, the approach to be adopted in this study will not insist on
ascribing a causal primacy to conflicts within the production sphere in
explaining societal evolution. While analysing the structuring effects of
external socio-economic relations delineated by the dependency approach,
we will emphasise the centrality of both economic and cognitive responses
to uneven international development. As we will argue, just as important
as the corìtexts of instrumental action are those conflicts located within the
normative or cognitive spheres - e.g. nationalism. In this lIght, the bureau-
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cratic opposition in the first quarter of the 20th century to the non-Muslim
bourgeoisie will be seen as the result of the bureaucracy' s project of
creating a linguistically and religiously homogeneous population in
Anatolia, a nationalist project which was enhanced by geo-political
considerations.
The emphasis on the concept of "lateness"attempts to recc))cile the
diverging positions of the moderiiisation and dependency perspectives.
Incorporating elements of the dependency paradigm, the lateness per-
spective emphasises that sequentially late industrialisations face a different
international context than earlier industrialisations. Hence, modernisation
theory' sendogenous prerequisites cannot be generalised to encompass the
late-comers. In Gerschenkron' s words, the industrialisation processes
launched in backward countries show "considerable differences, as
compared with more advanced countries, not only with regard to the speed
of development but alsowith regard to the productive and organisational
structures of industry which emerge from these processes" (1962:7). On the
other hand, contrary to the claims of the underdevelopment approach, the
backwardness of the countries attempting late capitalist industrialisation is
not the result of an earlier surplus transfer from these countries, but rather
the consequence of an uneven development on the world scale. In this sense
capitalist development, first in England and then in Western Europe, is seen
as a historically limited and peculiar phenomenon, not as the result of some
immanent mechanism transferring surplus from the periphery to the West
European core.
Drawing attention to the fact that industrial development did not
simultaneously emerge in different parts of Europe, the question of why an
indigenous capitalism did not evolve in the Ottoman realm is displaced with
the question of why Ottoman/Turkish late development did not succeed
once capitalism emerged in Western Europe. This way of posing the
problem situates the study of the Turkish development trajectory within an
analysis of the divergent paths of late industrial transformation. The
lateness or' backwardness perspecti ve, thus, has a direct bearing on the
problem of prerequisites of Industrial development. Unlike the moderni-
sation or dependency perspectives, this vie w regards the crucial features of
industrial evolution oflate..comer countries not as idiosyncrasies, exceptions
to the norm or as resulting from the determining influence of advanced
countries on the backward countries, but as "part and parcel of a system of
gradations of backwardness" (Gerschenkron 1962:41). The historical
experience of 19th century late industrialisation in Europe, as it is classi-
cally analysed by Gerschenkron, shows the strategic role of the state in
achieving successful industrialIsation. The more backward the country, the
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more its industrialisation proceeds under the organised direction of the state
depending on the degree of backwardness. Given the central roleof the
state in late industrialisation, the nature of the state' s intervention in the
economy becomes a crucial variable determining the outcome of late
industrialisation attempts. Our initial hypothesis in examining the
determinations of Turkey' s unsuccessful path, therefore, revolves around
the regressive or, correlatively, absence of the progressive role of the state.
This basic contention also corresponds to the prevailing negative view of
the Ottoman/Turkish state, however, as I shall argue, in a significantly
different sense.
Notwithstanding their,differences of emphasis, a common element in the
application of modernisation and revised dependency approaches to
Ottoinan/Turkish society is the view which sees a dominance of the
centralised state over the more or less egalitarian but fragmented "civil
society" on the periphery. This common outlook has a long tradition in
European writing on Ottoman society; it begins with Enlightenment
writers', especially Montesquieu's "Oriental despotism" and enters into
historie al sociological writing through Marx' s "Asiatic Mode of Production"
(AMP) and Weber' s "patrimonialism". A common theme in these
formulations is the existence of a gap between a mammoth state and a
disarticulated social structure ~ an absenee of mediating P olitic al
institutions between the state and the civil society. In contrast to the
predominance of individualist notions in the West, there are no corporate
bodies having any autonomous jurisdiction, and society is pervaded by
collectivist values. The result is a strong Ottoman state tradition unable to
tolerate any countervailing centres of power.
This model suggests a continuity between the Ottoman Empire and early
Republican Turkey: both in the manner reforms were undertaken from
above by a modernising bureaucracy unwilling to give up any of its power
over the society and in the extent of the cultural gap between elites and the
rest of the society in spite of the populist rhetoric and aggressive language
reform of the Kemalist period. Moreover, the étatiste economic policies of
the 1930sand 1940s areheldtojnvolv:e"strongcontroLfromthecentre,ançl.
thus to' be inimical to the development of a market economy which is
postulated to be favourable to the rise of modern forms of pluralist civil
society. The extension of this model to recent Turkish developments holds
that the influence of the civil society continually increased from the 19th
century onwards with the emergence of a decentralised market economy
and finally achieved a decisive victory over the accumulated Oriental
traditions and the rule of bureaucracy with the export orientation and the
neo-liberal "free market" reforms in the 1980s.2
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Although I will adhere to the model of state "autonomy" implicit in this
common denominator between modernisation and dependency interpre-
tations of the Ottoman/Turkish state, my theoretical departure point will be
different. In postulating the autonomy of the OttomanfTurkish state and
delineating its opposition to social c1asses, I will base the analysis on the
"state-centred" approach of Skocpol (1979) and Mann (1986a, 1986b), and
reject the fundamental difference between the Western and Ottoman states
as posited by the state/civil society paradigm. Indeed, as argued by Hann
(1990:60), the state versus ei vil society model is not only based on an
idealisedview of the West,3 but also on a specifically Hegelian view of
civil society, according to which society and state stand sharply öpposed to
each other. Whereas for Hegel the solution to this contradietion is that the
selfish, particularistic interests of the civil society must be transcended by
the state, proponents of this model with respect to Turkey have revers ed
Hegel's judgement in order to endorse, more or less explicitly, a call for the
liberation of civil society from the yoke of the strong state. Substitution of
an idealised version of Western lIberal democracyÆor all the institutions
missing in Ottoman society has led to the advocacy of the vie w which sees
the stimulatiön'of a market economy and the state's withdrawal from the
market sphere as the main criteria for the emergence of civil society.
The inability of this model to explain recent Turkish politics during
which the liberal market rhetoric of the 1980s has be en flagrantly
contradicted in practice has already been pointed out. 4 What is more
important for our purposes, however, is the ways in which the state versus
civil society opposition has drawn the attention away from the elaboration
of the particular mediation ,between state and society in the late Ottoman . .,..
and early Republican periods. As we shall see in the analysis of the early
Republican period, it is the particular form of interrelations between the
state and society - the absenee of a dense set of institutionalised links
between the state bureaucracy and social groups and classes and the pre-
dominance of political patronage.~ rather than a generalised conception of
the dominance of state over civil society which proved detrimental in the
trajectory of Turkish development. Correlatively, Iwill argue against the
dualistic conception of world history in which East and West are conceived
as ideal-type societies locked in their specificities: the dynamic, rational,
democratic West with its effective civil society versus the statie, irrational,
authoritarian East with its despotic state. I will defend the case that the
Ottoman and Turkish state and society can be analysed using analytical
construets similar to the ones us ed in the analysis of European states and
societies. Thus, in contrast to the offhand contrasting approach of the state
versus civil society model, which locates the Ottoman society in a different
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realm from that of an unitary Euròpean sphere, my approach will entail the
use ofcomparative contrasts between the Ottoman Empire and particular
European states and societies during the course of the narrative, and thereby
situate the OttomanfTurkish development trajectory within a typology of
diverging European paths to industrialisation.5
Central to the alternative framework I will adopt is a conception of the
state which is hel d to be common to both early modern European states and
the Ottoman state. Accordingly, the state has two dimensions: the domestie
economic aspect - the state regulates, judicially and repressively, the
economic relationships between individuals and c1asses located within its
boundaries - and the military international aspect - the states mediate
power relations between themselves in the geo-political arena through the
use of military force (Mann 1986a:417, 511-14, 1986b:111, Skocpol1979:
24-32). Drawing on Hintze' s two-dimensional view of the determinants of
the state organisation, Skocpol charaeterises the state as fundamentally
Janus-faced, with an intrinsically dual anchorage in class-divided socio-
economic structures and the international system of states. Because the
international system - the external ordering of states expressed especially
in terms of military relations - is autonomous of class structure, states'
activities can not be comprehended by their relations with their civil
societies or as an outcome of the actions of social classes. Rather, state
action can most fruitfully be studied by focusing upon the points of inter-
section between international conditions and pressures, on the one hand,
and class-structurèd economies and politically organised interests, on the
other hand. State elites, executives, and institutions manoeuvrewithin the
"space" constrained by these twocoordinates, and stake out an arena of
power autonomy for themselves; this power can then be used against the
classes and groups in the civil society or against the foreign states.
These two sources of the autonomy of the state are interdependent. As
Mann argues, the distinctive feature of state organisation vis-à-vis civil
society groups, the' "centralised territorial regulation" of the state in
comparison to the limited territorial scope of the latter ascribe a structurally
conditioning role to the external determinants of state power.6 The state is
defined by its monopolyof external milItary power ratherthan internal
political power. Exigencies of war are the forcing-house of taxation and
administration - the requirements of external military power nurse the
conditions of intern al political power. In this sense, the appearance of
capitalism and the nation-state, and the continuous.demand and develop-
ment of warfare are parallel and mutually reinforcing proeesses (Mann
1986a:416-90, 510-6; Tilly 1975:73-4 and see Tilly 1990 for a more recent
statement of the same contention). In this perspective, "centralised territorial
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regulations" achieved through meeting the requirements of external military
power become the foundation of states' - Eastern as well as Western,
ancient as well as modern states' - autonomy from their respective civil
societies.
The most telling proof of this way of looking at the state may be
obtained through an analysis of state finances. Byestimating state
expenditure, we can establish that the external military role of the Ottoman
state remained predominant well into the 20th century. Presumably it was
not until the 1930s that the Turkish state spent more money on domestie
civil functions than on its military defence or aggression (excluding the
repayments of external debt which were again primarily borrowed to meet
the requirements of military spending) - a trend which was soon revers ed
again in the favour of military spending under the Second World War
although Turkey did not enter the War. Thus, the domestic civil functions
of the OttomanfTurkish state never became predominant over its military
functions, except for the brief interlude in the 1930s, during the period we
are studying in this report (Genç 1984, Kepenek 1990:31).
The functions of the Ottoman state were overwhelmingly military and
geo-political rather than economic and domestic. In this respect, the
Ottoman state was not different fromits absolutist counterparts in early
modern Europe. What was distinctive in the Ottoman casewas the
continuation of this trend well into the 20th century. Whereas the public
ei vil functions.of the state had begun to overtake the military functions in
the early 19th ceritury in Western Europe (Mann 1986a:511), the extended
war efforts of the Ottoman state precluded a similar decrease in milItary
functions. As we shall see later in the analysis of the 19th century, the
state' s military expenditures prevented the emergence of a mutually
supporting dynamic of development between industry and agriculture.
More important for the argument here, the primacy of the Ottoman
state' sexternal military function discredits the theories which assign its
main function as the regulation of Its internal civil society. Like all states,
the Ottoman state did assume such functions but like all agrarian empires
these were largely derivative of its geo-political role. In order to see what
was distinctive in the Ottoman state in comparison to early modern
European states, we must discard a simplistic notion of the power of state
over civil society and attempt to qualIfy the nature of this power. Such an
elaboration may provide us with clues as to the particular nature of the
Ottoman and Turkish states.
Mann (1986b) distinguishes two types of state power, despotic and
infrastructural, both flowing principally from the state' s unique ability to
provide a territoriaZZy centralised form of organisation. Despotic power of
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the state elite concerns "the range of actions which the state is empowered
to undertake without routine, institutionalised negotiation with civil society
groups." What Mann terms infrastructural power refers to the "capacity of
the state actually to penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically
politicaldecisions throughout the realm" (1986b: 113). This infrastructural
dimension of power was comparatively weak in historical societies and
developed powerfully with the emergence of industrial societies and modern
nation states.
The growth in the infrastructural power of the state came about through
the development of the logistics of political control - a centrally
coordinated division of labour between the state' s main activities; spread
of literacy enabling stabilised messages to be transmitted throughout the
state' s territories, and securing the codification and storage of legal
responsibilities; increases in the rapidity of communication messages and
of transport of people and messages. Because it was logistically hard to
maintain intensive military controlover anything more than a radius of
about one hundred kilometre, all empires were extensive dominations which
had to rule through local elites (Mann 1986a: 137-42). These logistical
limitations to the infrastructural reach of states remained unchanged until
the 18th century in Europe; in the case of the Ottoman Empire they lasted
as long as to the beginning of the 19th century. Contrary to what a simple
state versus civil society model might indicate, all despotic rulers actually
ruled through local notables. The Ottoman Empire, like all extensive
societies, was in feality "territorially federal" (Mann 1986b:129, Giddens
1981: 103-4); its imperial rule was always far feebler than its traditional
image conveyed by the state versus civil society mode!.
The ideal-types Mann derives through the combinations of despotic and
infrastructuralpower are shown in Table 1.1. In this typology, the feudal
ideal-type corresponds to the medieval European states which governed
through independent magnates and towns. The imperial state, on the other
hand, possesses its own governing agents, but it has limittd capacity to
penetratecivil society; it corresponds to Weber' s patrimonial state.
Contemporarycapitalist deniocraci~s'aPP1"Pximate thebureaucratic type;".
they are controlled by ei vil society groups, but their decisions, once taken,
are enforceable through the state' s infrastructure: they are "despotically
weak"but "infrastructurally strong". Finally, in the authoritariancase,
competing power groupings can not evade the infrastructural reach of the
state, nor are they structurally separate from it (as they are in the
bureaucratic type). Mann sees Nazi Germany and Soviet Union as tending
towards this case. With reg ard to the historical examples which roughly
approximate these ideal-types, he identifies two major tendencies: a long-
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term historical growth in the infrastructural power of the state, and an
oscillation between the low and high en ds of the spectrum in the despotic
powers of the state. While there has been a secular process of infra-
structural improvements, there has been no corresponding general develop-
mental tendency in despotie pGwers: "the history of despotism has been one
of oscillation, not development" (1986b:115-16).
Table 1.1
Two dimensions of state power
Infrastructural coordinationLow lligh
Low
Despotic power High
Feudal
Imperial
B ureaucratic
Authoritarian
Source: Mann 1986b: 115
Mann's analysis of the dynamics of this oscillation provides some clues
for understanding the nature of state/civil society relations in the Ottoman
and early Republican states, and suggests a general framework for the
analysis of the Turkish development trajectory. In an attempt to further
c1arify and generalise the oscillation between imperial (patrimonial) and
feudal regimes in agrarian empires first identified by Weber, Mann rejects
the notion that the struggle between centralised, patrimonial empires, and
decentralised, loosely feudal, aristocratic monarchies is a simple oscillation
or an essentially cyclical movement lacking long-term development
(1986a: 172-3, 1986b: 130). Rather, he sees the centralising and
decentralising tendencies of state power, the consecutive strengthening and
weakening periods of despotie states as a dialectical process: a range of
infrastructural techniques are piöneered by despotic states, thên appropriated
by civil societies (or vice versa); then further opportunities for centralised
coordination present themselves, and the process begins anew. Such trends
are visible in early modern societies as well as in ancient societies.
By distinguishing the despotic and infrastructural elements of state
power, this view rejects the simple antithesis between state and civil
society; it sees the two as temporally entwined. Thus, in contrast to the
East-West oppositionality inherent in the Orientalist approach, according to
which social development occurred in Europe, rather than the East, because
it was dominated by a decentralised feudalism (as opposed to the Eastern
patrimonialism), we are led to reject the general formula concerning a
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"timeless" despotic state power for the OttomanfTurkish state. In this light,
the history of the relations between the Ottoman state and civil society
becomes one of a dialectic between centralising and decentralising
movements propelling social development.
The periodisation that I have adopted corresponds roughly to this
dialectical movement. Accordingly, the weak despotic powers of the
Ottoman Emirate prior to the 14th century are transcended by the
centralising pull of the Ottoman state towards the late 16th century, only
to be followed again by a decentralIsation period in the 17th and 18th
centuries.As a result of the central state' s utilisation of new infrastructural
techniques (advanced armaments, improved communication, administrative,
legal and educational reforms),the 19th and early 20th centuries witness an
enhancement of the despotic powers of the state. The leap in infrastructural
powers in this period, however, represents also a movement in the direction
of an authoritarian form of state. The logistical constraints mean that these
new infrastructures can not be kept within the body politi c of the state; its
agents continually "disappear" into civil society, bearing the state's
resources with them - hence the growing influence of civil society
purported to have occurred in the latter half of the 20th century. From this ,'.
perspective, the development of civil society is not predicated upon an
exogenously stimulated "commercialisation" or "expansion of the realm of
the market" in the static social structure of the "Oriental" empire; it is the
outcome of a dynamic driven by the dialectic between centralisation and
decentralisation.
The question of why the state, rather than the civil society, pioneered the
use of infrastructural techniques from the early 19th century onwards brings
us back to the Janus-faced nature of the state, which will form the
emblematic departure point of our analysis attempting to synthesise
dependency and modernisation paradigms. Mann's observation (1986b: 118)
that in the whole history of the development of the infrastructure of power
there is virtually no technique which belongs necessarily tO,;the state leads
to the analysis of the circumstances in which these infrastructural powers,
nominally a general feature of society, are appropriated by the state. The
statepioneers the use of infrastructural techniques because of its
territorialised centrality, its diferentia specifica vis-à-vis groups in civil
society. For in contrast to the class-reductionist and functionalist traditions
of state theory, the state is not predominantly an "arena" in which the
struggles of classes and interest groups are expressed and institutionalised;
it is an autonomous power which regulates, normativelyand by force, a
given set of social and territorial relations, and erects boundaries against the
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outside. It is first of alla socio-spatial arena, the condensation of social
relations within its territories.
In this sense, the state differs both socio-spatially and organisationally
from the major power groupings of civil society. UnlIke these groups the
state elite' s resources radiate authoritatively outwards from a centre and
stop at defined territorial boundaries; its autonomous power flows from this
distinctive attribute. Thus, the state is not a passive medium but an active
agent promoting social change by consolidating its territoriality. This role
of the state is enhanced by the increase in its infrastructural powers: the
greater they become, the greater the territorialising of social life. In spite
of a seeming oppositionality between state and civil society, modernising
states in particular transpose the struggles of civil society onto the territorial
plane of the state, consolidate social interaction over that terráin and create
territorialised mechanisms for repressing and compromising the struggle
(Mann 1986b:132).
The beginning and the course of this expansion of infrastructural power,
which we will identify as the nation-building phase, is characterised by a
pattern in which the state requires a disproportionate part of society' s
capacity for infrastructural coordination. This monopolisatiön of enhanced
infrastructural powers by the state derives from the social utility of forms
of territorial centralisation which can not be provided by civil society forces
themselves. Two such predominant utilities characterise the 19th and early
20th century Turkish nation-building process: coordinated military
command for oppösing first the demands of secessionist movements and the
later aggression of foreign powers, and the centrally coordinated late
development attempt. Both of these point to the external structuring
conditions underpinning the OttomanfTurkish state' s acquisition of
infrastructuralpowers.
However, it was not the economic and military necessity per se , but
rather the particular nature of these necessities in the 19th and 20th century
context which boosted the role of the state. A complex set of factors
ranging from military techniques to the requirements of creating a market
sustained by a linguistically homogeneous population determined the
conditions of this outcome. Modern warfare gradually encouraged army
command structures capable of routine, complex coordination of specialised
infantry andartillery units. Late industrialIsation required more and more
centralised and territorially confined mobilisation of economic resources
with state financing and state enterprises sheltered behind tariff walls
(Gerschenkron 1962). The particular utility provided by the military and
economic territorial centralisation of the state organisation proved superior
to the option of civil society' s acquisition of infrastructural powers.
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I should note that I am not suggesting a functionalist approach to the
modernisation efforts of the Ottoman/Turkish state. The early 19th century
military reforms, the mid-19th century administrative and educational
reforms, the early 20th century Turkish nationalism, and the state-led
industrialisation of the 1930s were not non-conflictual actions undertaken
to improve the functioning of the Ottomanfurkish society. When all other
options ran out, as the "old way of doing things" gradually became
impossible the modernising faction of the state bureaucracy monopolised
the infrastructural powers and set out to realise its slowly emerging project:
the creation of a nation-state. This gradual process covered the one and a
half century analysed in this study. This period began with external
aggression and the decentralising powers of 18th century local notables,
ayans, which threatened the integration of the Empire. The emergence of
the inter-state system and the increasing complexity of the Ottoman society
necessitated new bureaucratic cadres and a new set of administrative rules.
Secessionist nationalisms in the Balkans and the Middle East by the end of
the 19th century left the state bureaucracy with no alternative other than
a nationalism based on the Turkish-speaking population of Anatolia.
Finally, the bureaucracy realised that the economic structure of the new
Republican state could not be built and sustained without some kind of
industrial production. Concomitant to this process, the projects of civil
society groups (i.e. the non-Muslim bourgeoisie) and the aspirations of
other factions of the state elite (i.e. the traditionalIst ulema of the Ottoman
bureaucracy) failed one by one, leaving the nation-building project of the
modernising faction of the state bureaucracy uncontested.
The external structuring conditions determined the conditions of the
modernising project of the state bureaucracy. The state bureaucracy's
perceptions related to external military threats, the emergence of
secessionist nationalisms within its realms, and industrialisation of its rivals
created the conditions for a despotic use of its newly acquired infra-
struetural powers for modernisation purposes. The bureaucracy establIshed
regular taxation, greater military mobilisation, permanent bureaucratic
administration, and facilitated "the emergence ,.' oLadomesticmarket
supported by an indigenous capital and linguistically homogeneous labour.
Ironically, the state could not hold on to this despotic power it had acquired
by its monopolisation of infrastructural capacities during the conditions of
the nation-building phase. From the 1950s onwards these capacities were
carried off into civil society by its own agents. In this sense, the creation
of the Turkish nation-state was not a product of capitalism nor did it
coincide with the project of a rising bourgeoisie. It was the outcome of the
actions of an autonomous bureaucracy which, to pre serve the continuation
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of the state it had inherited, chose first military then administrative and
educational modernisation, and finally late industrialisation. By so doing,
it gave regulative boundaries to capitalist relations and created the
conditions for civil society' s penetration into the state in the latter half of
the 20th century.
We will analyse these processes leading to capitalist modernisation under
the conceptual pairs of "state and nation-building".7 "State-building"
generally denotes the growth of the state, as a body of regulations and as
a set of social apparatuses. It implies chiefly the emergence of a central
power possessing effective control of the means of coercion, continuous
sovereignty over a given territory and the ability to levy taxes regularly,
together with a stable judicial system. By these criteria, the Ottoman
Empire had begun state-building already in the 14th century. However, with
its low level of infrastructural powers, it was a "territorially federal" rather
than a central state prior to the 19th century. Throughout this state-building
phase the Ottoman state' s high levels of despotic power combined with
increasing levels of infrastructural capacities: increased surplus extraction
capacity from agriculture by an effective taxation system, improved
bureaucratic administration, building up of new educational institutions and
transport facilities. Although these attempts to boost infrastructural powers
were meagre compared to the contemporaneous European developments,
they provided the pillars of subsequent reforms in Republican Turkey.
The term "nation-building" draws attention to a different process. For
nation-building tO\obtain, the existence of the state as a central source of
authority is not enough: there must also be the growth of citizenship as a
principle of legitimacy supported by some form of representative
democracy and general civil and political equality under the law. By
historical evidence, the generalisation of these principles within the
boundaries of states have generally been concomitant with the growth of
nationalism - a collective commtment to nationhood. By its very
definition, it is clear that nation-building, like the term state-building,
indicates aprocess rather than an abrupt change. In many ways, especially
considering the ill record of its democratic institutions, it is possible to
argue that nation-building in Turkey is far from complete even as we are
approaching the end of the millennium. However, to differentiate different
stages of Turkish nation-building, we can assume that the initial steps came
with the brief life of the Constitutional Assembly in 1878, gained
momentum with the nationalist CUP leadership in 1908- 1 8 and the
Kemalist one-party rule between 1923-46, and made a leap towards
maturity with the transition to multiparty democracy in 1950. A notable
tendency in this nation-building proeess was the creation of a lInguistically
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homogeneous population, whose role in the uplifting of infrastructural
capacities at the level of society, in the creation of a domestic market, and
in promoting industrialisation will be analysed later.
By linking the nation-building project of the state bureaucracy to the
problems of uneven global industrial development, we will try to achieve
a balance between dependency and modernisation paradigms. At a general
level, this perspective approaches Cardoso and Faletto's (1979) "historical-
structural"methodology, which sees dependency as a structuring condition
that affects actors not directly but through defining the context in which
they operate. This approach attempts to strike a balance between the
extremes attributing primacy to external factors (dependency theory) and
intern al factors (modernisation theory). The external constraints, emanating
from the world economy, impose a conditioning situation, which creates the
internal context of social reproduction in the periphery. It is in this context
that the Tesearch programme of the modernisation approach with its
emphasis on the role of modernising institutions is applied.
The impact of these external and intern al factors, delineated by
dependency and modernisation theories respectively, are mediated through
the state - hence the emphasis laid on its Janus-faced nature. The state,
then, becomes a junction for the diverse determinants of societal develop-
ment. The recognition of the dual nature of the state enables a reconcilIa-
tion of modernisation and dependency paradigms. Within the space
provided by external structuring conditions, specific agents intern al to
society may take up modernising functions. Thus, a fundamental correction
to the modernisation paradigm is needed when studying the late-comer
countries. Reiterating the Gerschenkron thesis, countries that follow on the
path of capitalist industrialisation with a delay, face a different set of
external and intern al industrialisation prerequisites than the first-comers.
The diffusion of modernising institutions stipulated by the modernisation
theory requires the existence of specific intern al agents - e.g. the state
bureaucracy - which can employ. a learning mechanism for the develop-
ment of the late-comer country. It is also at this point that I will seek the
multiple causes of Turkey' s unsuccessful path towards capitalist industriali-
sation.
Such an approach necessitates an. emphasis on the state as promoting
development in general and industrialisation in particular. However, it
should be noted that this approach does not advocate a state-centred
analysis in general. The emphasis that should be given to the analysis of
state depends upon the prior evolution of the country under study and the
class structure prevailing in the society at large. In general, the historically
developed predominance of the state' s position and the weakness of classes
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vis-à- vis the state may require a central role to be accorded to the state, as
in the instance of the Ottoman/Turkish case. The state-centredness or the
society-centredness of the approach depends upon what is to be explained
and the nature of the country under study; it is not a general rule to be
applied independently of particular cases.
Modernisation theories have been explicitly comparative, and thus they
have played down the international influences in assuming that they work
in essentially similar ways. Accordingly, the exclusive focus of
modernisation theories has been on intrasocietal structures or processes.
The outcomes of the modernising process are explained by a combination
of the strengths or weaknesses of an endogenous "commercial impulse" and
the relative powers of the landed classes and the bourgeoisie (Mo ore 1967).
The opposite vie w represented by the development of underdevelopment
thesis, on the other hand, while focusing on intersocietal structures, has
subordinated societies' class and state structures to their "positions in a
world-capitalist division of labour" created by an all powerful "expansion
of trade in the world-economy" (Wallerstein 1974). As I have attempted to
show, the flaws of both approaches with respect to Turkish development
find expression in their one-sided view of the state. Both, in effect, see the
state as a passive medium through which either endogenous or exogenous
influences make their voices heard. The synthesis Iwill attempt to achieve
between these two approaches is best expressed by the alternative
theoretical approach I will adopt with respect to the state. Accordingly, the
state is anchoredin both intrasocietal and intersocietal frameworks, but is
reducible to the exigencies of neither. The state is like a junction where the
confluentendogenous and exogenousjnfluencesanalysed by the modernisa-"
tion and dependency approaches respectively meet. The state is also an
agent which acts upon these influences.
Moreover, breaking away from the exclusively intrasocietal focus of
modernisation theory is all the more necessary for the analysis of late
development. This is due to the fact that development in peripheral
countries follows a trajectory that is distinctive from original
industrialisers,8 because development always entails the interaction of
metropole and periphery. Nevertheless, the nature of this interaction is not
always as one-sided as the development of underdevelopment thesis
suggests. On the contrary, rather than standing by and watching the
workings of international trade or capital movements, the society in
question may act upon them, albeit within certain constraints. As we saw
above, this active intervention, especially in the case of late development,
is ùften undertaken by the state. States' unique capacity to this effect is
enhanced by particular circumstances: we identified the two most important
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in the Turkish case to be a perceived external threat to territorial integrity
and the felt need for late industrialisation by the state bureaucracy. The
autonomy of state action, thus enhanced at the intersocietal level, may
result in the modernising actions of the state bureaucracy. In an attempt to
reconcile theoppositionality between modernisation and dependency
approaches we may say that international political and economic conditions
provide the constraints on national modernisation by determining its rate,
the possibility of its success, and the relative strengths of the collective
actors undertaking the modernisation project.
1.2 Some hypotheses explaining the long-term development
paths
We will use an amalgam of three approaches to explain the long-term
development paths.9 These three approaches are distinguished from one
another with respect to the major areas to which they direct their attention.
In the following chapters we will employ elements of all three approaches
. withoutascribing explanatory priority to any of them; their explanatory
power with respect to the Turkish case will be assessed in the final section
of the report. The first, which may be called the culturalist approach (e.g.
Weiner 1981), places its main emphasis on the c1imate of ideas - ideas of
the elites rather than those of the people - in shaping behaviour and
determining sociQ-economic change. Although this approach is prone to
portray a unitary view of culture and thus to downgrade the fragmented
nature of culture in differentiated societies,. it may present valuable insights
with the help of a relatively simple operationalisation. Such an analysis
may direct attention to educational institutions and professions, and try to
assess their role in preserving and fostering an anti-industrial culture for the
elite. 
10
The second, what may be dubbed the corporatist approach, attempts to
present a more subtle picture of development trajectories. The c1assical
institutionalIst version of this approach (e.g. Hall 1986) places the emphasis
firmly upon the state-economy relations, and necessitates detailed historical
and comparative institutional analyses of the state bureaucracy, the
business community, organised labour, and the interactions of all three.
Thus the corporatist explanation of the determinants of the development
trajectory gives explanatory priority to the role of institutions (e.g. the
character of the state bureaucracy, the banking system, the organisation of
the labour movement) and attempts to assess whether these institutions are
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more or less adapted to the task of economic modernisation than similar
institutions in other countries.ll
Another version of the corporatist approach is Olson's work (1982,1990)
focusing on collective action and vested interests. Applying the analytical
tools of neoclassical economics, Olson analyses the impact of collective.
action by organised or collusive interests on economic performance.
According to him, the different rates of growth in different periods can be
understood only if one looks at "distributional coalitions", special interest
groups that havemanaged to institutionalise their private interests in the
power structure of the society at large. Most distributional coalitions are
harmful to efficiency and growth because they put barriers to the mobility
of resources greatly reducing the speed at which an economy can adapt to
changing demands and new technologies. The problematic nature of
organising collective action, especially for large groups, leads Olson to
expect that more groups will be organised the more time has passed. Thus,
distributional coalitions accumulate in stable societies with given boundaries
as time goes on.12
The third, the cZass approach (e.g. Leys 1989) to the study of long-term
development emphasises a more society-centred approach in contrast to the
state-'centred analyses of the corporatist approach. It focuses on the interests
of classes and the representation of these interests. Accordingly, shifts in
the balance of power between classes and between factions within classes
are held to be crucial for explaining the trajectory of industrialIsation.13
Notwithstanding their differences of emphasis, the culturalist, corporatist
and dass approaches share common analytical tools. Senghaas's (1985,
1988) and Menzel's (1988, 1992) work analysing the determinants of
divergent development paths in 19th-century peripheries can be interpreted
as an attempfto synthesise these three perspectives. The almost exdusive
endogenous emphasis that these approaches suggest is also consonant with
Senghaas's and Menzel's conclusions. Senghaas and Menzel reject the
priority given by the dependency approach to the wholly negative impact
of linkageswith the world economy in explaining the long-term
development trajectory. Their hypotheses form an ideal vantage point for
analysing the Turkish case not only because their focus coincides.,
temporally with the 19th and early 20th-century modernisation efforts of the
OttomanfTurkish state, but also because their analyses of cases of
successful world market -oriented development constitute a contrast to the
Turkish trajectory. For as we have suggested, the dominant mode of writing
on Ottomanfurkish social andeconomic history - the dependency tradition
- has always regarded the integration of Anatolia into the world economy
as being primarily responsible for Turkey' s underdevelopment. Content to
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regard nondeveloped parts of Europe as "semi-peripheral", this approach
has avoided the question of why some of the early 19th-century semi-
peripheral areas later became parts of the core and some, like Turkey, did
not. Senghaas and Menzel, on the other hand, through comparative analyses
of the 19th century peripheries, North America, Scandinavia, Eastern, and
Southern Europe - though not of Turkey - have found that, although
peripheralisation pressures were similar in all cases, some countries through
their association to the world market (e.g. Switzerland, Belgium,
Netherlands) and others through a combination of associative/disassociative
trade regimes (e.g. Scandinavian countries, Canada, Australia, New
Zealand) have managed to industrialise in the 19th and early 20th centuries.
Because of the centralIty of the so-called "long 19th century" in
Senghaas's and Menzel's analysis, it may be worthwhile to give this period
a closer inspection.
The "long 19th century" was initiated by the twin revolutions of the
English Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution and stretched
roughly from the 1780s to the 1910s. Its distinctive feature was the
enormous "pull" exerted by the rapid industrialisation in England and then
in otherparts of Western Europe on the "peripheral" economies. The major
factor in this relationship of attraction was the international trade. The
"core" of industrialised economies in Western Europe, in search of markets
for their manufactured goods and for cheap sources of raw materials and
foodstuffs, led an unprecedented increase in the international trade.
Between 1750 and 1913 world trade grew fifty-fold. Two-thirds of this
trade took place ainong the countries of Europe; thus, up to the end of the
19th century the "peripheralisation pressure" generated by the pull of the
industrialised core was strongest within Europe (Berend and Ranki 1982:21-
4).
The areas of the European periphery, the ring of regions surrounding the
core - Scandinavia, the Iberian Peninsula, the countries East of the Elbe,
the Balkans, and Anatolia - gavediffering responses to the challenge of the
Westeni'Core.These Tesponses led to the divergent outcomes of successful
and unsuccessful pathsof development in the European periphery. A
complex web of determinants ranging from the nature of external influences
to the intern al socioeconomic conditions played a role in setting the course
of these divergentpaths. Indeed, the change brought about by the English
industrialisation in the world economy context had a fundamental effect on
the nature of industrialisation prerequisites in the "late" industrial
developers. It was to express the centrality of such a combination of
external context and internal conditions in describing the development level
of a country that Gerschenkron devised the concept of "relative backward-
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ness". While the early industrialIsation in England had been a slow,
evolutionary process based on consumer-oriented industries, in late
developers the lead had to come from the heavy industry financed either by
the banks in moderately backward late industrialisers (e.g. Germany) or by
the state inextremely backward cases (e.g. Russia) (Gerschenkron 1962).
Moreover, the impuls es provided by the new international context were not
uniform in all parts of the periphery. While "the fundamentally similar
religious and cultural milIeu and geographical proximity facilitated the
spre ad of positive influences" in the form of the diffusion of technological
know-how and the transplantation of institutions in the immediate
peripheral Europe, these influences were more likely to be negative in the
far-flung peripheries (Berend and Ranki 1982:21).
Apart from the nature of these external influences, the later trajectory
of a peripheral economy was also contingent upon the character of the
socioeconomic conditions developed prior to the impact of the industrialised
core. The political and institutional framework, both prior to and
concomitant with the 19th century world economy context, had a decisive
effect on the ensuing development. While, what Amin has called the "auto-
centric" model of accumulation prevailed in the countries which eventually
constituted the successfulcases of development (e.g. the Scandinavian
countries), "dependent" reproduction came to prevail in the countries which
were unable to break off from their peripheral status in the 19th century
(e.g. the Balkan countries). Auto-centric reproduction in an economy was
characterised by-a balanced and mutually reinforcing growth between the
mass consumption goods sector and the means of production sector,
whereas productionof primary commodities for exports and luxury goods
for the consumption of high income groups was prevalent in dependent
reproduction.An auto-centric economy was characterised by "structural
homogeneity": pre-capitalist modes were eliminated by the capitalist mode
of production; levels of productivity, profit and wages, and patterns of work
organisation were equalised among different sectors of the t),conomy. In the
structurally heterogenous peripheral development, on the other hand, the
domestie market was very limited, linkages between agriculture and
industry were defective, there was no depth of production and demographie
developments were out of control (Amin 1972). While the peripheral
economy had a disarticulated character, auto-centric economies were highly
integrated. The disarticulated sectors in the periphery caried out only
marginal exchanges among themselves as the essential exchanges were
establIshed with the core economies.
Through various comparative case studies of auto-centric and peripheral
countries in Europe, Asia, and the Americas, Senghaas (1985) has worked
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out a list of variables explaining auto-centric development. These variables,
presented in Table 1.2, attempt to capture the causalities at work during the
"successful" or "unsuccessful" transitions from an export economy to an
integrated national economy. They also suggest a research strategy for
describing the impact of the Industrial Revolution on apotentially late
developing 19th century country, and the determinations involved in the
generation of a response to this challenge. In this study, we will try to
establish the nature of transformations in Anatolia by loosely following the
areas and variables in this list. The peculiarities of the Turkish development
path will provide us with some clues for an elaboration of the hypotheses
in Senghaas's analytical scheme.
Against Wallerstein's world-systems theory, Senghaas emphasises that
comparable world market positions can lead to both auto-centric and
dependent development. Steering away from monocausal explanations,
Senghaas' s scheme basically points towards multicausal determinations in
the generation of divergent development paths by examining the "different
in te rnal social conditions for the proeessing of the opportunities and
restrictions which the world market offered to the development process of
individual societies" (1985:155). This necessitates an "analysis of the socio-
structural and institutional factors which channelled decision-making into
different directions during critical phases of development" (1985:130,
emphasis in the original). Thus, whether societies suffer dependent
development or embark on auto-centric development depends on their
different social structures, and on the outcomes of the struggles between
different c1asses, sections of classes and the state. With its implicit rejectiön
of the inevitability of underdevelopment during conditions of world market
integration and its endogenous focus, Senghaas's framework approaches the
modernisation theory in the modernisation/dependency polarisation. But his
emphasis on peripheralisation pressures, internal distribution variables, and
socio-institutional deve10pment distances him from the neo-liberal variants
of modernisation theory.
In Senghaas' s scenario of auto-centric development, staple exports of the
enclave economygenerate strong linkages and lead to the consolidation of
the home market despite continuing world market integration. Among the
socio-institutional factors underpinning such a successful transition,
Senghaas gives causal priority to an egalitarian distribution profile - a
priority which, we will argue, needs further qualification in the lIght of the
Ottoman/Turkish trajectory. According to Senghaas's account, an equitable
distribution of income in agriculture - ultimately tied to an egalitarian land
distribution - and industry paves the way for a demand strcture oriented
23
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to mass consumer goods. The emergence of these socio-institutional
preconditions of auto-centric development is, in turn, tied to the outcome
of political and social mobilisation patterns. Most importantly, Senghaas
cites the centrality of successful defeudalisation in the emergence of a
development-promoting profile. During and after the nation-building phase,
strong peasant and worker movements !ead to the consolidation of
institutionalised conflict resolution systems. Clientelist and other vertical
patterns of integration - e.g. populism - in the party system, on the other
hand, impede such successful interest articulation and hamper the potential
developmentofmass demand. With respect to the nation-building process,
Senghaas argues that early national sovereignty allows national self-
determination in customs policies and control of resources. In this study we
will also emphasise the role of the cultural, ethnic and religious conflicts
of nation-building period - a second area in which the analysis of
Ottoman/Turkish development can complement Senghaas' s scheme. As we
shall argue, rather than being independent variables, the level of education,
the extent of literacy, the nature of the party system, and administrative
reform are related to the conflicts and "lateness" of nation-building whose
roots are anchored in endogenous (e.g. ethno-religious heterogeneity,
cultural institutions) as well as exogenous (e.g. the external structuring of
the state in the geopolitical arena) spheres.
1.3 About the method
This study situates itself within the historical sociology tradition. As Smith
(1991: 184) notes in his survey of the key works of this intellectual field,
historie al sociology draws out similarities and differences between societies
across time and space, traces long-term processes, seeks out causes and
pursuing effects and indicates the way people shape and are shaped by the
institutions. The report does not, however, use an exhaustive comparative
method. Instead, it tries to strike a balanee between the comparative method
and the method of historical narrative. My reservations against a "pure"
comparative methodology is not the historicist objection that every case is
unique. Though this is true, it does not preclude comparison. Rather,
reiterating a point made by Mann (1986a: 173-4), I think that "comparative
analysis should also be historieal; each case develops temporally, and this
dynamic must itself be part of our explanation of its structure" (emphasis
in the original). That I have relied more heavily on historical narrative and
limited comparative remarks to illustrate particular points is not due to a
rejection of comparative method on epistemological grounds. Rather, the
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practical difficulty in finding full analogies to the OttomanfTurkish
developmentpattern has dictated a pragmatic turn to historie al narrative.14
The analysis presented here may be considered as an hybrid of a
hypothesis-testing and hypothesis-generating case study which starts out
with an initial notion of a possible set of hypotheses developed through
comparative studies - Senghaas' s lIst of variables - about the determinants
of the outcome of late industrialisation attempts 'and proceeds to use these
hypotheses in the narration of the development history of a "crucial case".
The qualIfications brought by the study of Turkey to the original set of
hypotheses are discussed in the final chapter.
There are important specificities of the Ottoman/Turkish case which
warrant its status as a "crucial case" for the testing of our initial
hypotheses, and for the possible generation of new ones. The two most
important are the absenee of large-scale ownership in the agrarian structure
and the expulsion of a majority of the Christian bourgeoisie during and
after the First World War (Keyder 1987:2). The egalitarian agricultural
structure, as it will be argued, resulted in the autonomy of state bureaucracy
from landed c1asses and also inhibited a convergence of the interests of
foreign capital and domestic agrarian classes. The state power,thus
enhanced, on the one hand prevented the colonisation of the Empire, and
on the other handchannelled the otherwise investable agricultural surplus
to the unproductive sphere of military territorial defence. The ethnic
dislocations of the Turkish nation-building process, the second crucial
feature of the Turkish trajectory, had a similar contradictory effect. In
Hirschmann's (1970) terminology, the "exit" of the Greek and Armenian
bourgeoisie from the stage during the 1914-24 period sharpened the state
bureaucracy' s resôlve to rapidly industrialise, but the diversion of the
reaIIsation åf "voice" options from institutionalised representations of
interests to particularistic domains hampered the infrastructural powers of
the state bureaucracy, and obstructed the success of the late industrialisation
attempt.
During the course of the narrative I have made comparative references
to other cases by extracting certain elements of the Ottoman/Turkish
development from their social and temporal matrices, and by looking at
how they have operated in different environments. These comparative
referenceshave often be en made to different points in time. In making the
contextualising comparisons I have assumed that there is no uniform
temporal medium and that the times of societies' development are
enormously diverse (cf. Tilly 1993). In this respect, it may be more
informative to compare 19th-century Ottoman agriculture with 17th-century
French and East European agriculture; early 20th-century Turkish nation-
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building with 19th-century European nation-building processes or with mid-
19th-century Japanese Meiji Restoration; and Turkish étatisme in the 1930s
with the German late industrialisation in the 19th century or with the
dirigisme of South East Asian states in the 1960s. Although the dates in
these comparisons may be different, the times may be similar (cf. the
comparative approach in Anderson 1974).
The theoretical framework adopted in the historical exposition of the
dynamics of the Ottoman/Turkish development trajectory attempts to
advocate a delicate balance between the perils of determinism on the one
side and voluntarism on the other; it allows an element of choice to the
political actors albeit within situational constraints. In looking for periods
of relatively stable social reproduction in an attempt to make a periodisation
of development trajectories, our method assumes that each of these periods
is characterised by what may be called a model of development which is
constituted, in general terms, by a complex interplay between economic
structure, and the politico-institutional framework which is dependent on
class structureand pattern of political mobilIsation. In addition to these
internal determinants, a country' s model of development is also assumed
to be contingent upon the effect of the external constraints originating from
world politics and economy (cf. the economic policy model in Mjøset
1987).
In explaining the evolutionary dynamics of the model of development
composed of the interdependent sub-systems of economy, polit y,
institutions, class structure and political organisation forms, both determinist
and functionalist variants of systems theory are avoided. Thus, the
theoretical framework utilIsed here recognises that certain historie al
situations are open and that their resolution is contingent upon the outcome
of social coriflicts which determine the future of a mode! of development.
Once a model of development is established, some of its constitutive
relations become functional; but these functional relations can easily be
weakened as the alliances, compromises or hegemonies which they are built
on are undermined. The stabilisation of a new model of development
depends upon the outcome of social conflicts and the institutionalisation of
new compromises or hegemonies. Thus, the outcome of the crisis periods
heralding the end of a model of development are historically open (Mjøset
1991: 316-17). The determination of these historically open periods, the
crossroads of social development, is an essential element in the
periodisation of the development trajectory of a society.
An undeniable feature of the transition period is the predominance of
crisis symptoms. In this context, the study of the transition between the two
development models requires probing the mechanisms and politics of crisis
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resolution. The study of the crisis periods in a society' s evolution and the
periodisation achieved through this study is a valuable tool in the in-depth
analysis of each of these periods. The study of key events marking the
beginning or end of crisis periods becomes indispensable in this context.
Events as they are eventuated from the past and as signifiers for the future,
constitute a "prism through which social structure and process may be
seen" (Abrams 1982:191-2). The significant events which will guide our
periodisation as markers of transition are the 1839 inauguration of Tanzimat
reforms in the aftermath of the Free Trade Treaty with England, the 1908
Y oung Turk nationalist putsch, and the 1929 initiation of étatiste
industrialisation.
The methods used in studying the emergence and resolution of crisis
periods also present some clues for pro bing the mechanisms at work during
periods of "normal" social reproduction. Adopting a more interpretive and
less deterministic approach while also attempting to avoid simple
subjectivism or voluntarism, it can be asserted that crises are not merely
"objective" phenomena; they are also "subjective" historical processes - a
time of decision for social actors present (O'Connor 1987:3). In this sense,
contrary to the c1aims of neo-lIberal arguments regarding market
mechanisms as autonomous forces which can be brought to crises through
"excessive" intervention of the state or the contending organisations of
societal groups, I will argue for a non-reductionist approach which
emphasises that economic, social, political and cultural crises overlap and
are not reducible to one another.
Such an approach represents a thrust against the arguments of the
neoc1assical institutionalist tradition. Rational choice theory, through
importing the equilibrium conditions in neoclassical economic theory to
sociology, basically views social change as an unintended consequence of
the interplay between the actions of numerous interests groups (Olson
1990). Thus, neoclassical institutionalism interprets the rigidities in societal
development as resulting from disruptions in the rational choice framework.
The classical institutionalist tradition inspired by Weber, Veblen and
Polanyi, on the other hand, interprets the emergence of the rational choice
context or market rationalIty as being dependent upon the conflicts between
collective actors on the basis of their special and general interests (Mjøset
1991:52-77).
In the classical institutionalist tradition, institutions are depicted as
regulative principles which organise the activities of individuals or
collective actors. They comprise laws, rules as well as common value
systems and representations of realIty which impose certain types of
behaviour on groups and individuals through direct or symbolic coercion
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(Boyer 1990:44-5). Thus, the classical tradition does not exclude power and
legitimation struggles since institutions also signal established power
relations and compromises between collectivities (Johnson and Lundvall
1989:93).
A central weakness of neoclassical approaches in comparison to classical
institutionalist analyses becomes their reluctance to differentiate between
fundamental conflicts of interests and innumerable special interests. As it
is pointed out by Mjøset, the problem of identifying the critical subjects
who present their particular special interests as general interests to the
society does not arise in the neoclassical paradigm (1991: 314-15). The
approach used here, by contrast, leaves the pure rational choice model
focusing on a pluralistic concept of special interests and attempts to identify
the role of critical collective actors which aspire to put forward their special
interests as legitimate general interests at the societallevel. With respect to
the study of social change, this implies an action theory whereby individual
and collective actors are not only driven by special interests and rational
choice contexts but also by legitimation struggles.
The application of such a normative perspective on social action to the
study of societal development is especially relevant when we consider the
resolution of crises in historically open situations. Once the crisis is
resolved, the reduction of the choice possibilities makes the analysis more
suitable for rational choice approaches (Mjøset 1991 :316). The rational
choice model is, thus, historically limited to periods of "normal" social
reproduction delimited in time by periods of crises.15 By contrast, within the
crises periods themselves, social actors' use of symbols, representational
practices, and legitimation attempts come to the forefront. In studying the
emergence of Turkish nationalism and the state-building phase of the
Turkish Republic (the central crisis period used in the periodisation of the
Turkish development trajectory) I will employ this normative action theory
perspective. I will identify the state bureaucracy as the critical subject
linking the reformism of the 19th century Ottoman and the early 20th
centuryRepublIcan period. The struggle of the bureaucracy to legitimise its
interests and the effects of this project to the outcome of industrialisation
attempt will constitute the main thrust of the argument.
The perspective of the classical institutionalist tradition adopted here is
an attempt to introduce sociological action theory to economics and thereby
to resist the theories which import unqualIfiedly neoclassical economic
axioms to sociology. Polanyi's (1957) distrust of the self-regulating
potential of the market applies to the fin-de-siècle capitalism of the last
quarter of the 20th century characterised by deregulation and reign of the
"free market" as it did to the 19th century liberalism. The rhetoric of the
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free market devoid of any theorisation with respect to its institutional
underpinnings cloaks the power relations and legitimation struggles
permeating societal reproduction. As it is convincingly pointed out by
Jameson (1991), the fundamentalIevel on which political struggle is waged
is that of the struggle over the legitimacy of the concepts, and the rhetoric
of themarket has been a central component of this struggle.16
The theoretical framework applied in this studyaspires to answer the
need expressed by Habermas for a new theory of the interaction between
economics, politics and culture (1986:65). By resisting the segregation of
social science disciplines in academia, it attempts to study society in its
"totality" and thereby combine the two major paradigms in sociology ~
action theory and systems theory. The implIcations of such an attempt to
combine "objective" and "subjective" methods become evident especially
in the analysis of the crisis period - the 1908-29 nation-building phase -
dividing the two major periods constituting two distinct models of
development - the 19th century and the 1930-46 one-party rule. Thus,
although the study of Turkish industrialisation is of primary interest, the
analysis of the actions of the foremost actor of this industrialisation attempt,
the state bureaucracy, is indispensable. For the same reason, the resolution
of the crisis of the Ottoman system and the integration of Turkish society
in the nation-building phase through the nationalist, secular and
modernising project of the state bureaucracy forms a point of departure for
the analysis of pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, the 19th century and the
1930-46 period respectively. Jf the order of exposition does not follow the
order of analysis it is because of the need for a chronological narrative.
The crisis dividing the late Ottoman and early Republican periods can not
be studied in economic terms alone as a crisis of industrialisation, of capital
accumulation pattern, or as a crisis of what Habermas calls "economic-
system integration"(integration of system functions into one another). Nor
can the evolutionary dynamics in the 19th century and the 1930-46 period
be analysed without incorporating the elements of action theory, or in
Habermas's terminology, problems of "social integration" (normative
integration of individuals in particular system functions and economic and
social roles). 17 In other words, the Ottoman/Turkish bureaucracy' s
modernising actions extending from the mid-19th to the mid-20th centuries
can not be. analysed in instrumental terms related to economic or territorial
control alone. The communicative and normative context of the
bureaucracy' s attempts to spread Turkish vernacular language andto make
sense of and overcome the crisis of the Ottoman system by creating a new
context of meaning for itself through Westernising, secular and nationalist
reforms must also be considered. As we will see in the analysis of the
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1930s and 1940s, this normative element - the state bureaucracy's
nationalist ideology - throughattempting to "colonise" the "life-world"
represented by popular Islam, eventually impeded social integration in the
nation-state, and became dysfunctional thereby leading to the demise of the
economic-system integration of state industrialisation.
It must bereiterated that the analysis of the 1908-29 crisis period serves
a heuristic purpose here; for it is plausible to argue that the bureaucracy did
not resolve the crisis at the level of social integration although it secured
economic-system integration. The hegemony of the bureaucracy' s
nationalist, secularandWesternising ideology was contested throughoutthe
period under study and oppositional social forces gained ground following
the 1950 transition to multiparty democracy. However, probing the
bureaucracy' s hegemonic projectin the nation-building phase provides
valuable insights with respect to its nascent forms in the 19th century, and
its developed state in the 1930-46 period. Moreover, the multifaceted
determinants of industrialisation, which we will discuss from the
perspective of Senghaas's auto-centric/dependent development dichotomy,
warant an analysis which incorporates different theoretical approaches
borrowed from different disciplines. The spillovereffects of a normative
perspective on the analysis of Turkish nationalismto the study of
industrialisation from the early 19th century to 1946 necessitated a wider
reading and use of theories from diverse disciplines. Hopefully, the ensuing
analysis was a synthesis rather than a syncretism.
Notes
1. Analyses produced from the world-system perspective have conflcting claims about the
periodisation of the Ottoman Empire's integration with the world-economy. While Islamoglu
and Keyder (1977) date it from 1600, Wallerstein (1980) and Kasaba (1988b) seem to
emphasise 1750. In a balanced assessment Wallerstein, Decdeli and Kasaba (1987:96) state
that "though the actual emergence of a peripheral structure can not be said to be complete
before the end of the 19th century,the process of incorporation clearly occurred earlier".
2. The application of state/civil society, centre/periphery dichotomies to the Ottoman Empire
and Turkey originated with Mardin (1969b, 1973). For an elaboration of these views and their
. applications to the politics of the 1980s, see thecontributionsin Heper and Evin eds. 1988.
Critics of the modernisation approach, too, adhere to this interpretation by replacing the
state/civil society opposition with the opposition between bureaucracy and bourgeoisie
(Keyder 1987, Schick and Tonak eds. 1987). Thus, Keyder (1987:Chapter 9) sees the post-
1980 period as the culmination of the long-term "impossible rise of the bourgeoisie".
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3. Islamoglu-Inan (1987b) amply demonstrates the Orientalist discourse at the rootof the
notions of "despotism", "Asiatic Mode of Production", "patrimonialism" and,"weak civil
society versus strong state". According to her formulation, this discourse is premised on an
essential oppositionality in the historical developments of the "East" and the "West", and
embodies a Western self-definition that requires conceptualising the "Other" (the East) as its
opposite whereby the history of the East becomes that of the West in negation (cf. Said
1979). For the centrality of "the Turk", and "Ottoman Empire" in the construetion of
European identity from the 14th century onwards, see also Neumann and Welsh 1990.
4. Hann (1990:56-71), rather than seeing the ostensible liberalisation of the 1980s as the
defeat and gradual reduction of the realm of the powerful state which prevented the
development of institutions of civil society, contends that the Turkish state has been "soft"
in the last few decades. He coins the term "domestication of the state" to describe the ways
in which the state has become part of everyday reality and penetrated into the li fe of its
citizens and the success with which societal pressure groups influence state policy and defend
theifinterests. From this perspective, the problem of the contemporar Turkish state is not
that it is overly "powerful" but rather that it is too "weak": it can not set up the institutional
framework within which particularistic demands can be successfully resisted and lasting
bargains struck (cf. Keyder 1992a).
5. Slightly transforming the argument Žižek (1991:13, 38) has made in another context, this
approach corresponds to the transcendence of the duality between "West" and "East" or
"developed" and "developing" societies througha double-reflection - i.e. negating their
fundamental oppositionality and applying similar analytical devices to the study of
"developed" and "developing" countries alike. For in Lacanian terms, the very identity of
"developed society" is constituted by reference to "developing society", not only in the sense
of a simpledifferential opposition whereby an identity can assert itself on ly via its differenee
to its Other, but in a far more radical way. The identity of the developed society is in itself
always-already impossible, "antagonistic" - i.e. with divisions related to dass, ethnicity,
gender or race - and the Other is nothing but an outside-projection, an embodiment of its own
inherited antagonism. In this light, applying the theoretical apparatuses usually employed in
the analysis of advanced countries to the study of developing ones means achieving, what
Žižek calls a double reflection: neither what the First World immediately sees in the Third
World - modernisation theory - nor the waythe Third World sees the First -- the viewpoint
of the Persian ambassador in Montesquieu's Persian Letters - but the way the First World
sees the Third World seeing itself Thus, unlike the attempts which project the future of the
Third World based on the past of the First World, this alternative conception is based on the
assumption that the processes in the First and Third W orlds are "sufficiently similar to make
combined analysis essential to arrive at a valid theoretical understanding of what is going on
in either" (Evans and Stephens 1988:748). With respect to the transcendence of East and West
oppositionality, this does not mean,however, that I wil use theconceptof "feudalism"-a
term generally used to describe European pre-capitalist social formations - for the Ottoman
system. Neither wil I use the concept of AMP whose theoretical inadequacy and empirical
inaccuracy is convincingly demonstrated in Anderson 1974. War of its Orientalist
connotation, nevertheless being aware of the futility of seeking a "neutral" descriptive
language in social sciences, I wil retain the Weberian concept of patrimonialism in the course
of developing the narrative as a comparative backdrop to the development patterns in Europe.
6. Combining both institutional and functional elements, pertaining to the appearance of state
apparatuses as well as their functions, Mann (1986a:37) defines the state as a set of
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institutions and personneI, concentrated spatially at a single point, and exerting authority over
a territorially distinct area. In Mann's reformulation of Weber~s definition: "the state is a
differentiated set of institutions and personneI embodying centrality, in the sense that political
relations radiate outward to cover a territorially demarcated area, over which it claims a
monopoly of binding and permanent rule-making, backed up by physical violence."
7. The term "bourgeois revolution", usually utilsed in Marxist historiography to theorise the
nation-building processes, is not adopted here because of its conceptual unclarity and class-
reductionist connotations. Indeed, as we shall see in the case of the Turkish transition from
an imperial state structure to a capitalist nation-state, the state bureaucracy, the primary
subject behind the implementation of the nation-building process, neither represented nor
acted in the interests of a particular class. Rather, the specific circumstances of Turkish
nation-building - most importantly the predominance of non-Muslims in the Ottoman
bourgeoisie, the existence of ethnic and religious conflcts in the nation-building phase - and
the prior evolution of the Ottoman state and society enhanced the class-aloofness of the state
bureaucracy. The consequence of this process, the eventual formation of a capitalist natioÎ1-
state in the post-Second World War period does not warrant the use of the bourgeois
revolution concept. Moreover, the term bourgeois revolution suggests an abrupt
transformation resulting in a modern capitalist nation-state; this process, however, is in fact
rather long-drawn. In recent Marxist writing this deficiency is acknowledged and a conceptual
clarification rather than an ad hoc usage of the term is suggested (Anderson 1992a:8 and
Evans 1985:74). In an elaboration along these lines, Anderson (1987:47-8) notes that the
notion of bourgeois revolution can neither be confined to a single episode nor made coeval
with a continuous evolutionary process. The fact that the state and nation-building concepts
have traditionally been used by modernisation theorists has resulted in dependency theorists'
shying away from this conceptual pair. The outcome has been an undermining of the effects
of normative contexts - e.g. nationalist sentiment - in the analysis of development patterns.
A notable example in this regard is the attempt to find an economic rationality for the actions
of státe bureaucracy in the Turkish Revolution between 1908 and 1923 through assigning a
dominant class position to the bureaucracy in AMP (Keyder 1987, 1988). For all its empirical
nuances and important insights, the negligence of non-instrumental action in the construction
of the nationalist project of the state bureaucracy leaves an important theoretical lacuna in
Keyder' s work.
8. This was first recognised by Veblen (1915) when he coined the term "the advantages of
backwardness". Re stated that the methods of modernisation chosen in one country change
the dimensions of the problem for the following countries. An elaboration of this perspective
with respect to late industrialisation was provided later by Gerschenkron (1962).
9. Gamble (1990:78-86) uses a similar categorisation in his review of the literature on the
determinants of British industrial decline in the 20th century .
10. In arecent version of this culturalist approach Weiner (1981) identifies an anti-industrial
and anti-enterprise culture as the fundamental cause of Britain's problems. In an early version,
again with respect to the industrial decline in the UK in the latter half of 20th century,
Anderson (1964) offered an account of British history which emphasised the role of ideology,
and the failure of the rising industrial bourgeoisie ever to supplantthe ideology and
institutions of the aristocracy; instead they were co-opted into the aristocrats' world and
Britain never experienced a thoroughgoing modernisation of the kind experienced by other
European countries.
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11. In arecent example of this corporatist approach emphasising the role of institutions, Hall
(1986) diagnoses British corporatist weakness as the lack of integration between the industrial
and financial sectors. The examples cited are the Treasury-Bank-City nexus which was more
influential in determining economic policy priorities than manufacturing industry and
organised labour; poor industrial and poor management, as shown by strikes, restrictive
practices and low productivity; the character and st yle of state intervention in Britain. In yet
another example, contrasting British experience with other countries, Anderson (1987:73-4)
lists four different national models of development, all of which have exhibitedwhat he calls
a "regulative intelligence". The four types of regulative intelligence identified are (1) the state
technocracy in France; (2) the banking system in Germany; (3) the combination of
interventionist bureaucracy and banking system in Japan; (4) the organised labour movement
in Sweden.
12. In the light of this argumentation, Olson explains the post-World War Il rapid growth of
West Germany, Japan, Italy, and France by the fact that war-time governments did away with
most independent organisations. Conversely, he explains the slow growth rate of certain
industries in the United States by their outmoded and cartelised nature, and he attributes the
decline of the British economy to the mostly intact nature of distributional coalitions in the
British society. For the case of British decline, for example, the two principal distributional
coalitions are the financial and commercial interests of the City-Bank of England- Treasury
nexus and the military-imperial connection (Olson 1990:95-8). Olson's account of the
determinants of industri al decline emanating from a plurality of special interests organised in
distributional coalitions has its roots in his neo-liberal convictions. Olson sees the major cause
of economic decline as due to encroachments on the market from organised special interests
intent on violating its competitive laws, whose untrammelled operation alone can assure
national dyhamism. Anderson, whose classical institutionalist position we share regards
Olson's account as empirically naive (Japan is treated as an example of the success of free
market principles) and logically inconsistent (Olson's only remedy against decline induced
by toa much state intervention is more state intervention - the complete liquidation of all
special interests by the state) (Anderson 1987:74). Anderson, on the other hand, while
accounting for Britain' s industri al decline emphasises the institutional rigidities and sclerosis
resulting from the aristocratic tone and origins of the British state continuing its course
without any considerable institutional alteration for more than three centuries ("no gale of
creative destruction has blow n through the creaking political timbers of the United Kingdom"
(Anderson 1987:48)) and from its early industrialisation. With respect to the latter, using
Dahmén's (1970) concept of "development blocs" - associated chains of fixed investment
subsequently becoming blocks to further development due to their interconnectedness which
imposes fetters on movement into newer technologies and industries - Anderson notes that
"the first country tomechanise textiles and build railways, Britain generated development
blocs of inter-related capital investment around them, which then took on a massive historical'
inertia" (Anderson 1987:72).
13. The most well-known application of the class approach to British decline is the Anderson-
Nairn thesis (Anderson 1964). It argues that the British bourgeois revolution was premature
and therefore unfinished, and the consequences of this were the creation of legacies which
were eventually to become crucial handicaps for the British economy in competition with
economies whose modernisation had been later and more radicaL. The general lon g historical
perspective of Anderson and Nairn's approach was later supplanted by the more detailed
research of Leys (1989) and Ingham (1984). This later research placed more emphasis on the
social andeconomic peculiarities of Britain rather than on its ideological features. Other
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versions of the dass thesis have contested some of the results of Anderson-Nairn thesis. One
of these places much greater emphasis on the defensive abilty, of the British working dass
to resist the pressures from capital for rationalisation and higher productivity. The labourism
of the British trade union movement, instead of being a symptom of the incorporation of the
labour movement into the British anden régime, reflects the stalemate between capital and
labour in Britain, whichneither side was powerful enough to break (Glynand Scuttdiffe
1972). The sec ond alternative account (Barratt-Brown 1988) disputes the significance and the
extent of the split between industryand the ,City pointed out by Ingham (1984). The
international orientation of the British capital is given explanatory .priority and this orientation
is explained not by the ascendency of finance over industry but by greater profit opportunities
outside Britain than within it.
14. For a similar approach see Mann 1986a. For an exposition of his methodological premises
see 1986a:503. Arecent review of methodological debates in historical sociology is provided
in Kazancigil ed. 1992. Burawoy (1991) and McMichael (1992) have criticised rigorous
comparative approaches (e.g. Skocpol and Somers 1980) on epistemological grounds. Their
critique is basically directed against the assumption of a relative uniformity of cases which
abstracts events and their "variables" from their temporal and spatial settings.
15. For an alternative approach which makes use of rational choice ide as in the study of
revolutions see the contributions in Taylor ed. 1988.
16. According to Jameson (1991:263-78), the slogan of the market and all its accompanying
rhetoric was devised to secure a decisive shift from the conceptuality of production to that
of distribution and consumption. In his opinion, no free market exists today in the realm of
oligopolies and multinationals. In view of many neo-liberals, moreover, not only do we not
yet have a free market but what we have in its place - namely a mutual compromise and
buying off of pressure groups, special interests - is in itself a structure absolutely inimical
to the real free market. "Market" , thus, turns out to be as utopian as socialism has recently
been held to be.
17. Habermas questions the basic axiom of Marx's historical materialism which locates the
structure and dynamics of societies in the antagonisms rooted in the sphere of production.
Through his critique of the "epistemological dominance of labour" within Marxism, he sees
the dynamics of societies in the collision between the "sub-systems of purposive-rational
action" mediated by money and power on the one hand, and a symbolically structured "life-
world" constituted by "communicative action" spheres directed towards reaching
understanding that resists these systems, on the other hand (Habermas 1984). In this
alternative theorisation, the concepts of "forms of life" replaces the concept of "mode of
production" and "communicative action" the concept of "purposive-rational action". In his
theory of social evolution, Habermas connects societal reproduction with instrumental action
on the one hand, and language and communication with the competent use of normative rules
on the other.
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2. The Ottoman Empire until the end of
the 18th century
2.1 The classical period: From the 14th to the 16th centuries
The Ottoman Sultanate was established by the Turkic nomads who migrated
to Anatolia from Central Asia.1 Between the 11th and 13th centuries,
succes sive migration waves of Tureoman nomads caused profound changes
in the social fabric of Anatolian societies. With the collapse of the
Byzantine rule, Greek, Armenian, Kurdish spe aking population groups
increasingly came under the rule of petty emirates dominated by Turkic
wariors and pastoralists.2 It was not until the beginning of 14th century
that the Ottoman Sultanate emerged out of this demographic and political
confusion and gradually became the dominant power. When it reached the
apogee of its power at the end of the 16th century following three centuries
of continuous expansion, the territories of the Empire inc1uded Anatolia,
Middle East and the Balkans.
Between 1300 and 1600, the inexorable advanee of the Ottoman Empire
vis-à- vis the European Empires and the Anatolian and Middle Eastern
Muslim states deri ved from its effective military and administrative
structure (inalc1k 1973). Characteristic features of the Ottoman state during
this period were itspatrimonialism and its redistributive-tributary mode of
integration.3 The population was divided into the Osmanli ruling class and
the reaya subject class whether Muslim or non-Muslim. The reaya
comprised the peasants, which constituted its majority, craftsmen and
merchants. The ruling class was composed of a hierarchically organised
bureaucracy with the Grand Vizier at its apex. Governor generals (beyler
beys), military rulers of the districts (sancak beys), judges (kadis),
theologians (ulema) and Muslim cavalry (sipahis) were ultimately under the
command of the Palace. The higher ranks of the imperial bureaucracy, from
the supreme office of Grand Vizier downwards through the ranks of
provincial sancak beys and the janissary elite infantry were recruited
through the devsirme levy. Through this system, war prisoners and male
children of the Christian subject population taken from their parents were
reared as Muslims and trained for posts of command in the army or
administration.
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The Ottoman agricultural relations of production were based on the timar
system, a derivative of the former Byzantine'themata system in Anatolia
(Anderson 1978:268-9). The vast majority of land belonged to the Sultan
and as such there could be no stable, hereditarynobility within the Empire.
The Sultan's land was divided into landed estates or timars and were
allocatedtoMuslim mounted soldiers. The peasants were required to pay
a tithe, the traditional product tax ofösr, to these soldiertimar..holders,or
sipahis. The prebendal sipahi cavalry used the revenue they drew from the
peasants in the timär to sustain troops and thus provided military service
to the central state. Sipahis represented the nearest analogy to a knight class
within the Ottoman Empire; but the timar estates were not genuine fiefs of
the kind found in European feudalism. Sipahis did not exercise any feudal
lordship over the peasants who worked in the timars (Anderson 1974:369).
Their ability to alter the use of land, to evict peasants, or to increase
production was strictly controlled by the higher lev el representatives of the
central authority, sancak beys and kadis (W allers tein, Decdeli and Kasaba
1987:89). Although the peasants had hereditary tenure on the plots they
tilled, sipahis did not. In order to eliminate the emergence of power centres
of potential centrifugal forces, the central bureaucracy systematically
reshuffled the timars. 4
Control of the bureaucracy in the political and economic spheres was
reinforced by Teligious ideology. The Ulema theologians performed the
essential ideological and jural tasks related to the perpetuation of this
ideological domination. The Ulema, the stratum of clergies organised in a
religious hierarchy and educated in medreses, provided the key judicial and
civil personneI of the state apparatus, most notably kadis. At the apex of
this hierarchy was Seyhülislam, a supreme religious authority who could,
on occasion, even block the initiatives of the Palace by invoking the tenets
of the sacred law of Seriat of which it had the monopoly of interpretation
(Anderson 1974:369-70).
The milItary and administrative efficacy of the Ottoman state towards the
end of the 16th century was accompanied by a flourishing Anatolian
economy. In relative tranquillity away from the Ottoman expansion zone,
the Anatolian population and agricultural production increased with the
accelerating sedantarisation of nomadic tribes. Growth of intraregional,
interregional, and international trade resulted in commercial prosperity
which, in turn, led to an upswing of urban growth.
In urban manufacturing centres, industrial crafts were governed by a
guilds system where production was in strict conformity with the norms set
by the state. The buying ofraw materials, methods of production, and profit
margins of craftsmen were subject to a strict code of regulations (hisba).
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There was much differentiation within these guilds; the most pronounced
distinction was between the guildmasters owningmuch of the investments,
and journeymen and workmen employed by these masters. Newly trained
workmen were unable to open "independent" shops for themselves. The
established masters fought bitterly against the "rebeIs" who opened shops
without a license or stimulated demand by produeing new types of wares.
On the grounds that these rebels were infringing the hisba Tegulations, they
would try to bring government action against them. By and large, the state
did intervene to support the claims of the .established masters (ina1c1k
1969: 117). However, the same hisba regulations which perpetuated this
differentiation within the guild structure, also effectively prevented capital
accumulation by the guild masters.
Both interregional and international trade, far from supplying only luxury
goods, provided the large cities with their essential food and raw materials.
Because of the essential function of trade for the provisioning of large
urban populations, the Ottoman state imposed controls on the activities of
the merchants. Though not as strict as hisba, these controls aimed to
prevent profiteering and speculation in essential commodities. Moreover,
although the judicial framework permitted the use of capital for investment
and taking of interest and various forms of credit were widespread, the
Ottoman state limited the opportunities for accumulation. The merchant
class remained an indispensable but subordinate ally to the state; merchants
made loans to the state and generated steady revenues for its treasury
through customs charges, but their accumulations were never immune
against the confiscatory actions of the state. 5
Thus, in spite of a lively trade in spices, silks, cotton, slaves, timber,
iron, copper and urban manufacturing of silks and cotton textiles for
exports, even in the flourishing manufacturing and trade centres of istanbul,
Bursa and Edirne in 16th-century Anatolia, the fortunes of guildmasters,
money changers, usurers and merchants rarely exceeded those of the higher
members of the military class, beyler beys, and sancak beys. Just as the
guildmasters' accumulation could not compare with those of the money
changers and merchants, with the exception of a few wealthy families of
istanbul, the wealth of the merchants in the Empire remained modest in
comparison with those of the military bureaucracy whose incomes came
from the timar-estates (ina1c1k 1969: 119- 3 2). However, the fortunes of the
military dass, too, were exposed to confiscation by the state, because there
was no legal principle permitting individuals' rights to private property.6
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2.2 The decentralisation period: the 17th and 18th centuries
That the pillar of the strength of the Ottoman state was its perpetual
military conquests at the expense of commercial and manufacturing vitality
within its borders was to have grave consequences in its further evolution
from the 17th century onwards. The exhaustion of its expansion potential
in the East and the West at the end of the 16th century had a series of
repercussions within the Empire. Once the seizure of more and more lands
as timars ceased, state revenues became insufficient. The crisis of the state
was further aggravated by the Price Revolution of the 16th centurywhich
was created by the influx of American bullion to Europe. The Ottoman
state' s military expenses grew due to the economic and the military
supremacy of the European absolutist states.
With the decline of its international supremacy, the Empire lost its grip
over, trade. The entry of English, French and Dutch into the Indian Ocean
and Levant trade from the 17th century onwards led to the disruption of its
trade routes. This resulted in a significant loss of revenue for the state in
the form of customs duties from transit trade and the decline of trading and
manufacturing urban centres in AnatolIa (islamoglu and Keyder 1987:51).
Merchants increasingly managed to escape from the loosening administra-
tive controls of the state and preferred to sell the commodities in more
profitable markets. Though still not free from immanent confiscations, they
became more and more independent of state' s concessions and control of
the destination of commodities.
The resultant revenue squeeze of the state inevitably led to a much more
intensive exploitation of the subject reaya class and thus added to the
dislocating effects of the Celali peasant unrest of the 17th century. The
Celali rebellions signalled the beginning of a new period which stretched
until the early 19th century. This period was characterised by the
disintegration of the central imperial state. The Timar system was gradually
replaced by tax - farming (iltizam) and a provinciallandowning class of tax-
farmers (mültezim) was consolidated. Through the new tax-farming system,
highest bidding tax-farmers obtained the right to collect the traditional
agricultural tax of ösr from peasants tilling the imperialIands and former
timar land. The decline of timar as a relation of production in the Anatolian
countryside was related both to the revenue generation attempts of the
Ottoman state through the implementation of tax-farming and to changes
in rñlitary technology. By the end of the 16th century, new fighting
techniques, the development of new firearms, muskets and improved
fortifications shifted the basis of military power from cavalry to infantry
(Barkey 1991:711).
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As the timar holding sipahi cavalry fell into disuse, the state expanded
the size of its companies of paid musketeers (sekban units) and janissary
infantry. The population pressure generated by a 50 to 70 per cent
population growth in the 16th century facilitated the peasants' joining the
army under conditions of economic strife. The swelled ranks of the army
further exacerbated the revenue crisis of the state. The state of flux between
the timar system and iltizam, the decline in the power of sipahis, and the
steep increase in the number of sekban units and janissaries set the stage
for the Celali rebellions. Although these outbreaks were instigated by
companies of demobilised soldier-brigands who wanted territory to control
and tax rather than by peasants on land (Barkey 1991), their popular
following reflected the opposition of the peasantry against further
degradation. When the outbreaks ended in the second half of the 17th
century, through fierce repression and cooptation of its military leaders, a
significant worsening in the conditions of peasants was affected (Yetkin
1984: 141-68).7
The powerful increase in the numbers of janissary corps led to the
dissolution of the Janissary's devsirme identity. While they were insulated
from the rest of the Osmanli ruling class through the devsirme levy in the
classical period, they were now recruited through native MuslIms. From
the mid-17th century onwards, with the end of the devsirme levy,
janissaries increasingly became vast bodies of semi- or untrained urban
militia, many of whom no longer resided in barracks but in their workshops
as petty traders and artisans. Theirintegration into the social structuremade
them a political force to be reckoned with in the palace intrigues.
Dethronement of Sultans through janissary mutinies became commonplace
in istanbul politicallife (Anderson 1974:381-2).
Amid territoriallosses and fiscal crisis, the administrative structure of the
central state deteriorated. With the decline of the meritocratic devsirme
system, bureaucratic offices became objects of sale, and ayans became the
prominent feature of Anatolian provincial society. Enforced with their own
janissaries, these local magnates acquired control of whole territories and
accumulated estates. They represented a new class of notables who were
authorised to collect taxes and initiated a "feudalisation" tendency within
the Empire in the 17th and 18th centuries. As a new urban stratum
autonomous from the state, they assumed a prominent role in the civil
society, and opposed the centralisation efforts of the Ottoman state.
Just as the timar system had corresponded to the strong central
administrative apparatus of the Ottoman state, the decentralisation of the
state found its reflection in the proliferation of tax-farming - iltizam system
- in the sphere of agricultural relations of production. Tax-farmers came
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from diverse groups, among them were urban merchants, ayans, janissaries,
ulema,or members of higher levels of bureaucracy. In contrast to the timar
holders, tax-farmers had considerable autonomy, they could increase the
exploitation of peasantry at will toincrease their accumulation or to be able
to pay back the loans they might have taken to purehase the tax - farming
rights. In order to counter the tendencies towards the short-term
maximisation of this exploitation, a new system was devised at the end of
the 17th century whereby tax-farmswere granted on a lifetime basis
(malikhane). Thus, by acquiring the right to manage their farms
independently of state supervision, tax-farmers came to exercise de facto,
if not de jure rights, of the private property on land.
Tax - farmers prov ide d the state with loans and obtained the right to
collect taxes; moreover, they introduced usury into the agricultural relations
of production. U sury exacerbated the economic position of peasants who,
under heavy tax burdens to the state, tax-farmers and ayans had increased
their borrowing. Although usury never developed to the extent sufficient to
destroy the small property structure inherited from the timar system, it
served as a means to increase exploitation, to bind peasants to "feudalIsed"
units of production as sharecroppers, and to accelerate capital accumulation
in agriculture (islamoglu and Keyder 1987:58-9). Through usury and
various forms of direct labour control, the tax-farming system meant the
development of a more autonomous class of landowners on the one hand
and dependent peasantry on the other. Peasant producers whose freedom
and protectionwere institutionally guaranteed in the timar system, were
transformed into sharecroppers or indebted tenants under tax-farming.
One result of this transformation was the emergence of commercial
agricultural estates (çiftliks) in the 18th-century Balkans and Anatolia. A
typical çiftlik estate consisted of a conglomeration of villages in which
peasants were still attending to the plots of lands they had received from
the timar holders. However, under excessive debt obligations due to heavy
taxation, some of these lands had now been converted into the private
property of tax-farmers. Peasant families came to be employed as
sharecroppers or as "enserfed" peasants providing taxes and labourservices
to çiftlik owners in these lands. The majority of Anatolian çiftliks were
concentrated in Western Anatolia and they were composed of small
holdings. The average size of Western Anatolian çiftliks were between 90
and 734 hectares (Kasaba 1988b:24). Apart from its new labour
organisation which allowed çiftlik owners to organise production through
conversion, coercion, and limitations on peasant mobility, çiftliks also
altere d the traditional crop pattern. Through their autonomy vis-à-vis the
central state, çiftlik owners could now respond to market exigencies; cash
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crops replaced subsistence products. Larger and larger parts of çiftlik estates
were devoted to the profitable crops of the period (wheat,maize, cotton,
and tobacco).
There was a definite connection between the emergence of tax - farming
and the rise of local magnates (ayans). Takingadvantage of the weak
central authority, some prominent tax-farmers or çiftlik owners established
themselves permanently as governors. By purchasing tax-farms for the
entire area under their administrative authority, these ayans built themselves
a client group of locallypowerful sub-contracting farmers (islamoglu and
Keyder 1987:59). The centrifugal tendeneies generated by tax-farmersand
ayans had permeated the administrative structure to such a degree that, by
the end of the 18th century, the central state controlled only a fraction of
the provinces under its formal administration.
The two-centuries-long protracted decomposition of the Ottoman state,
however, did not generate a feudal structure. Ayans remained politically
subordinate to the central authority; they merely increased their share of the
surplus destined for the central bureaucracy (islamoglu and Keyder
1987:54). Although they enjoyed substantial autonomy from the state, due
to the informality and ambiguity of the political arena in which they were
operating, the ayans' power was ultimately manipulated by the state and
did not establish its own political terrain. The ayans' landed power
remained too weak in the face of the vast patronage potential of the state
(Hourani 1968). The tilt in favour of the civil society represented by the
rise of the ayans was thus precarious. The Ottoman state did not lose the
basis of its political legitimacy which later enabled the reassertion of its
power in the 19th century. Locally rivalling ayans, though strong, did not
man age to establish local power structures that were anything other than the
"perversions of the powers delegated to them by the central state"
(Wickham 1988:87). The imperial title to all land within the Empire was
not abandoned; the çiftlik system never received a formal legal status. Right
down to the first quarter of the 19th century, the fortunes of the bureaucrats
and tax-farmers could be arbitrarily confiscated by the Sultan by the time
of their death (Anderson 1974:387).
The nondevelopment of capitalist relations in Anatolian agriculture in the
17th and 18th centuries, at a time when agrarian capitalism was de vel opin g
in Western Europe, particularly in England, was fundamentally lInked to
this consolidation of iltizam system, following the dissolution of the timar
system which had dominated the Anatolian countryside from the 14th to the
16th centuries. This transition was not determined by the rise of contraband
trade, price and population movements or the "integration of the Ottoman
economy into the circuit of world capital" . 8 Indeed, the class structure of
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the Anatolian society imposed the lImits on the impact of these
demographic and commercial trends. The retrogression of 'Ottoman society
vis-à- vis Western Europe after the 17th century depended upon the
relatively autonomous processes by which the property or surplus extraction
relations (class structure) in the country side were established. The key to
the problem of nondevelopment of an endogenous capitalism in Anatolia
resided in the outcome of such conflicts (i.e. the evolution of the timar-
system, its destruction and the consequent establishment of tax-farming).
With respect to Brenner' s typology covering Eastern Europe, France, and
England, Ottoman tax-farming was a hybrid of the regressive French and
East Europeanpatterns.9Although theirsmallholdings from the timar
system persisted, peasants increasingly came under the control of çiftlik
owners. The size of the çiftliks and the volume of cash crop production,
however, were modest compared with the East European estates (Kasaba
1988b:24). Furthermore, tax-farmers' limitations ofpeasantmobility and the
imposition of labour services and taxes never reached the levels of East
European landlords' coercion of serfs. Based on Brenner's perspective, we
can postulate that the emergence of this pattern in the Ottoman realm was
predicated upon the development and relative strength of the contending
agrarian classes: their levels of internal solidarity, their self-consciousness
and organisation, their relationships to urban class allies and to the state. In
particular, the low leve! of development of peasant solidarity and strength
influenced the outcome of conflicts in the 17th century and contributed to
the increased exploitation of the peasantry. 10
Individualistic farming on smallholdings resulted in a less developed
organisation of collaborative agricultural practices at the leve! of vill age or
between villages in Ottoman Anatolia. The existence of some communal
grazing rights and the communal assessment of some taxes, rather than
implying a heightened sense of community, produced increased conflict.
The division of the populations of Anatolian villages along religious lines
between Sünni Islam (the official state religion) and heterodoxAlevi Islam
added to these conflicts. This division was exacerbated by the fact that
most of the settled population conformed to Sünni Islam and attended the
mosques whereas the nomadic population participated in "heretical" Alevi
rituals. Peasant solidarity vis-à-vis potential tax-farmers and the state was,
thus, further diminished by the conflicts between settled and nomadic
peasants over grazing rights and communal lands. In the absence of a
successful long-term peasant resistance, the spread of the tax-farming
system depended on the confrontation between the central state, tax -farmers
and ayans. Being a class-like competitor of the ayans for the peasants'
surplus, the Ottoman state, on the one hand, opposed the enserfment of
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peasants; but on the other hand, it could not enforce a full-scale
consolidation of peasant smallholdings until the first quarter of the 19th
century.
N otes
1. In what follows, we wil concentrate our analysis on Anatolia, the only geographical area
of the Ottoman Empire which eventually constituted Turkey. The existence of considerable
variation in terms of economic structure, socioeconomic conditions, and political and social
mobilisation between different regions of the Ottoman Empire (Le. Balkans, Anatolia, Middle
East, North Africa) prec1udes any generalisation of the effects of Ottoman institutions.
2. Here we have only mentioned the major linguistic groups. The ethnic composition of Asia
Minor prior to Turcoman invasion was in fact much more heterogenous. The volatile
population movements had left a mosaic1ike imprint on the strategically placed Anatolian
peninsula. For the extent of this diversity see Oguz 1976:61-132. The Anatolian population
in this'periodwas about ten milion whereas the incoming nomadic tribes were a fewhundred
thousand (Oguz 1976: 179). The migration of Turcoman nomads to Anatolia was gradual and
fragmentary, unlike an organised military occupation or a mass Völkerwanderung of Gothic
or Vandal type. The synthesis between the cultural institutions of Hellenism and Turkic
nomads and the emergence of a post-Byzantine Helleno-Turkic entity is amply demonstrated
in Vryonis 1971.
3. The term patrimonialism, derived from Weber, describes a political structure having a well-
defined centre which exercises its authority through a large administrative staff. Ultimate
ownership of economic and administrative means remains in the hands of the centre; the
bureaucratic offshoots which exercise power locally, do so only in the name of the centre.
The concept redistributive-tributar mode of integration, derived from Polanyi (1957:43-55),
describes a system in which surplus flows from the peasant and artisan producer c1ass of
subjects to the non-producer c1ass of rulers. Goods, titles and resources, in turn, are
redistributed by the priorities rulers set themselves. For the application of these two concepts
to the c1assical period of the Ottoman Empire see Wallerstein, Decdeli and Kasaba 1987, and
Kasaba 1988.
4. The mode of production prevalent in the Ottoman EIlpire is the subjectof a far frolI
resolved controversy in Marxist historiography. For a review of this controversy see Seddon
and Margulies 1983. While there seems to be a general agreement with respect to the basic
features of the politico-Iegal superstructure and the relations of production described above,
the extent to which their interrelation defines a mode of production distinct from the
European feudalism is unc1ear. While Islamoglu and Keyder (1977) regard the Ottoman social
formation as an example of the Asiatic Mode of Production (AMP), Berktay (1987) regards
it as feudaL. Anderson (1974) takes an intermediate position and points out the theoretical
inconsistencies in Marx's AMP concept on the one hand, and the peculiarities of the Ottoman
social formation vis-à-vis European feudalism on the other (1974:397-431, 473-526). Giving
a Weberian tone to Marx' s historical materialism, he dec1ares that "superstructures of kinship,
religion, law or the state necessarily enter into the constitutive structure of the mode of
production in pre-capitalist social formations" (1974:403), and draws attention to the fact that
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the absence of the legacies of Antiquity and Roman law hindered private property rights and
urban autonomy in the Ottoman Empire. According to his account of transition from
feudalism to capitalism in Western Europe, "parcellsation of sovereignty permitted the growth
of autonomous towns in the interstitial spaces between disparate lordships" (1974:410), the
omnipotence of the central state did not allow any indigenous transition to capitalism in the
Ottoman realm. Thus the divergent trajectories of Western Europe and the Ottoman Empire
was an outcome of their disparate modes of production prior to the 16th century . For a
refutation of Anderson's definition of feudalism and a critique of his account of Eastern
development see Wickham 1988. While we wil not go into the definitional debates
concerning the mode of production in the Ottoman Empire here, it should be stressed that the
approach adopted below wil be basically in conformity with Anderson's comparative account
and focus on the contrasts rather than the similarities between Western European and Ottoman
social structures. For arecent similar approach see Barkey 1991.
5. The absence of legal guarantees for commercial accumulation or urban autonomy was not
an outcome of Islamic ideology per se; in fact, the commercial prosperity of the Arab lands
far surpassed that of Europe before the 12th century. Merchant and financial capital were an
integral part of Islamic societies, and Islam as a cultural system was not antithetical to
commercial accumulation (Rodinson 1966). In an opposite view, Gellner (1981), building
up on an idea originally advanced by Ibn El Khaldun, sees the endless cyclical struggle
between townsmenltraders and rural tribesmen as the cause of Islam's stagnation. Similarly,
Anderson (1974:503-16) exaggerates somewhat in ascribing the obstacles the Ottoman state
set to the unlimited accumulation by merchants to the nomadic origins of the state. According
to his account, in contrast to the Islamic homeland of Arabia, a major residuary legatee of the
urban institutions of the Antiquity, the steppes of Central Asia which supplied the pastoral
conquerors of Anatolia, had know n few cities and little commerce. Thus, in comparison to
its contemporaries in Europe and its predecessors in Anatolia and the Arab lands, the ensuing
Ottoman rule generated an effective military and administrative organisation but feeble
commercial activity in its cities: "contempt for trade was a general hallmark of the ruling
class in the Ottoman Empire, whose commercial policy was at best one of tolerance, and at
worse one of discrimination against the mercantile classes in towns" (1974:516). While trying
to "situate the specificity of European experience as a whole within a wider international
setting" (1974:78) Anderson characterises Western feudalism as a complex unit y of serfdom,
manorialism, extraeconomic coercion of peasants by lords, vassal hierarchy among lords and
"parcellisation of sovereignty" . Thus, what renders the unique passage to capitalism in Europe
is the "concatenation of antiquity and feudalism" (1974:420). Because the study of the
Ottoman Empire mainly serves the function of a contrasting case to this argument, given the
undeniable anchoring of Antiquity in far South-East Europe(Anderson 1978:265), a break
with Antiquity affected by a nomadic culture is postulated. This is, in fact, not in conformity
with his emphasis on the divergent paths of Western and Eastern Roman Empire prior to the
Turkic invasion (Anderson 1978:265-93). Despite Byzantium's status as a successor state to
Rome, the absence of an urban dynamic or a widespread slavery, and the consolidation of
smallianded property beneath largeestates in Byzantine Anatolia starkly contrasted with the
legacy of Antiquity in Western Europe. In this respect, the Ottoman Empire incorporated the
Byzantine institutions as much as the nomadic origins of its Turcoman founders (Keyder
1987:9-13, Vryonis 1971, Stefanos 1974:1). Anderson's preoccupation with the continuities
between Antiquity and capitalism may be attributed to his France-centred approach (Skocpol
and Fulbrook 1984). However, while both parcellisation of sovereignty and the growth of a
commercially minded and urban-based bourgeoisie characterised France's evolutionary
advance towards capitalism, neither Roman Law nor parcellisation of sovereignty had a
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substantial impact and importance in England where capitalism first arose (Mooers 1991:38-
39). Likewise, the existence of obstacles set by the Ottoman state to the capital accumulation
of merchants, leads Anderson mistakenly to the conclusion that the merchants and the bankers
in the classical period of the Empire until the 17th century were non-Muslims (1974:517).
This error is the result of projecting back into earlier centuries a development which occurred
only after the 17th century. Until then Muslims were as numerous and as active as non-
Muslims in commercial activities. The ascendency of Jewish, Armenian and Greek merchants
was due to the rise of the Empire's tradewith the West, while the Easterntradedeclined
after the 17th century.
6.The only exception to this rule was the vakifinstitution. A vakifwas a charitable foundation
whose income was being expended only upon the defined charitable purpose. The state
controlled the establishment of vakifs, they were registered by the kadi and were legally valid
only after confirmation by the ruler; but once established, they were immune to confiscation
and protected, in effect, the fortunes of specific families. However, vakifs were pious
establishments and supplied the expenses of mosques, colleges, hospitals, hospices. They
were, thus, fundamentally consuming institutions and never assumed the characteristics of a
manufacturing enterprise (Inalcik 1969: 132-6).
7. This being said, it is necessary to stress that the Celali uprisings never assumed the
character of peasant uprisings in Europe. For the contrasts between the early 17th century
peasant unrest in France and in the Ottoman Empire see Barkey 1991. It is more correct to
characterise the anarchy and brigandage prevailing in Anatolia during the Celali outbreaks
as a rivalrybetween the central state, sipahi, and tax-farmers in order to appropriate a larger
portion of the peasants' surplus (Pamuk 1988b: 136-7). The extension of tax-farming in the
latter part of the 17th and 18th centuries corresponded to an increase in peasant exploitation
on the one hand, and to a stalemate between the contending forces of central state and tax-
farmers on the other.
8. The seminal essay (Islamoglu and Keyder 1977) which set the agenda for the research
tradition providing the most impressive scholarly output on Ottoman economic history in
recent years (Islamoglu- Inan ed. 1987) tended to argue otherwise. Influenced byWallerstein
(1974), Islamoglu and Keyder gave analytical priority to "integration with the world
economy" in analysing the post-16th century transformations in the Ottoman economy (see
also Wallerstein 1979). Though they noted that the volume of trade did not increase
significantly until the 1830s, adopting unqualifiedly Wallerstein's arguments on the rise of
the world economy, they pointed out that the commencement of the process of integration of
the Ottoman economy into the circuit of world capital can be traced back to the 16th century.
While not abandoning the primacy given to integration with the world economy, by dating
this integration to the 19th century, Kasaba (1988b), Pamuk (1987a), and Keyder (1987) seem
to have resolved the tension in the Wallerstein traditionwithrespecttothetimingand .
conditions of this process. However, in spite of moving towards a more syncretic approach
(see Keyder 1987 in particular), the retention of Wallerstein's paradigm and its related
concepts such as "incorporation into the world-economy" and "peripheralisation" results in
giving undue emphasis to integration to the division of labour of the capitalist world
economy, and responses to the imperatives of the drive for accumulation of capital on a
world scale in explaining coercive forms of labour in agricultural relations of production. The
circulationist nature of this argument which dictates an externally determined
underdevelopment through the workings of a trade-induced division of labour in the world-
economy has been criticised by Brenner (1977). The major drawback of Wallerstein's
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approach, according to Brenner, is that "it defines capitalism not by a specific relation
between dasses but rather by produetion for profit in the world market; it, thus,displaces
dass relations from the centre of analysis and neglects the way in which dass structures
emerge: as the outcome of dass struggles whose results are incomprehensible in terms merely
of market forces" (1977:27). Noting that the divergent trajectories of long-term development
in the Western and Eastern halves of Europe were due to the termination of serfdom in the
West at a time when it was inaugurated in the East in the 15th century, Brenner attributes this
bifurcation to the results of dass conflcts, themse1ves dependent upon different organisational
forms of dasses and states (see also Brenner 1985a and 1985b). Here we are using the
methods and results of Brenner' s analysis on early modern European development to make
some suggestive remarks on Ottoman development. Brenner' s position has been the subject
of an extended debate known to students of early modern European history as the "Brenner
debate". Some participants in this debate, such as Hilton and Bois have pleaded in favour of
a model incorporating both dass relations; and economic and demographic conjectures (Aston
and Philpin eds. 1985). An elaboration of such an alternative model, let alone its application
to Ottoman history, is beyond the scope of this study.
9. In his comparative analysis of the property relations resulting from the differential
outcomes of dass struggles across Europe in the late medieval and early modern period,
Brenner developed the three-way contrast between Eastern Europe, France, and England first
pointed out by the French historian Mare Bloch. While successful struggle by peasants to
protect the integrity of the tenancy of their holdings led to the consolidation of smallholder
property in France; in Eastern Europe, successful repression of peasant resistance by the lords
led to the spread of demesne farming and serfdom. The long-term rise of feudalism from the
15th century onwards represented the most important factor underpinning the nondevelopment
of capitalism in the areas East of the Elbe. Because of its inabilty to generate technological
innovation, French small-scale farming, too, led to a sort of historical regression. In England,
by contrast, the dominant tendency of landowners was to consolidate larger and larger
holdings ,and to farm them out to large tenant farmers who in turn cultivated them with the
aid of wage labour (Brenner 1977, 1985a, 1985b). The breakthrough from "traditional
economy" to relatively self-sustaining economic development in England was a "historically
limited, surprising, and peculiar phenomenon"; the agrarian capitalism in 17th-century
England, necessitating co st-cutting and productivity increasing measures on the part of
capitalist tenant farmers, sowed the seeds of the subsequent industrial revolution. This was
an "unintended" outcome of a two-sided proeess of dass development and dass conflct: on
the one hand, the destruction of serfdom; on the other, the short-circuiting of the emerging
predominance of small peasant property (Brenner 1987:53, 1985a:30).
10. The testing of this hypothesis would require a different research agenda than the one set
by the approaches influenced byW allerstein. The considerations below are based partly on
Barkey's (1991) account. Barkey also contrasts the peasantJtimar-holder allances and the
peasantJnoble allances vis-à-vis the central state in the 17th century Ottoman Empire and
Franee respectively, and attributes the relatively acquiescent nature of the peasant unrest in
the Ottoman Empire to the weakness of these allances due to the lack of solid patron-dient
relations caused by the rotation of timar-holders.
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3. The international, context and its impact
on the Turkish development
3.1 Periodisation of growth patterns in the world economy
during the 19th and 20th centuries
One way of schematising the recurrent periods of growth and crisis in the
world economy is to make use of the so-called "Kondratiev long waves".
Although their existence and causes is a matter of contestation among the
economic historians, they provide a suitable way of periodising the
succes sive cyc1es of economic rise and decline. In what follows, the
Kondratiev periodisation will mainly be used to organise the exposition of
the world economy context in the 19th and 20th centuries. In contras t to the
approaches which give mono-causal explanations of these long waves of
economic development, we will attempt to interpret them as an expression
of the complex interrelationships between technological dynamics,
production organisation forms, and international monetary, trade, and
security regimes.1 Neo-Schumpeterian perspectives, the work of the French
regulation school, and the hegemonic stability theory will provide the
complementary perspectives for the charting of these complex interrelation-
ships. After a brief excursus of each of these approaches, I will sketch the
developments in the 19th and 20th centuries by using the conceptual
apparatus they provide. A summary of the interrelationships between the
trends depicted by these three theories and the Kondratiev periodisation is
presented in Table 3.1.
The Schumpeterian tradition has emphasised the role of new technologies
as the basis of long waves. The upturn phase of Kl (first Kondratiev long
wave) is related to the unprecedented growth in cotton cloth production in
England arising from increases in the productivity of cotton spinning and
weaving. K2 is interpreted as a consequence of the expansion of iron and
steel industries and railways, and the accompanying transport revolution.
K3 is seen as an electro-chemical and heavy industries long wave, while K4
is presumed to be supported predominantly by Fordist - based on mass
production and mass consumption - industries. As a matter of conjecture,
a presently emerging information and communication long wave is added
to the periodisation.
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To overcome the inclination towards technological determinism in the
classicalSchumpeterian interpretation which links long waves to the
clustering of innovations in particular industries, the neo-Schumpeterian
theorist Perez (1985) has emphasised the role of institutions associated with
each long wave and has introduced production organisation forms at the
intra-firm and inter-firm leve! to her definition of techno-economic
paradigms which she associates with each Kondratiev long wave.
According to her account, each techno-economic paradigm requires a
fundamental restructuring of the socio-institutional framework on the
national and international levels. The resulting social and institutional
transformations determine the general shape of the propagation of new
technological innovations across industries and countries, and the form of
economic development or the "mode of growth" of the next long wave:' a
Kondratiev wave is thus described as the rise and fall of a mode of growth
(1985:441).
Regulation theory (Aglietta 1979, Lipietz 1987, Boyer 1990) attempts to
link the growth patterns in the world economy to national and international
institutional structures which support them.2 Accordingly, the history of
capitalism is seen as a succession of phases, each distinguished by certain
historically developed, socio-institutionally defined structural forms that
giv e rise to distinctive economic trends and patterns (Brenner and Glick
1991:46).3 The concepts used to analyse the growth dynamics of these
distinct periods mediate between pure abstraction and empirical verification.
The middle-range concepts of regime of accumulation and mode of
regulation are used to explain what seems to be a paradox according to
Marx: the question of how a contradictory process such as capitalism can
stabilise over a long period of time given the conflicts stemming from the
relationships of exploitation and competition. The answer, according to
regulation theory, is that there are a set of routines which establish
coherence against the workings of destabilising tendencies in the capitalist
system.
The regime of accumulation denotes a systematic mode of allocating the
social product, which results over a long period of time in a certain match
between conditions of production and consumption. The two ideal-types of
regimes of accumulation are extensive and intensive accumulation described
in detail in Table 3.2. The components of a regime of accumulation involve
on the produetion side:
(i) technical structure of production organisation, origins of productivity
gains;
(ii) volume of capital employed, and its distribution between various
branches;
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Table 3.2
Ideal-typical regimes of accumulation in dominant economies
Extensive accumulation. Examples: 19th-century US and Franee
Technology and produetion Artisinal production, productivity gains
org anis ation through absolute surplus value
increases, low productivity gains
Distribution of capital Department I (capital goods sector)
most dynamic
Articulation with other Gradual disappearance of petty
production relations commodity production in agriculture,
workers reproduced partly outside
capitalism
Income distribution Low wages
Composition of social Capital formation plays the motor role,
demand final consumption secondary, no
collective expenditures
Intensive accumulation. Examples: 1945-74 North America and
Western Europe
Technology and production Taylorism and Fordism, productivity
organisation gains through relative surplus value
increases, high productivity gains
Distribution of capital Balanced growth between Department I
and Department Il (consumption goods
sec tor )
Articulation with other Workers depend entirely on wage
production relations labour for reproduction
Income distribution High wages
Composition of social Dynamic linking of consumption and
demand investment, welfare state
Sources: Aglietta 1979, Boyer 1990, Lipietz 1987, Mjøset and Bohlin 1985.
(iii) transfers associated with other production relations such as rent,
manner of articulation with the öther relations of production (i.e. non"'
capitalistie economic forms).
On the consumption side, components of a regime of accumulation involve:
(iv) income distribution that allows for the reproduction of different social
classes or groups;
52
(v) composition of social demand (Boyer 1990:35).
At a second level of analysis nearer to empirical verification, the concept
of mode of regulation (sometimes called institutional forms or structural
forms) moves from social relations described in general by the regime of
accumulation to their specific configuration in a given country and during,
a particular historical phase. Thus the mode of regulation is the ensemble
of institutional forms, explicit or implicit norms which assure the
compatibility of behaviours in the framework of a regime of accumulation.
It denotes the set of institutionalised norms which ensure the conformity of
the conflictual relations between agents and social groups with the state of
social relations circumscribed by the regime of accumulation. The two
ideal-types of modes of regulatiön are competitive and monopolistie
regulation forms, described in detail in Table 3.3.
The components of a mode of regulation involve:
(i) forms ofmonetary constraint: the reallocation of capital between
branches, monetary and credit pOlIcies, international management of
currency;
(ii) the configuration of thewage relations: capital-labour relations which
may include the social and technical division of labour, the ways in
which workers are attracted and retained by the firm, fixing the norms
of working hours and intensity of work, workers' norms and patterns
of consumption and the use of collective services outside the market;
(iii) forms of competition in capital-capital relations: the interrelationships
between accumulation and profitability, and the concentration,
centralIsation, and sectoral composition of capital;
(iv) the role of the state: the routines the state creates based on the
institutional compromises between classes which may include the
management of the currency, essential components of the wage
relations both in terms of the judicial framework pertaining to the
industrial relations and interventions through income policies,
codification ofcertain rules governing competition such as industrial
regulations, antitrust laws, tax system, government purehases,
management of transfer payments and public expenditures which affect
the collective costs associated with the labour force (Boyer 1990: 37-
42).
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Competitive regulation. Examples: 19th-century US and Franee
Monetary constraint and Gold standard restraining domestie
credit system credits
Wage relations Craft control, individualised bargaining,
competitive determination of wages,
limited potential for mass consumption
Competition between firms Competitive pricing
Form of state intervention Laissez-faire
Table 3.3
Ideal-typical modes of regulation in dominant economies
Monopolistic regulation. Examples: 1945-74 North America and
Western Europe
Monetary constraint and Dollar standard allowing flexible
credit system domestie credit creation
Wage relations Scientific management, collective and
connective bargaining, determination of
wages through a complex system of
capital-labour and government
institutions, social regulation of mass
consumption
Competition between firms Oligopolistic pricing
Form of state intervention Dirigisme
Sources: Aglietta 1979, Boyer 1990, Lipietz 1987, Mjøset and Bohlin 1985
Finally, in regulation theory, the concept of mode or model of
development refers to a pattern of development based on a specific regime
of accumulation and mode of regulation. The operating site of these is the
nationallevel, thus the mode of development establishes itself within the
boundaries of the nation-state. With respect to the internationallevel, the
existence of a configuration of different national modes of development,
which may exist in relations of complementarity, dependence or domination
with each other, may be postulated (Aglietta 1982). The stability of a
national mode of development depends upon the compatibility of its
constituent regime of accumulation and mode of regulation. The extension
in time of each mode of development ultimately issues in a series of
crippling contradictions which result from the fetters imposed by the
54
already existing mode of regulation upon the regime of accumulation.
When the old mode of regulation has finally broken down, a structural
crisis ensues. Such a crisis is accompanied by the necessarily unregulated
and conflictual action of classes, firms, political groups and governments.
Out of these indeterminate processes of competitive economic war and
socioeconomic and political struggle, one specific resolution of the crisis
is reached. A new mode of regulation is established, which by governing
the historically developed regime of accumulation makes possible a new
mode of development (Brenner and Glick 1991:48).
Out of the elements of macroeconomic regulation outlined above,
regulation researchers give explanatory priority to the changes in the form
of wage relations in understanding the dynamics of the development pattern
in the advanced capitalist countries. The absence of a complementarity in
the wage relations - a balance between production and consumption norms
-leads to a general economic crisis. The success of the post-Second World
War "Golden Age" of capitalism or Fordism lies exactly in establishing this
complementarity. In Fordism, national variations apart, wage increases are
lInked to the increases in productivity and thereby a balanced growth
between thespheresof consumption and production is secured. This
indexing of wages to productivity is achieved through the institutionali-
sation of collective bargaining and connective bargaining - the procedure
whereby income increases in a few central industries (e.g. the auto industry
in the US) are propagated to non-unionised sectors. With the balanced
growth it provides between production and consumption, and between
capital goods and consumption goods sectors of the industry, this mode of
development sustained by intensive accumulation and monopolistic
regulation corresponds to the auto-centric development described by Amin
and Senghaas (Ruccio 1989:48).
As this theoretical excursus reveals, the regulation approach attempts to
synthesise diverse areas of socioeconomic research - those related to
international, national, inter-firm and intra-firm spheres - through analyses
of different forms of labour proeesses, firm and sectoral strategies, modes
of macro-economic regulation and modes of growth within the overall
dynamic of the global circuit of capital. Moreover, by emphasising that
historically specific social and polItical struggles and institutionalised
compromises deriving from these struggles constitute the parameters for the
stabilisation of a mode of regulation, the approach provides a theorisation
of the link between the economic and political spheres. The breadth of this
theorisation covering both the macro and the micro levels of sociological
and economic analysis, and the question of how the regularities at the
macro level emerge from the micro behaviours of individuals, groups,
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institutions, classes and nation-states necessitates an interlocking between
the regulation approach and institutionalist and corporatist theories studying
interest mediation in general. Thus, regulation theory provides auseful
institutionalist theoretical framework for the synthesis of the neo-
Schumpeterian perspective, examining the effects of particular industrial
innovations and international hegemony theories concentrating on
institutional forms at the international level which regulate the modes of
development of nation-states.
As it was schematically shown in Table 3.1, during K2 covering the
latter half of the 19th century, an extensive regime of accumulation was
superimposed on a competitive mode of regulation. Under the pressure of
class struggle and technical change there arose at various historical
junctures - from the first decades of the 20th century in the US - a new
mode of development. Here, craft control was sufficiently weakened to
allow for the emergence of intensive accumulation based predominantly on
Taylorist work organisation principles. However, this new mode of
development turned out to be unstable because the mode of regulation, still
essentially competitive, was unable to institutionalise the expanding mass
consumption that was required to underpin the expanding mass production
made possible by intensive accumulation. The result was the severe
structural crisis of overinvestment and underconsumption of the interwar
period. The absence of institutional arrangements, which were essential for
securing stable and expanding markets, led to the collapse of the world
economy in the 1930s.
As a result of the class struggles of the 1930s, there emerged the new
monopolistic mode of regulation which resolved the contradictions of the
previous mode of development by providing for the rise of mass
consumption. However, the repetition of the very processes that had
underwritten ,the pro sp erit y of this new Fordist mode of development
eventually prove d problematic, as the progressive perfection of the Fordist
labour process resulted in the exhaustion of the system' s capacity for steady
growth of productivity (Brenner and Glick 1991 :49). The result was the
crisis of productivity experienced most severely between 1974-84. This
period witnessed a sharp decline in growth, and a rise in unemployment in
the OECD region. The balanee of power decisively turned against the wage
workers in the industrial relations system. Delocalisation of the labour
process from the advanced countries to the low wage pools mitigated the
effects of the crisis in the NICs. However, apart from these very general
observations, it is a matter of controversy among researchers working in the
regulation tradition what sort of a new mode of development will emerge
from this structural crisis. Although some commentators see the
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inauguration of a new post-Fordist mode of development based on flexible
specialisation in OECD countries (Piore and Sabe11984), others understand
these changes not as a symptom of the emergence of a new mode of
development but rather as the decay of an old one (Gordon 1988).
The distinction brought by regulation theory between the different
regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation characterising the second
halves of the 19th and 20th centuries allows for a differentiated viewof
centre-periphery relations in the world economy in these two periods
(Lipietz 1987:47-68). Under extensive accumulation, in the absence of
sufficient intern al demand in the core capitalIst economies - because there
is no monopolistic regulation of wages - demand is necessarily created in
the periphery. In Lipietz's words, the periphery acts as a "thermostat": "the
capitalist circuits of extended reproduction can not be completed within the
centre. The outside world therefore supplies it with both hot and cold
sources (labour-power and raw materials, and markets)" (1987:49). The
result is the military struggle between great powers to acquire different
"zones of influence". However, as the centre becomes more auto-centric
with the development of intensive accumulation during the Fordist mode of
development, the problem of external markets in the periphery becomes less
pressing, and the ratio of trade flows between centre and periphery to flows
intern al to the centre falls as home markets are consolidated. Thus until the
1970s, the history of capitalism in the 20th century can be seen as the
declining importanee of foreign trade (Lipietz 1987:57).
In contrast to the neoclassical theory of international economic relations
which stipulates the dissolution of spatial heterogeneity in the international
economy and its replacement by the homogeneous space of "pure" market
relations on a world scale, regulation theory "bases itself on the primacy of
the national dimension and regards the world economy as a system of
interacting national social formations" (Aglietta 1982:6). The site of
regulation is the natÌon-state where the correspondence between the regime
of accumulation and the mode of regulation must take place if there is to
be a stable and harmonious mode of development. The dynamics of
institutional forms which regulate the workings of national modes of
development in the international arena can be clarified using hegemonic
stability theory.
The hegemonic stability theory (Kindleberger 1973, Gilpin 1987) asserts
that international economy benefits from having a single hegemonic power
- Britain in the 19th century and the US since 1945 - to provide military
stability and international financial instruments in the global system. The
leading power provides a stable medium of exchange, ensures free trade,
and exports capital for its development. It sustains global order with its
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military force and channels investment and trade in agenerally beneficial
fashion with its economic strength and institutions. A youthful hegemon in
the mid- 19th century, Britain took on these functions with relative ease and
the liberal world order prospered accordingly. In due course, however, the
hegemonic power begins to grow weaker relative to other major states and
to the system as a whole. AJiberal systemfavours a diffusion of econömic
development, and thus leads to a gradual diminution of the economic
superiority of the leading power. At the same time, the hegemonic function
- both military and economic - draws resources from the hegemon. As the
economic strenght of the hegemonic country ebbs, the growing challenges
to its economic position compells the hegemon to allocate more and more
resources into the military sector. This "imperial overstreteh" squeezes out
productive investment and, over time, leads to the downward spiral of
slower growth, heavier taxes and a weakening capacity to bear the burdens
of defence (Kennedy 1988). The absence of a single hegemon, as was the
case in the interwar vacuum when Britain was too weak and the United
States was yet unwilling to assume leadership, is held to have contributed
to chaos, and then to war (Mann ed. 1990:6, Hall, J. 1990:116-17). Thus,
broadly speaking, the decay of the Pax Britannica led to WorId War I, the
interwar Depression and finally to W orId War IL. Restoration of the liberal
global economy awaited a new hegemonic power - the United States -
after W orId War IL.
Mjøset (1990) distinguishes between three areas of international regimes
through which the hegemonic country exerts its influence in accordance
with its national mode of development. In this usage, "regimes" refer to
principles, norms, laws and procedures governing transnational interactions
(see also Krasner ed. 1983). Accordingly, each hegemonic powerdominates
the international arena by exerting a decisive influence, through its own
policies and through the policies of the international organisations which it
dominates, on constitutive international regimes:
(i) the trade regime (agreements concerning trade liberalisation);
(ii) the monetary regime (organisation of the international monetary
system);
(iii) thesecurity regime (network of security alliances).
As the schematic representation in Table 3.1 revealed, the period of British
hegemony in the 19th century was superimposed on an extensive
accumulation and Britain' s lead in the techno-economic paradigm. This
period was characterised by international free trade (though not without
periods of German and French protectionism), an international gold
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standard, the dominance of the sterling and British financial capital, and the
fluid military alliance system enabling Britain to check the strength of other
powers (especially Germany). Even after it lost its economic and political
leadership, Britain continued to draw upon the resources it had created: it
used the gold exchange standard as a device to rebuild its enfeebled global
financial positioii and thus contributed to the international monetary
instability in the interwar period. Fordism in the sec ond half of the 20th
century, on the other hand, was presided over by the US hegemony. Under
the GATT system world trade grew faster than world production. But two
thirds of this trade was within the OECD region. The Bretton W oods
system of the dollar standard and fixed exchange rates ensured that the
balance-of-payments constraint never weighed on the US in spite of its
chronic current account deficit. Thus, the continuous export of US capital
abroad resulted in the spread of Fordist production norms. The security
regime, too, was characterised by American hegemony built on the strong
presenee of the US within NATO.
3.2 The' impact of the international con text on the Turkish
trajectory
The international context delIneated by the leading techno-economic
paradigm, dominant national modes of development, and international trade,
monetary and security regimes does not exert a fully determining influence
on national development trajectories. Contrary to approaches which tend to
see class relations and state action as determined by the dynamics of world
economy (i.e. Wallerstein's world system theory) (SkocpoI1977), we will
attempt to advocate a more subtle conception of the structure/agent dialectic
in the world economy and polit y , and try to strike a balance between the
two extremes of full national autonomy and the determining influence of
external constraints. The focus on the institutional arrangements in the
international space, to which we have hinted, provides a firm departure
point for the constitution of such a balanced assessment because the
strength or weakness of the influence of international economic regimes is
closely linked to the relationships of political and military power among
states.
Polanyi' s concept of opportunity structure can be useful in maintaining
the analytic autonomy of international and nationalleveIs of analysis (Bloch
and Somers 1984:74). Accordingly, it can be postulated that international
regimes underpinned by dominant powers' techno-economic paradigms and
modes of development create a global opportunity structure that shapes
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what is possible for particular states. This set of limits, in turn, creates a
national opportunity structure that shapes in what ways social groups or
class forces will be most effecti ve in influencing state policy. The strategic
space circumscribed by the set of possibilities offered and constraints
imposed by the opportunity structure of the international regime may
involve geopolitical as well as economic elements. The elements of this
strategic space may include the country' s position within the security
regime, the effect of hegemonic countries' monetary policies, and the extent
and nature of foreign investments.
A suitable starting point for the impact of the international context on the
Ottoman Empire/Turkey is the effect of the security regime. Prior to the
aftermath of Napoleonic Wars (1815), the frequent incidence of wars
between European absolutist states had limited the extent of external
military threat to the Ottoman Empire. Although it had begun to lose
territories as early as in the 17th century, the political and military
contestations of the Empire was mostly with the states in its immediate
vicinity. With the emergence of the European balance-of-power system in
the post-Napoleonic era, direct military confrontations between the states
decreased, but the Ottoman Empire's role in the interstate system was
increasingly reduced to that of a pawn in the fluid 19th-century alliance
system. Because a central feature of the balance-of-power system was the
aim to contain Russia' sascent, when ne ed arose, Western powers,
especially Britain, acted to preserve and strengthen the Ottoman state while
obtaining as much trade concessions as possible.
In 1799 the Ottoman Empire had entered into a Tri-Partite Alliance with
Britain and Russia against the N apoleonic France. For the European powers
the pact was motivated by the need to check French hegemonic claims and
to postpone the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Once the French threat
disappeared, the alliance crumbled. What followed was a century of shifting
alliances between European states and the Ottoman Empire mainly against
Russia, directed at preserving the European balance of power byensuring
the Ottoman state's survival and preventing the emergence of a dangerous
power vacuum in the case of its collapse. Hence, during Pax Britannica,
the primary aim of Britain became to support the Empire, dubbed "the sick
man of Europe", and to check Russian expansion. Gi ven the high level of
imports of English goods, the Ottoman market was a vital region for 19th-
century English industry. In addition, British maritime supremacy in the
Mediterranean, and the strategic placing of Ottoman lands precluded any
accommodation of English and Russian interests. During the Mohammed
Ali crisis of 1838, when the rebellious governor of Egypt came on the brink
of capturing istanbul, England backed the Ottoman army and prevented the
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Empire's collapse. In the 1853 Crimean War, Britain and Ottoman Empire
were again allies against Russia.
Both during the Greek Liberation in the first half of the 19th century and
the secessionist Balkan and Arab nationalisms towards the end of the
century, the interventions of foreign imperial powers were prominent. With
its emerging technological leadership in electrochemical industries and
national unification, Germany began to contest Pax Britannica towards the
end of the century. Thereafter, the main axis of inter-imperialist rivalry
between Britain and Russia was displaced by the rivalry between Britain
and Germany. During the fragmentation of the security regime in the first
decades of the 20th century, the nationalIst leadership gaining ascendency
in the bureaucracy of the Ottoman Empire allied with Germany to break the
hegemony of Britain over the Ottoman state conclusively.
The dependent position of the Ottoman state in the European balance-of-
power system did not mean that the actions of the Ottoman state bureau-
cracy were dictated by the foreign powers. Within the room for manoeuvre
provided by the extent of inter-imperialist rivalry, the Ottoman state sought
to preserve its own interests. The timing and nature of state actions were,
however, determined by the balance of power in the interstate arena. The
milestones of the period we will analyse corresponded to critical junctures
in the international arena.
The mid-19th century reforms were an attempt of the state bureaucracy
to ease the tensions of inter-imperialist rivalry over its domains and to
enhance the strength of the Ottoman state. The judicial dauses of these
reforms giving privileges to foreigners were adopted as a result of the
pressure of foreign powers increasing their dominance over the Empire.
Thus these reforms, Tanzimat, were introduced in 1839 at the height of the
Mohammed Ali crisis. The 1856 reforms, reaffirming the privileges and
immunities for non-Muslim communities and introducing a new principle
of religious equality throughout the Empire, appeared a month before the
Treaty of Paris by which Sublime Porte (the Ottoman Government) was
officially accepted as a member of the European state system. The first
Ottoman constitution was promulgated in December 1876, at a time of
another Balkan crisis which threatened to involve the Ottomans in a war
with Russia. The fragmentation of the European security regime leading to
the First World War prompted the disintegration of the Empire and created
a strategic space for the emergence of the Turkish nation-state. The 1930
World Depression was instrumental in the initiation of the state-led
industrialisation drive. Finally, Turkey's position within the newly emerging
security system in the post-World War Il era facilitated the transition to
multiparty democracy.
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The Ottoman central bureaucracy was strong enough vis-à-vis the
imperialist powers and/or the rivalry among those powers was such thatthe
Ottoman Empire never became part of a formal or informal empire.4
Increased infrastructural capacities in the 19th century, which enabled the
central government to establish a more effective army, improve the
transportation and communications network, rein force d the strength of the
Ottoman state. Because no single power was able to exclude its competitors
from the Empire, rather than developing alliances with merchants or
landlords, European powers had to come to terms with the Ottoman central
bureaucracy. Despite the continuous attempts of imperial powers,
penetration of foreign c ap it al in agriculture remained limited. The
government resolutely protected its controlover agriculture, it successfully
resisted the attempts of European citizens to establish capitalist farms
employing wage labourers in Western Anatolia.
The agrarian structure consisting mostly of small-sized holdings
employing family labour represented the most favourable conditions for
appropriating the agricultural surplus;The state supported freeholding
peasant property against landlords and foreigii capital both in order to
preserve its financial base and to prevent a political challenge to its rule
(Pamuk 1988a: 134). The persistenee of small-scale production in agriculture
was, in this way, intimately related to the manoeuvring room of the central
bureaucracy in the interstate arena. This room, of course, was not constant;
it varied directly with the degree of rivalry on the world scale. At the
height of Pax Britannica, the ability of the Ottoman state to play one
European power against other was limited; this ability increased following
the 1880s with the ascendency of Germany on the international scene.
With respect to the trade regime, while the major European countries
reacted to the expansion of British cotton exports during the first
Kondratiev wave with protectionist measures, the Ottoman Empire, being
paralysed with the geopolitical struggles between Western imperial powers,
experienced a major competitive pressure against its large textile proto-
industry. Because Britain's economic leadership was accompanied by a
military and political superiority especially in the latter half of Kl, the
Ottoman market was opened to British manufactured goods, which were
composed predominantly of textiles, following the 1838 Free Trade
Agreement with Britain.
"The steam power and railway" long wave (K2) led to a transport
revolution. The loss of the protective capacity of long distances resulted in
the tighter integration of the world market and the prices of traditional
staples declined due to cheaper transport. Due to its relative geographic
remoteness, this development wave, which drew ever newer areas into the
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international economy, reached Anatolia later than other regions of the
periphery (e.g. Scandinavia and the Balkans) (cf. Berend and Ranki
1982: 114). With the building of railroads in the last quarter of the century,
the Western Anatolian hinterland was connected to world markets, while
formerly world market integration was limited to coastal areas.
The A-phase (first half, prosperity and recession phases) of the second
Kondratiev wave saw continuous liberalisation in the world economy. This
started with unilateral British free trade in the 1840s and 1850s and
continued in the 1860s and 1870s with limited multilateralism in the model
provided by the Anglo- French Treaty of Commerce. Although British free
trade policies were solidly supported at home, they were fragile abroad.. A
co operative international institution formally independent of the British state
and comparable to the post-Second World War GATT did nöt exist. This
institutional weakness contributed to the rapid dissolution of the system
following Germany's industrial ascendency (Mjøset 1990:31). The export
of agricultural products and import of manufactured goods in Anatolia
gained momentum during the boom of world trade in the A-phase of K2
and the transport revolution that accompanied it. Thus, the economic
growth in Anatolian major port cities over the 19th and early 20th centuries
showed a close correlation with Kondratiev cycles. The B-phases (second
half, depression and recovery phases)(1814-45 and 1872-92) corresponded
to periods of faster growth of imports than exports, while the reverse was
true for A-phases. The most rapid expansion occurred during the mid-
Victorian boom of the 1850s and 1860s (cf. Kasaba, Keyder and Tabak
1986:127).
The European trade (imports plus exports) with the total areas of the
Ottoman Empire expanded by average annual rates of 1 to 1.5 per cent
between 1730 and 1830. In the following quarter of a century until the eve
of the Crimean War (1853), this trade increased at average annual rates of
5 per cent. In the 1840-1913 period, in constant 1880 prices, the increase
in exports was ninefold and increase in imports was tenfold. During the
second half of this period, characterised by protectionism in Europe
following 1880 and the escalation of inter-imperialIst rivalry with the rise
of Germany, the expansion of the Ottoman foreign trade was comparatively
slower (Pamuk 1987a: 18-41). As we shall see later when looking at the
handicrafts production in the 19th century, the decline in the rate of
increase in the levels of production in industrialised economies during the
1873-96 Great Depression led to the easing of the "pull" generated by
European economies, and created a room for a relative revival of handi-
crafts production towards the end of the century.
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The free trade regime imposed by Britain and France could only be
abolished by the Y oung-Turk government unilaterally when World War I
broke out. The 1923 Lausanne Treaty made by the Entente powers ratifying
the formation of the Turkish Republic, imposed the Ottoman trade regime
on Turkey until 1929. Until then, Turkey did not have the sovereignty to
adopt a trade regime of her own. Coincidental with the end of Lausanne
restrictions, the total breakdown of the international trade regime, the
consolidation of rigid economic zones, the contraction of world trade, and
the collapse of the international payments system following the 1930 World
Depression facilitated Turkey' s adoption of a "self-reliant" strategy of
industrialisation.
By the time a proper monetary regime was established, the European
trade regime constituted by bilateral trade treaties hadbegun to erode. The
monetary regime, which was subsequently established under British
dominance in the 1870-1914 period, was connected to the international gold
standard. Sterling' s dominance during this period was underpinned by the
permanent balance-of-payments surplus of Britain. Under the gold/sterling
system managed by the Bank of Britain, most countries were linked to the
London-based banking network and kept sterling balances on their London
accounts; as a result British banks controlled large quantities of funds for
financing world trade.
The importance of having gold reserves in the central banks contributed
to the growing tensions in the gold standard system which basically arose
from its London-based monocentredness. The priority given to the national
gold reserves increased the geopolitical tensions among European imperial
powers which rivalled among themselves in search of "spheres of
influence" in the periphery. The gold standard was perpetuated by the
P 
olitic al domination of peripheral countries by the core. Since core
countries had to defend their gold reserves, they needed a supply of foreign
currency deposits to provide room of action for themselves. By keeping
their reserves in Britain, France and Germany the peripheral countries that
were under the sphere of influence of these imperial powers provided this
room of action. As the gold hoarding and inter-imperialist rivalry increased,
it became more difficult for London to attract the funds needed for the
smooth monocentric operation of the monetary regime. When the British
interest rates were increased to overcome this difficulty, given the centrality
of the London-based banking network, credit contracted and industri al
production declined setting the stage for the 1873-96 Great Depression
(Mjøset 1990:33-9).
The gold standard corresponded to a compromise solution to the problem
of financing international trade and investment under conditions of
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declining British economic leadership and escalating pOlItical rivalry among
the core states. In Polanyi's interpretation (1957:9-19) of the 1870-1914
period, the haute finance supplIed the instruments for an international peace
system. Although it failed to maintain peace in the end, due to its interests
in widespread infrastructural investments in peripheral countries (e.g.
railway construction), high finanee attempted to prevent the emergence of
military confrontations among imperial powers. One important consequence
of this was to limit the violent rivalries among big powers over peripheral
areas like the Ottoman Empire and to integrate these into the European
financial system.
As the peripheral countries were forced to accept the gold standard, they
became subject to the international control of high finance. To protect its
investments, high finance acted in concert with the European states in their
respective zones of influence. By the first decade of the 20th century, the
rigidity of the respective economic zones of the big powers undermined the
establishment of any common interest, and inter-imperialist rivalry took a
violent turn. The attempts of Britain to reintroduce the gold standard in the
1920s led to international monetary instability which was worsened by the
1930s World Depression. The subsequent failure of economic liberalism
released the autocratic tendencies within the world economy in the 1930s
and 1940s.
By the transfer of the monopoly to print paper currency inside the
Empire to the Anglo-French owned Ottoman Bank in 1863 under the
pressure of the European powers, the Ottoman Empire was in effect linked
to the international gold standard. This linkage to the prevailing monetary
regime had two major consequences which would prove to be detrimental
in the years to come. Firstly, although the introduction of the gold standard
assured relative price stabilIty by pre venting the debasement of the gold/
silver content of the local currency, it meant the complete loss of monetary
independence of the Ottoman state. The exchange rate of the lira against
major European currencies thus remained unchanged throughout the rest of
the century, and destructive European price movements were directly trans-
mitted to the Ottoman economy (Boratav, Ökçün and Pamuk 1985:388).
Secondly, by accepting international financial control, the Ottoman state
was given the "privilege" of borrowing in the European financial markets
which it would increasingly have recourse to. Most of the financial inflows
to the Empire thus began to be composed of loans to the central state. The
share of external debt in total foreign investments (66 per cent) was much
higher in the Ottoman Empire compared to the other medium-sized
countries in the periphery (Pamuk 1988a:145). Direct foreign investments
were mainly concentrated in the construction of railways in coastal regions
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and in harbour-works; foreign investment in production activities such as
agriculture, industry or mining remained limited. A large part of the foreign
loans, on the other hand, were us ed for military purehases abroad leading
to rapid increases in the external trade deficit and making the repayment of
the loans impossible.
In 1881, after two decades of extensive borrowing had engendered the
financial collapse of the Ottoman government, the Ottoman Public Debt
Administration (PDA), Düyun-i Ummumiye, was forme d by the European
bondholders of the huge Ottoman debt. To repay its loans, the Ottoman
state ceded to PDA a variety of important revenues; thus, whole sectors of
the Ottoman economy functioned under direct European financial contro!.
The PDA, as an agent of the Ottoman state, collected revenues directly
from the specified areas of the economy to service new loans or to
construct rai1ways.
While keeping the Ottoman bureaucracy from bankrptcy, the PDA
effectively checked its controlover the economy. By 1914, revenues ceded
to the organisation comprised 15 per cent of all Ottoman tax revenues
(Quataert 1987:289). After the foundation of the PDA, the fiscal crisis of
the state deepened. In an attempt to provide a solution to its long-standing
fiscal crisis, the Ottoman government began to hand out railway con-
cessiöns to foreign investors. As a consequence of intensified imperialist
rivalry, the partitioning of the Empire in to spheres of influence through the
construction of railroads by German and French capital gained momentum
during 1888-1896 (Pamuk 1987a: 15). European powers also us ed renewed
lending as an instrument for gaining influence over the Empire. On the eve
of the First W orId War, payments on the outstanding debt could only be
made by further borrowing. By the stipulations of the Lausanne Treaty,
sealIng the international recognition of the new Republic, Turkey inherited
two-thirds ofthis Ottoman debt which was only liquidated between 1929-53
(Boratav 1981:170, 1988:32).
N otes
1. In other interpretations, Kondratiev waves have been seen as an automatic, technically or
economicallygenerated phenomenon of capitalist economy. Kondratiev's (1935) long wave
theory is based on the capital goods replacement cyc1e for very long-lived capital goods - the
need to replace old capita!. Schumpeter's (1939) theory is based on the bunching of long-term
investments which result from the c1ustering of major innovations. Mandel (1980) on the other
hand, explains lon g waves by employing Marx's law of the tendency of the rate of profit to
fall, resulting from a rising organic composition of capital: a long wave expansion occurs
when several "noneconomic" factors (e.g. gold discoveries, major innovations, wars, capitalist
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victories over the working c1ass) ten ding to counteract the fallng rate of profit operate in a
synchronised wayò In Kondratiev'sand Schumpeter's versions both phases of lon g waves are
caused by economic factors whereas in Mandel' s version the downward phase is caused by
economic factors while the upward phase is contingent upon accidental factors. Common to
all three approaches is a tendency to undermine the role of the social institutions which
coexist with these waves. Finally, the neoc1assical tradition in economics has been sceptical
towards lon g waves and has regarded capitalist growth as stable in the long run. Even when
it has accepted the premise that capitalism is unstable at the macro leve1, as in the case of
business cyc1e theories, the neoc1assical tradition has seen these instabilities as sporadic rather
than regular or systematic (Kotz 1987:18).
2. I wil not give a full-scale exposition of the regulation approach here. I wil merely employ
the regulationist conceptual apparatus to give a comprehensive summary of the deve10pment
of the international economy in the 19th and 20th centuries. Economic development in the
post-Second World War US and Western Europe, comprising the bulk of regulationist writing
wil be mentioned with the aim of providing a contrast to earlier patterns. Neither wil I be
using the regulation approach to study the Ottoman/Turkish development pattern in the 19th
century. Developed to explain the history of industrial capitalism, regulation theory concepts
are inappropriate to analyse the dynamics of a social formation which is characterised by a
feeble industry and a predominance of self-sufficient peasant househ01ds and which is only
partially market-dependent for their reproduction. For the weaknesses'of regulation theory in
this regard see Brenner and Glick 1991. I wil, however, use elements of regulation theory
later, when studying the Turkish state-led industrialisation of the 1930s and 1940s. For critical
surveys of the regulation approach see Hirsch 1990, Jessop 1990, Mjøset and Bohlin 1985,
Noë11987. A similar perspective, working with a slightly different conceptual framework, is
the "social structures of accumulation" (SSA) approach (Bowles, Gordon and Weisskopf
1983). According to this approach, capital accumulation requires the existence of a set of
social institutions which facilitate the accumulation process. This set of institutions, SSA,
inc1udes political, ideological and economic structures. For surveys of the SSA approach see
Jessop 1990, Kotz 1987.
3. The origin of regulation theory was an analysis of the 1974 crisis through a theoretical
synthesis of Marxist, Keynesian and institutionalist (most notably Polanyi's) traditions in
economics. The theory criticised the neoc1assical interpretation of the crisis, according to
which, a crisis represented a difference between theory and reality, or more specifically, the
blockage of the market mechanisms by monopolies, labour unions and interest groups.
Adhering to a "realist" theory of science, Regulation theorists c1aimed that both growth and
crisis patterns were dependent upon prevailng forms of social organisation, institutional forms
and constellation of social forces. In their usage, the term régulation corresponded to a
"balancing mechanism" or "equilibration" - not to the standard us age of regulation in English
as a shorthand for "government intervention in private markets". Thus,regulation was defined
as "the conjunction of the mechanisms working together for social reproduction, with attention
to the prevalent economic structures and social forms" (Boyer 1990:20). One of the central
results of regulationist research was a periodisation of the history of French and American
capitalism in terms of a set of specifically designed concepts. In delimiting distinct periods
of capitalist development, the theory gave central analytical importance to the study of
structural crisis. A main emphasis was that the 1974 crisis was fundamentally different from
the 1929 crisis. While the 1929 crisis was an underconsumption crisis, the 1974 crisis was
related to the slow exhaustion of the productivity potential due to the problems in the
organisation of production. The two crises corresponded to different sets of incompatibilties
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between their respective regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation - the two central
conceptsused to describe the set of institutional forms in a national economy.
4. Pamuk (1988a) offers three basic categories of peripheral countries (formal colonies,
countries belonging to the "informal empire" of an imperialist power, countries which due to
inter-imperialist rivalry did not belong to the informal empire of any single power) with
respect to their position in the security regime. Re analyses economic development as
conditioned by this balanee of power in the international arena. In the formal colony, the
patterns of produetion in the colony were transformed such that they were most beneficia! to
the interests of the colonising power; trade and investment by other industrialised countries
were severely restricted; the local state had lost its autonomy of jurisdiction or taxation. In
the countries belonging to the informal empire (e.g. the cases of countries in Central and
South America), the opening to world capitalism proceeded under conditions of formal
political independence, but the country inquestion belonged to the sphere of influencè Of one
imperialist power. Although there was less room for direct intervention on the part of the
imperialist power in this category of countries, the interests of the ruling allance of merchant
capital and export-oriented landlords in the periphery in most instances coincided with the
interests of the imperialist country. In the third category of countries (e.g. 19th-century China,
Persia and Ottoman Empire), the relatively strong state structure of the country in the
periphery together with conditions of rivalry between major imperialist powers resulted in the
peripheral country's state bureaucracy obtaining greater political andeconornc influence. As
an empirical support for his argument, Pamuk notes that medium-sized countries in Latin
America (Argentina, Mexico, Brazil and Peru) belonging to informal empires, had higher per
capita foreign trade and investment levels than the Ottoman Empire in the early 191Os. Or
conversely, the highest rates of growth in per capita exports in the later half of the 19th
century were registered by the three formal colonies (Algeria, Egypt and Sri Lanka).
Sirnlarly, on the eve of the First World War, cornodity exports from the Ottoman Empire
were more diversified than those of any other medium-sized country in the periphery. This
was an outcome of the resistance of the Ottoman governments, whose strength were supported
by inter-imperialist rivalry, to attempts of the European powers to intervene directly in
Ottoman agriculture and to transform it in the direction of monoculture (Pamuk 1988a: 138,
141, 146).
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4. Anatolia in the long 19th century
4.1 The modernisation attempts of the state bureaucracy
Because of the delicate balance in the 19th century interstate system we
have sketched in the previous chapter, the European imperial powers opted
for the survival of the Ottoman state or, correlatively, the Ottoman state
made use of the inter-imperialist rivalry in order to prolong its survival.
Within the room for man oeuvre provided by the imperial powers, the
Ottoman bureaucracy acted to preserve its own interests: while it resisted
the British attempts to establish large-scale capitalist farming in Western
Anatolia, it made substantial attempts to modernise the military,
administrative and economic apparatus of the Empire and initiated, however
unsuccessfully, a state-led industrialisation. Thus, liberal trade policies
imposed by the Anglo-Ottoman Treaty of Commerce of 1838, and the
copying of legal, administrative and educational institutions of the West
became the hallmark of the 19th-century Ottoman Empire. The initial
thrust of the reforms in the 1820s was military modernisation directed at
territorial control through enhanced infrastructural capacities, and
uncovering of new sources of taxation to support the creation of a new
standing army. With the abolishment of janissary corps and the creation of
a more centralised and disciplined army, central controlover the provinces
was reasserted and the local power of ayans was gradually undermined.
Although the century proceeded with a continual struggle between state and
the notables, the Ottoman state managed to hold the notables to a standoff
until its final hour at the end of the First W orId W ar.
The culmination of these reform movements was the T anzimat
(reordering) reforms of the mid-century.l Through Tanzimat, the Ottoman
reformers attempted to transform educational institutions, reform state
administration, secularise courts of justice, and establish rights to private
property. These reforms assuredjuridical security of private property within
the Empire and religious equality before the law (Lewis 1969: 106-8). The
Land Laws of 1858 and 1867 extended these rights to landownership; with
the consolidation of small peasant ownership the financial basis of the state
was secured.2
The restructuring of the central apparatus of the Ottoman government
brought it doser to W eber' s ideal-type of rationalised bureaucracy: the
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bureaucratic network was expanded, Ministries were formed, new
bureaucratic linkages emerged within the Ministries, new regulations
appeared, and all these were accompanied by a novel administrative law.
With a more precise definition and limitation of the powers of provincial
administrators, control of the central administrative machinery of the
Ottoman state was strengthened. Bureaucratic centralism and effectivity was
enhanced with the reorganisation of Sublime Porte, now constituting the
executive headquarters in Istanbul and including the office of Grand Vizier,
Council of Ministers and the Ministries of Internal and Foreign Affairs. The
Ottoman bureaucracy known as the scribal service (kalemiye) thus evolved
into a new form known as civil officialdom (mülkiye) after the 1830s. The
shift from traditional to rational-legal authority remained incomplete due to
the subversion of the proeesses of rationalisation to serve the ends of
patrimonial discretionalism in the high echelons of power (Findley 1980).
But the Ottoman administrative reforms undoubtedly involved a long-term
transformation of a scribal corps operating under conditions of traditional
patrimonialism into something more like a modern civil service (Findley
1991:10).
One consequence of Tanzimat in the judicial sphere was the emergence
of a system of secular courts. The application of the religious law, Seriat,
becaine more and more confined to matters of personal status such as
mariage and inheritance and was relegated to religious courts. With time,
however, principles of Western civil law codes began to infiltrate into
Ottoman legal practice. In response to this challenge, the government
appointed a commttee to codify Muslim law in areas corresponding to
those covered by the civil code. Though never completed, mecelle, the
basic document which emerged from the years of work of this commttee,
was later considered to be a monument of Ottoman jurisprudence (Mardin
1989:114-15).
An important component of 19th-century reforms was related to the
transformationof educational institutions. In 1847the state replaced the old
system of neighbourhood schools financed by charitable grants by a system
of state financed primary schools. The programme of primary schools
which had consisted of Koranic recitation was also modified. In the 1850s
military and civilian rüstiyes, new schools of secondary education, began
to spre ad throughout Anatolia. This was followed by a wave of lycée
building inspired by the programme of French lycée. The secularisation of
education went even further with the establIshment of university leve!
institutions after the model provided by the French grandes écoles.
Beginning with the 1880s, the administrative, judicial and military posts of
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the Ottoman state were increasingly staffed by the graduates of these
university level Political Science, Law, and Military schools.
Concomitant with these reforms in the educational institutions, the
medrese system underwent a deep crisis. The programme of education in
medreses, Muslim "seminaries", had traditionally been devoted to the study
of Koran and other classical Islamic texts; now that the bureaucratic cadres
were increasingly recruited from the new secular schools, the study of
religion iwthe níedreses becarne more of a field of specialisation than a
pervasive social ¡nnction. Succes sive attempts to reform medreses in order
to cover Western scientific subjects in their programmes failed (Mardin
1989:111-12). The result was an institutional duality of religious and
secular schools with the disparate structures of the new educational
institutions and medreses nourishing the separation between the
"modernising" and "traditional" sections in the bureaucratic apparatus and
the population at large. On the other hand, the new schools established with
Tanzimat were essentially geared to the purpose of providing military and
civilian cadres to the Ottoman central bureaucracy. A disinterested attitude
towards technical education was conspicuous in the design of the
educational reforms well into the 20th century.
The Tanzimat reforms were not instigated by a unitary bureaucracy. They
originatedarnong the higher ranks of the Ottoman bureaucracy. The secular
aspirations of the reformist bureaucrats were opposed by the Islamic
oriented ulema trained in medreses. Jf the ulema did not firmlyoppose the
reforms, ,', it was because they' regarded the military and administrative
modernisation as a last resort for the preservation of the Ottoman state.
However, with the gradual Westernisation of the Ottoman institutions, the
position of ulema was undermined, and they were, progressively , assigned
to marginal roles in the administrative, judicial, and educational areas of the
state. As late as the beginning of the 19th century, Islamic ideology and
institutions had been integrated into the Ottoman governmental machinery.
The, ulema through their offices as kadis, through their positions in the
centralbureaucracy and finally through the supreme religious authority of
Seyhülislam had exerted a powerful influence on the preparation,
elaboration, and execution of state policy. Although a number of ulema
continued to be nominated to governmentposts in the Tanzimatera, with
the gradual segregation of religion from the administrative affairs, their
politicallyinfluential positions were undermined.
Mardin (1989: 113) ascribes the swiftness with which the Ottoman state
adopted policies which displaced ulema from their influential position in
government to the emergence of reforming bureaucrats at the end of 18th
century. It was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which shaped the careers of
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these reforming statesmen. Confronted with the ever more menacing
superiority of the Western imperial powers, these bureaucrats urged Turkey
to accept the civilisation of Europe in its entirety, to prove itself a
"civilised state". While realising that some anchoring for the Ottoman was
necessary, they show ed an increasing propensity to disregard the ulema, and
believed that the good government and the development of commerce and
education would fill the gap left by the gradual receding of Islam.3 In
Findley's (1991:13) words, the role of the Foreign Ministry officials was
that "they represented the outside world to their compatriots, more than the
other way round ... (they) were virtually the vanguard ofWesternising
cultural change." In this sense, the mid-19th-century Foreign Ministry
formed the leading sector of the state bureaucracy which would eventually
esta.blish the secular and Westernised Turkish nation-state in the 1920s.
Although the administrative reforms brought a leap in the number of
civilian bureaucrats, from 2,000 scribes to 35,000 civil officials by 1900
(Findley 1991 :25), the changes this transformation entailed was more
qualitative than quantitative. Sons of bureaucrats with similar backgrounds
were recruited through the modernised educational institutions and, by the
end of the century, the civilianand military state bureaucracy formed a
distinct social stratum reproducing itself mainly from its own ranks.4 With
its particular Westernising and transformative potential, civil officialdom
and the military corps had become nearly coterminous with "intelligentsia"
by the end of the century. Moreover, they were the most organised and
coherent social group on the scene when the external military threats
emanating from the international crisis prior to the First World War hit the
Empire.
Within two decades of the inception of Tanzimat, the need for a principle
of legitimation of the reform movement had arisen. The reformist
bureaucrats of Tanzimat were wary of initiating a movement in this
direction. Their critics of the 1860s, the Y oung Ottomans, found the new
political forrrula of providing political participation through their proposal
of representative government. Though they were basically a secular
intelligentsia, the Y oung Ottomans sought to revive Islamic cultural
principles in an attempt to find a new legitimising foundation for the
Ottoman state. While the ulema leaned towards traditional "populistic"
Islam seemingly more appealing to the Muslim masses of the Empire, the
y oung Ottoman ideologues adhered to Islam more as a legitimising
discourse and a cultural foundation. According to the Y oung Ottomans'
version of liberal constitutionalism, participation in the process of
government would rally Muslims to reforms and eliminate the barriers
between different religious groups. Through the creation of an Ottoman
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patriotism one would be able to elIcit allegiance to the Ottoman state
regardless of religious affiliation (Mardin 1989: 1 16).
The Y oung Ottomans interpreted the thrust of the mid-century reforms
as the creation of a "nation-state". Their patriotism, however, depended on
a different set of premises than the emergent contemporaneous nationalism
among the non-Muslim communities of the Empire. The Y oung Ottomans'
preoccupation with "saving the Ottoman motherland" was rendered
anachronistic with the rise of nationalism in 19th-century Europe. Rather,
what Seton-Watson (1977: 148) has called "official nationalism"
characterised the Y oung Ottoman thought. Parallel to the contemporary
policies of dynastic empires like Russia, Great Britain, and Austro- Hungary
(Anderson 1991:83-111), the Young Ottomans advocated the creation of 
an
"Ottoman nation" over the polyglot domains undet the rule of the Empire.
As Anderson (1991: 86) observes, "official nationalism" - the willed merger
of nation and dynastic empire - developed after, and in re action to, the
popular national movements proliferating in Europe since 1820. As a
deliberate policy of the Ottoman state as it was progressively adopted
towards the end of the century, Ottoman "official nationalism", too, was a
respons e of the bureaucracy to the appearance of linguistic nationalIsms in,
the Balkans. Greece had gained her independence from the Ottoman Empire
in 1829. By 1878, Bulgaria had received autonomy; Rumania, Montenegro
and Serbia had proclaimed their independence; Bosnia-Hercegovina was
under Au stri an occupation.
The new idea of an "Ottoman nation" involved a fusion of two distinct
ideologies, the traditional miZZet (religious community) system of the
Empire and the principles of French Revolution. According to the miZZet
system, the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire were free in the
management of their domestie affairs - though this freedom often meant
indifference of the central state to non-Muslim communities. Through a
synthesis of millet and French revolutionary ideals, the Y oung Ottomans
advocated arì~dOttoman nation" where all Ottomansubjects would be equal
before the law regardless of religion and the Empire would be a free and
equal nation lIke France. Nevertheless, the implIcit adoption of these
principles by the modernising bureaucracy was to be resented by all the
communities of the Empire, including the Turks. As a result of its policies
like the imposition of the "Ottoman" language - a dynastie officialese
combining elements of Turkish, Persian, and Arabic - and the mass
conscription of Muslims and non-Muslims alike, the Ottoman state came
to be hated by Turkish-speakers as apostates and by non- Turkish-speakers
as Turkifiers (Anderson 1991:85). The discrepancy between nation and the
dynastic realm lying at the heart of "Ottoman national synthesis" was
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finally resolved by the Y oung Turks - the movement leading the 1908
Rev01ution.
The reform drive in the Western mould did not, however, issue in a
permanent Western form of parliamentarianism. With the initiative of the
y oung Ottomans, the first Ottoman parliament was formed in 1877. Elected
through limited - based on property restrictions - and indirect male
suffrage, the parliament was broadly representative of the various national
and religious communities of the Empire. Although the Muslims had a
majority in the parliament, Christians and Jews were proportionately much
better represented, and ethnic Turks were ina minorityamong the deputies.
The introduction of constitutional government, however, was the work of
a very small group of reformist government officials and intellectuals, and
it was based neither on popular support nor on organised parties. Thus,
when Sultan Abdülhamid disbanded the parliament a year later and
established his three-decades-long repressive rule, there was hardly any
popular reaction. During the 19th century then, a mechanism of
representation that would have translated the interests of the bourgeoisie,
the tax-farmers, or the peasants onto the politicallevel did not evolve.
4.2 The commercial bourgeoisie
The structure of landownership in Anatolia characterised by the
predominance of small peasant landownership necessitated a large number
of merchants mediating between agricultural production and trade (Keyder
1983a). Due to the rise of the Empire's trade withEurope following the
17th century and given the cultural affinities of non-Muslim minorities to
the West, the majority of this commercial bourgeoisie were composed of
Greek and Armenian minorities who were concentrated in the major
entrepôts of izmir and istanbuL. The ethnical alignments of the commercial
bourgeoisie's class formation had a direct bearing on their subsequent
cultural and political choices. Especially after the 1870s, the imperial
rivalry between Britain, Franee and Germany included attempts to draw
segments of this bourgeoisie to imp eri al interests mostly in the form. of
schools and cultural associations establIshed in various parts of the Empire.
Thus, these groups articulated their interests by taking Into account both
their economic relations with the outside and their administrative and legal
affairs with the Ottoman state.
It would be misleading to portray this commercial bourgeoisie as a mere
appendage of foreign capital - i.e. as a "comprador" bourgeoisie. In
dependency theory, the comprador bourgeoisie means that fraction of
capitalists who are concentrated in trade and finance, and whose interests
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are entirely subordinated to those of foreign capital. Except for the fact that
the activities of the numerous non-MuslIm bourgeoisie of the 19th-century
Anatolia were concentrated in trade and finance, there was by contrast no
correspondence between the interests of indigenous bourgeoisie and foreign
capital; rather than assisting it, the bourgeoisie prevented the implantation
of foreign capital in Anatolia (Kasaba 1988a). The cleavages which arose
between the Muslim and non-MuslIm factions of the bourgeoisie in the first
quarter of the 20th century were a result of the nation-building efforts of
the state bureaucracy rather than an outcome of an unsubstantiated
convergence of interests between the non-Muslim bourgeoisie and foreign
capital in the 19th century.
B y the end of the 18th century, amid growing difficulties of the imperial
finances, members of the commercial bourgeoisie, having easy access to
liquid capital, had begun to finance government officials who were engaged
in bidding for the government auctioning of tax-farms. In the absence of
formal banking institutions, these merchants had become the main creditors
of both government officials and peasants. Especially during the first half
of the 19th century, these ventures in financing had become more profitable
than trading activities. It was at this point that the commercial bourgeoisie,
composed mostly of non-Muslim merchants, found itself in fundamental
disagreement with British foreign capital (Kasaba 1988a:218-22). As we
have seen, the British geopolitical interest in checking the Russian advance
into the Mediterranean, and its economic interest which necessitated a
stronger Ottoman economy to pay for more British imports, resulted in
Britain' s backing of the Ottoman state in the latter' s centralist drive to curb
the decentralising aims of tax-farmers. In its financing as well as its
c ommerci al activity, however, the Ottoman bourgeoisie was thriving
precisely on the weaknesses of the Ottoman central state. To the extent that
they could obtain higher and more secure profits from financing tax-
farmers, the interests of the cosmopolitan commercial bourgeoisie were not
in harmonywith the interests of foreign capita!.
When the Empire was forced by the imperial powers to award
capitulatory privileges to foreigners in the latter half of the 19th century,
the Greeks and Armenians engaged in trade and finance were given
passports and privileges (most notably, extraterritoriality and tax-
exemptions) by foreign embassies. Thus, the positions of Muslim merchants
in overland and maritime trade were further weakened. The predominance
of Christian minorities within the bourgeoisie and their privileg ed status
granted by foreign powers had two important consequences for the
subsequent pattern of political mobilisation within the Empire. Firstly, due
to their privileged status the Christian bourgeoisie was reluctant to articulate
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their interests collectively and form a pressure group in the domestic
political arena. 
5
Secondly, Ottoman bureaucrats' continuous objections to non-MuslIm
bourgeoisie's immunity from the judicial and fiscal reach of the Ottoman
state (Kasaba 1988a), bore the seeds of bureaucracy's subsequent hostility
to non-Muslim bourgeoisie in the Young Turk era in the 1910s. The ethnic
gap between the bourgeoisie on the one hand, and bureaucracy and the bulk
of the peasantry on the other hand prevented the realignment of bourgeoisie
behind the nationalist project gaining ground from the 1910s onwards.
Turkish nation-building was going to be carried out by the state
bureaucracy independently of and often in opposition to the bourgeoisie.
4.3 Handicrafts and industry
The steep rise in the export of manufactured goods from Western Europe
in the first half of the 19th century led to a decline of the indigenous
preindustrial manufacturing activities in the periphery. In fact, the
destruction of the pre-industrial handicrafts-based manufacturing activities,
as a result of the increases in productivity and declines in the prices of
industrial commodities, was common both to the core and periphery of
Europe. Whereas this ~process was paralleled by the emergence of the
factory system in England and in other European countries constituting
successful cases of peripheral industrialisation, it was not until the 1930s
that the commodities produced by the domestic industry prevailed in the
Turkish home market.
Not all branches of preindustrial production in the 19th-century Ottoman
Empire were similarly effected. There were cases of successful resistance
and adaptation to the resurgence of European industrial goods in the
Ottoman market. But the general downward trend in handicrafts production
was unequiyocal. The impact of the European indu~trial goods in the
Anatolian ecÓnomy was most pronounced in the textiles sector. This was
so for two reasons. Firstly, the initial thrst of the Industrial Revolution in
England was based on the textiles sector. This first wave of industrialisation
generated outstanding increases in textiles produetion and declines in the
prices of textiles. Secondly, similar to the usual pattern in preindustrial
economies, the most important branch of nonagricultural production in the
Ottoman Empire, both in terms of employment and output, were textiles.
In spite of the massive impact of imported cloth and yarn, not even in the
case of cotton textiles - the main nonagricultural item consumed by the
Anatolian population in the 19th century - the destruction of Ottoman
handicrafts was complete. Nor were textile factories completely absent,
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especially towards the end of the century. However, given the predominant
position of textiles in handicrafts production in the secondary sector of the
Ottoman economy at the end of the 18th century, it is not surprising that
the flo od of the Ottoman markets by the European textiles in the 19th
century led to a substantial decline in the share of the secondary sector in
the total employment in the Ottoman economy.
As late as the second decade of the 19th century, the Empire had been
self-sufficient in cotton textiles. AnatolIa was a net exporter of cotton;
imports of cotton cloth from Europe were limited - comprising not more
than 3 per cent of total domestie consumption. In the urban areas of
Anatolia the artisans were organised around small-scale manufacturing
establishments which were under varying degrees of guild control.
Throughout the 19th century the strength of these guilds decreased
continuously although they were not formally abolished until the 20th
century. Capital accumulation in the hands of the owners of these
establishments and the degree of differentiation among artisans were small.
The other site of the production for the market was in the rural areas of
Anatolia. Here, until the arival of the imported yarn, merchants organised
rural women at their homes for the spinning of yarn. While a large
proportion of the cotton yarn produced for the market was spun in this
putting-out mode; in the context of a more or less self-sufficient rural
economy, spinning and weaving for immediate consumption within the
rural household or the village constituted the predominant form. Since
around 80 per cent of the population lived in rural areas during the 19th
century, home production of cotton and woollen textiles for immediate
consumption was the form of production with the largest share of the total
production of textiles (Pamuk 1987a:110-11).
The self~sufficiency in cotton textiles changed rapidly after the
N apoleonic Wars when the expansion of trade brought about an intense
competition by European industrial goods. The adverse consequences of the
Free Trade Treaties signed after 1838 were determinant in this context6
Between 1820 and World War I, imports of cotton cloth and yar into the
area within the 1911 borders of the Empire increasedover hundredfold, per
capita imports of cotton textiles increased over fiftyfold, As a result of this
massive invasion, the share of imports in total domestie consumption
increased from less than 5 per cent in 1820 to more than 80 per cent in the
early 1910s (Pamuk 1987a: 118).
The rate of transformation brought about by European industrial exports
in the Anatolian society was not uniform with respect to time and space.
As the rates of expansion of the Empire's external trade sugge st, the degree
of integration of the Ottoman economy into the world market was more
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rapid in the decades until the 1870s in comparison to the period stretching
from the 1880s to World War I (Pamuk 1987a:18-41). Nor were these
changes uniform throughout Anatolia. Coastal areas and the major urban
celltres of istanbul, Bursa, izmir, Aleppo were more adversely affected by
the competition from imported factory products. This regional differentia-
tion was due both to high transportation costs of imported manufactured
goods and to the lack of demand for these goods in the more or less self-
sufficient nature of the rural economy in the interior parts of Anatolia.
The 1840-73 period, starting with the signing of the Free Trade Treaties
between the Ottoman Empire and the European powers and coinciding
roughly with the Victorian boom of the world economy, witnessed a
decisive decline of Ottoman handicrafts production in cotton textiles.
Corresponding to this produetion dec1ine, according to Pamuk' s (1987a: 120-
1) careful calculations, employment dropped by about 2 to 3 per cent of the
working population, affecting about 100,000 jobs (in full-time equivalents)
during this period. Since the share of the nonagricultural sector was a
small fraction of the 19th century economy, this decline meant a major
contraction in the employment provided by the secondary sector. Given the
differential impact of European textile exports on the spinning and weaving
stages of Ottoman cotton textiles, unemployment in weaving was only one-
tenth of the amount of unemployment in spinning: Since spinning was an
overwhelmingly rural activity as opposed to the predominantly urban
character of weaving, the unemployment in the nonagricultural sector was
more pronounced in the rural areas. This trend was reinforced by the
increasing commercialisation of agriculture especially in the coastal areas.
As a result of increasing specialisation and increasing incomes in
agriculture, less time was allocated to nonagricultural activities in the rural
areas.
The 1882-1914 period, on the other hand, witnessed a rise in domestie
production. However, because the increase in domestie production levels
was aboufthe same as the rate of increase in the size of the domestic
market and the rate of increase in the volume of imports, domestic
.production did not regain the relative share of the domestic market it lost
during the 1840-73 period. Part of the increases in domestic produetion
were due to the emergence of a limited number of factories using imported
technology. More importantly though, reflecting an adaptive mechanism,
the volume of hand spinning continued to decline while the volume of
hand weaving approximately doubled between 1880 and 1914 (Pamuk
1987a:118-119). The result was that while the employment in hand
spinning continued to decline after 1880, there was a limited increase in the
total amount of employment provided by handicrafts-based production
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because of increases at the weaving stage. However, this increase was quite
limited in comparison to the decline in employment during the half century
until 1870. All in all, the numbers of people employed (in full-time
equivalents) in Ottoman cotton textiles (the most important branch of
production out side agriculture) declined by two'-hirds between 1820 and
1913 (Pamuk 1987a:122-3).
The first wave of the industrialIsation drive in cotton textiles was
initiated by the Ottoman state primarily to meet military and government
demands. However, despite effective insulation from the competition of the
European imports, several dozen factories established during the 1840s
collapsed within a decade. Until the last quarter of the 19th century many
attempts to establish similar factories metwith resistance from the guilds.
Towards the end of the century, availability of the locally grown cotton and
low wages constituted the basis for the construction of factories by private
capital under conditions of very low rates of tariff protection. By 1910
these factories produced less than a quarter of the yarn consumed in the
domestie market. The industri al production of cotton cloth was even more
limited, it averaged about 2 per cent of the volume of cotton c10th imports
and about 1.5 per cent of domestic consumption (Ökçün 1972).
In sum, in the case of the textiles industry, trends showed that while in
the 1820s, the Ottoman economy wasbasically self-sufficient in cotton
textiles, by the 1910s aDout four-fifths of consumption was being imported.
A 150 per cent per capita increase in the consumption of cotton textiles had
broken the self-sufficient nature of the rural economy in the course of one
century. Rural households which had be en producing the largest part of
textiles for consumption within the vill age in the beginning of the 19th
century, were meeting two-thirds of their consumption in the marketplace
by the beginning of the 20th century (Pamuk 1987a:129).
The trajectory of the Ottoman industry in general was more complex than
the simple decline presented by the textiles industry. Restructuring in some
seçtors contributed both to a shift in employment patterns and to cases of
successful adaptation to the threat posed by rising European imports. The
shift from spinning to weaving in the cotton textiles industry has already
been mentioned. In another case, the centuries-old carpet weaving industry
in the interior of Anatolia, underwent a vast expansion responding to the
rise of European and American demand for "Oriental" carpets especially
after 1870. The value of carpet produetion at least tripled in the last three
decades of the century. More importantly, an increasingly significant
portion of the total West Anatolian outputs of carpets deri ved from the rural
parts rather than from the urban centres. Organised in a putting-out mode
by export merchants - some Ottoman but mostly foreign - production in
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carpet weaving workshops of rural Anatolia had surpassed the output of the
major interior Anatolian urban centres towards the end of the century
(Quataert 1986). By then employment in the carpet weaving industry,
coinposed predominantly of women, may have equalled 50,000, almost as
much as half of the employment provided by the cotton textiles production.
(Quataert 1988: 176).
Similar to many cases of European proto-industrialisation, the increase
in the production of carpets in the rural areas wasachieved without
mechanisation. Towards the end of the century, however, the 100m
operators were increasingly required to accept the dyed yarn produced in
the factories of the merchants organising the putting-out mode. By dictating
that the 100m operators makng the carpets use only the dyed yarn that had
beenprepared in their factories, the merchant houses effectively took away
most of the available spinning and dying jobs; the fact that most of this
merchant capital was concentrated in the hands of foreigners and non-
Muslim minorities added to the popular discontent directed towards
mechanisation (Quataert 1986).
In yet another case of successful adaptation, the raw silk industry of
Bursa restructured around the use of steam poweredspinning mills during
the 1840s and 1850s following a pattern similar to carpet weaving. As a
result of the European and Ottoman entreprenturs' placing of steam
powered mills in the rural areas in order to take advantage of the reservoirs
of underemployed and cheap labour, factories in small towns and in the
countryside were by 1900 employing 15,000 persons, nearly three times the
workforce in the mills of Bursa. The administrative measures introduced by
the Public Debt Administration (PDA) after it was ceded part of the
revenues of the silk industry by the Ottoman government in the late 1880s
furthered the revival of this industry (Quataert 1987, 1988).
Thus, the opening up of the Ottoman market to cheap British
manufactured goods did not lead to a complete collapse of the domestic
proto-industrial activity. Although there was a decline insome branches of
traditional handicrafts, in other branches (e.g. in cotton-weaving and carpet-
making) there was an expansion of production and employment. In most
cases, this expansion was made possible by the intervention of commercial
capital in the production proeess through the putting-out system. Moreover,
even for cases of deindustrialisation, there was no indication that the
destruction of crafts had aregressive impact, or that these crafts might have
evolved into an advanced form had they not been destroyed.7 As we shall
see, the roots of the sluggish industrial dynamics in the Empire lay
elsewhere.
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While in rural Anatolia the major impact of European industrial goods
had been to undermine the self-sufficient nature of the economy and, to
increase specialisation in the direction of cash crop production, there had
alsobeen a shift within the sphere of nonagricultural activities themselves.
Decline in the hand spinning of yarn had been followed by a resurgence of
carpet weaving for the market. In urban centres, on the other hand, given
the predominantly weaving character of the urban textiles industry, the
unemployment effect of European imports had been much smaller.
However, because of the weakening of previously strong guilds in.the big
coastal cities, the effects on the production organisation lev el had been
much stronger - a fact which explains the unduly large emphasis given to
the destructive effects of European goods on Ottoman cities rather than on
their Impact in rural Anatolia by the 19th century contemporary observers
(Quataert 1988).
In the cities, the guilds had sought to maintainartificially high wages for
their members through their restrictive practices; but under the pressure of
low price imported goods, \such practices had proved disastrous. In the
absence of a large scale indigenous industrial production, artisans pushed
out of the craft guilds had either fallen into unskilled labour categories
(becoming, for example, transport workers and stevedores ) or had worked
for piecework wages in small shops of five to ten workers organised by
merchants and exporters (Quataert 1988: 175). Thus, while as late as in the
mid-18th century the established masters had not prevented the entry of
newcomers into their field, the 19th century saw a stepping up of stringent
rules for entry into the guilds - proliferation of the so called gedik system
- on the one hand, and supersession of independent artisans by a putting-
out system, on the other (Faroqhi 1991:52-5). However, urbanguilds
continued their existence throughout the 19th century especially in istanbul,
izmir and small Western Anatolian towns. In most instances, these guilds
opposed the introduction of modern methods of production.
Accompanying the partially successful restructuring in rural proto-
industriaLactivities and deindustrialisation in urban manufacturing, were the
largely uncoordinated attempts of the Ottoman state toestablishstate-öwned
manufacturing facilities. These attempts reached a peak in the 1840s. They
were primarily directed towards meeting the requirements of the military
and the palace. Hence, this industrialisation drive became confined to
setting up factories for the production of military supplies ranging from
gunpowder to woollen cloth or leather boots. These factories employed
imported machinery, foreign skilled workers and engineers. This largest
attempt at state-led industrialisation in the 19th century ended in failure
within a decade. Although profitability was never an issue, the bottlenecks
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in the flow of raw materials, intermediate goods, and imported machinery
could not be eliminated. Foreign engineers and skilled workers were hired
at rates twice as those current in Western Europe and they had little
incentive to train recruits for their positions. The most important reason for
the eventual failure of the mid- 19th century state-directed industrialisation
effort, however, was the low lev el of development of wage labour. As we
shall analyse in depth in the next two sections, the agrarian structure based
on the predominance of freeholding peasantry did not provide sufficient
amounts of free wage labourers for industrial production. Therefore, a
permanent industrial work force did not evolve; the efficiency in these
state-owned factories remained low with high levels of absenteeism.
However unsuccessful, one important legacy of the ill- fated industrialisation
efforts of the mid-century was that several of the Ottoman factories of this
period provided the nucleus of the managers and workers of the étatiste
industrialisation attempt in the 1930s (Clark 1974).
4.4 Agriculture
The increased exports from the Ottoman Empire to Europe after the
N apoleonic Wars were composed of agricultural products for the most part.
In 1913, the share of agricultural commodities in èxports were close to 90
per cent. As a result of the extensive commercialisation of agriculture
brought about by this export orientation, the share of agricultural exports
in net agricultural production rose from 18.4 per cent in 1889 to 26.4 per
cent in 1913. According to an estimate, by 1913, 14 per cent of GNP of the
Empire and more than one-fourth of net agricultural production was being
exported (Pamuk 1987b: 179-80).
The shift in the composition of agricultural output from subsistence to
cash crops, however, was not as pronounced as the new export orientation
would suggest. In 1910, cereals covered 84 per cent of all land and
accounted for 77 per cent of the value of agricultural output, but no single
crop dominated the exports. During the export increase years following
1840, only rarely did the share of any single commodity exceed 12 per
cent of the value of total exports. The share of the eight most important
commodities (tobacco, wheat, barley, raisins, figs, raw silk, raw wool, and
opium) in the total value of exports was around 40 to 50 per cent (Pamuk
1987b: 181-2).
Specialisation in agriculture in the direction of exports was neither
accompanied by a strengthening of large-scale landownership (à la Latin
America) nor by a mechanisation and modernisation of predominantly small
landholdings (à la Denmark). This was due to two interrelated reasons: the
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relative scarcity of labour and the relative abundance of land on the one
hand, and the attempts of the Ottoman state to prevent the emergence of a
powerful landlord class on the other. Though the immgration of large
numbers of Muslims into Anatolia from the areas that seceded from the
Empire contributed to the growth of population which had showed a net
decline in the two centuries preceding the 19th century, labour shortage
continued to be an important characteristic of the Ottoman agriculture until
World War i.
The availability of marginal lands meant that substantial amounts of new
land could be brought under cultivation under conditions of high world
market demand for cash crops. This improved the batgaining position of the
small peasant producer so that the attempts of large landowners to
implement labour-saving machineryin order to redtice their dependence on
relatively scarce labour remained limited. Under conditions of labour
scarcity, the Ottoman state, being very much aware that the most secure
taxation base would be constituted by small-owner producers, actively
promoted the consolidation of simple commodity production by independent
peasant households.
The emergence of a powerful landlord class, which might expand its
share oftheagricultural surplus at the expense of the state and/or challenge
its rule, was seen as a threat by the central bureaucracy. But this did not
mean that the state didnot heavily tax the small peasantry - as much as a
quarter of agricultural production was taxed. Moreover, given the low levels
of productivity, dependenee of the harvest on weather conditions, and heavy
state taxation, both the small owner producers and the sharecropping tenants
were permanently indebted to usurers at high interest rates.
Attempts of British foreign capital to organise large-scale farms in mid-
19th-century Western Anatolia failed for similar reasons. Land was cheap
and plentiful but labour was scarce and wages were high. Moreover, it was
difficult to bring and maintain farm machinery in the interior. Even if they
were willing to tackle these problems, as theydid occasionally, the
resulting costs' were so high that British capitalists ,had little chanee of
successfully competing with those peasant holdings that were situated in the
immediate vicinity of izmir (Kurmus 1974:101-2).
A survey of land ownership and tenancy patterns in the Asiatic provinces
of the Ottoman Empire clearly reveals the predominant proliferation of
small-landholdings and small peasant producers in Anatolian agriculture. As
evident in Table 4.1, in the late 1860s, three decades after the revers al of
the decentralisation tendencies of the two previous centuries, 82.5 per cent
of all cultivable land was in smallholdings ranging from 2 to 20 hectares
while large holdings comprised 17.5 per cent of all cultivable land.
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Regional variations notwithstanding, fixed-rent and sharecropping tenants
in small-sized holdings constituted the majority of direct producers (52.4
per cent). Following them were owners of smallholdings (31 per cent).
Table 4.1
Distribution of landownership and tenancy patterns in the
Asiatic provinces of the Ottoman Empire around 1870
Type of direct producer Size of the Share in all Share of the
holding direct-producer total cultiv-
operated house-holds (%) able land (%)2 to 20 31.0 27.5
hectares with
an average of
6-8 hectares
Small peasant owner-
producer
N onowner producers working
in small owners' holdings;
mostly sharecroppers, some
paying fixed rent
N onowner producers working
in large land holdings; mostly
share-croppers; some tenants
paying fixed rent; some year-
round wage labourers;
200,000 seasonal wage
workers
2 to 20
hectares with
an average of
6-8 hectares
52.4 55.0
Greater than
20 hectares
with an
average of
120 hectares
16.6 17.5
Source: Pamuk 1987b:188-190
Auseful contrast here is the pattern of land ownership in Denmark, a case
of successful agricultural modernisation in Senghaas' s typologies. As the
distribution of landholdings in Tagle 4.2 shows, 77 per cent of landholdings
in Western Anatolia (the most commercialised and developed region of the
peninsula) were less than 5 hectares in size while in Denmark the
corresponding percentage was 32.7. In comparison to the predominance of
medium-sized farms in Denmark, land ownership in Anatolia was much
more "pulverised". On the other hand, while 90 per cent of the farms in
Denmark were owned by the farmers themselves (Senghaas 1985:103), only
31 per cent of the direct producer households owned the landholdings they
were tilling (see Table 4.1). Thus, despite the predominance. of small
landholdings - 82 per cent of total land were comprised of farms with less
than 20 hectares in size - only one-third of these farms were tilled by their
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owners, the rema1n1ng two-thirds were being rented by sharecroppers,
comprising 52.4 per cent of direct producer households.
Table 4.2
Distribution of landholdings with respect to size:
Denmark and Western Anatolia
Denmark 1919
Hectares
N o. of landholdings as
percentage of total
Western Anatolia 1900
Hectares
N o. of landholdings as
percentage of the total
Less than 5
32.7
More than 5
67.3
Less than 5
77
More than 5
33
Sources: Calculated from Pamuk 1987b:192, and Mjøset 1992b:2lO
4.5 The state and the relations between industry and
agriculture
Confronted with the pull of Western European countries in the 19th
century, some areas of the periphery, most notably Scandinavia, managed
to catch up with the industrial core as their primary exports triggered
industrial spin-offs on a large scale. Other areas, such as the Balkans and
Anatolia, on the other hand, could not transform their economic structures
in the direction of industrialIsation despite rising primary exports. In
Hirschmann's (1977) linkage terminology, increases in the exports of staple
goods, primary goods with low value added, did notgenerate enough
"linkage effects" to enhance the development of an'indigenous industry in
these regions. Such export production may trigger new types of production
by linkage effects: forward linkages are established when the initial export
good is used as an input of a new local production, while backward
linkages are established by new local production of inputs for the export
sector. Incomes from the export production may create indirect linkages as
well: consumption linkages are established when export incomes spent on
consumption stimulate new production for domestie consumption demand;
fiscal linkages, on the other hand, are established by taxation of export
incomes and investment of these incomes in new production (Nordhaug
1992:162-9).
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In 19th-century Anatolia,agricultural export commodities (wheat, barley,
cotton, raisins, figs, rawwool) generated very limited linkage effects. In the
production of raw silk backward linkages were strong. Steam-powered silk
reeling mills increased their production towards the end of the century.
Cotton exports, toa, generated some backward linkages with the
establishment of a number of small factories for the cleaning and pressing
of cotton. The brief nature of the cotton export boom between 1862 and
1866 - due to the contraction of American exports because of the American
Civil W ar ~ however, inhibited the consolidation of these linkages (Kurmus
1987). Due to the Ottoman state's heavy taxation of agricultural incomes
and their channelling to unproductive military expenditures, consumption
and fiscallinkages, too, remained limited. Export incomes,u-efiet,-went
to the expenses of the central government, most importantly to its war
effort. Fiscal linkages, were primarily limited to the construction of
railways and reached a moderate magnitude especially during the last
decade of the century. The bulk of railway construction was undertaken by
foreign capital rather than by the Ottoman state.
The inability of agriculture in promoting the industrial transformation of
the AnatolIan economy, can be illustrated by looking at another set of
variables. According to Menzel (1985: 168 cited in Nordhaug 1992: 170)
agriculture has five vital functions during a process of industrialisation:
1. The product contribution of agriculture: food production for the non-
agrarian population and primary goods for industry. In order to sustain
economic transformation, the contribution of agriculture should be to
produce sufficient amounts of both at low prices.
2. The currency contribution of agriculture: export earnings generated by
agriculture which contribute to the necessary imports for
industrialisation.
3. The capital contribution of agriculture: transfer of funds to industrial
investments through taxation and savings.
4. The labour contribution of agriculture: agriculture's supply of a labour
force for industry.
5. The home-market contribution of agriculture: the role of agriculture as
an outlet for manufactured consumer goods and agricultural inputs.
With respect to the experience of 19th-century Anatolia, product
contribution of agriculture was large in consumption goods but small in
industrial inputs. With roughly a quarter of agricultural production going
to exports towards the end of the century, agriculture had a moderately
strong potential for currency contribution to industry. However, as it was
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the case for the potential capital contribution of agriculture, the Ottoman
state' s debt burden and war effort inhibited the realisation of these potential
contributions.
On the other hand, the socio-institutional conditions in agriculture and the
persistence of subsistence-oriented small owner produetion limited
agriculture's supply of a labour force for industry - the fourth functional
contribution on Menzel' s list. The form of the duality in the Ottoman
economy negated the basic premise postulating an "unlimited" labour
supply from the traditional (agricultural) to the modern (industrial) sector
in Lewis' model (Lewis 1954). The absence of a self-sustaining dynamic
between agriculture and industry, which prevented both productivity
increases and a generation of a substantial surplus in agriculture, was
conditioned by the pre-capitalist nature of agrarian surplus extraction
relations (class structure) - an important feature neglected in Lewis' model
(Skarstein 1985:26-44). Thus, one of the major findings of Lewis' model
predicting the tendency of the agricultural sector' s subsistence "wages" to
keep the industrial wages low was not realised in 19th century Anatolia;
urban real wages rose at an average rate of 1 per cent per annum between
1839 and 1913. Furthermore, in spite of a rapid integration into the
international division of labour and specialisation in the direction of
primary commodity exports, the wage differential between the preindustrial
Ottoman economy and industrial economies did not increase in the 19th
century (Boratav, Ökçün, and Pamuk 1985:396-8).8
The absenee of downward pressures on urban wages so as to keep them
at "subsistence" levels was primarily due to the chronic scarcity of
agriculturallabour. Although the high ratio of conscription contributed to
this scarcity, the primary reason for this labour shortage was related to the
Ottoman bureaucracy' s resolute opposition to any movement towards the
dissolution of small ownership in the rural economy, because it regarded
the small peasantry as the fiscal basis. of the state. Neither could the
, position of the Ottoman economy in the 19th century international division
of labour as a producer of cash crops exert à downward pressure on
agricultural "wages". In the produetion of tobacco, raisins, figs, raw wool,
cereals - the commodities the economy was specialising in - wage labour
was of limited significance. Production was predominantly carried out
through family labour by small peasant producers or sharecroppers working
on small landholdings .
The growing commercialisation of agriculture in Anatolia in the 19th
century neither generated increases in agricultural productivity - as was the
case in 17th- century England, 19th-century US or Denmark - nor the
emergence of forced labour - as was the case in 17th-century Eastern
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Europe, or to a lesser degree, 17th and 18th-century Anatolia. The
availability of untilled land, combined with the scarcity of labour, resulted
in an agricultural growth pattern based not on productivity gains but on
increasing the share of cash crops in agricultural production and the amount
of total cultivable land. The upward trend in urban wage levels were the
result of the growth in the Ottoman economy whose impetus was provided
by this low-key dynamism of the agricultural sector.
In addition to inhibiting theemergence of widespread wage labour, the
persistence of subsistence-oriented peasants and the smallholding structure
in 19th-century Anatolian agriculture also limited the home-market
contribution of agriculture - the final point on Menzel' s list. The
contribution of agriculture as a market for manufactured consumer goods
and agricultural inputs remained weak. This was not due to an unequal
distribution of land - the explanatory factor frequently iterated by Senghaas
while accounting for the low level of development of the home market.9
The structure of the Ottoman agriculture was unlike the Latin American or
East European. In these cases the loss of sovereign ty, or semicolonial
status, and the prevalence of large landholdings in agriculture prevented the
transfer of export earnings to agricultural investments and inhibited an
effective enlargement of the home market. In the Ottoman Empire, on the
other hand, the semi-peripheral status of the Empire presided over the
prevalence of small land ownership in agriculture. While the surplus
extraction by the large landowners was the predominant form in Latin
America, in Anatolia the major part of the agricultural surplus was usurped
by the central state. In the Ottoman case, then, the factor mainly
responsible for the inhibition of agricultural modernisation was the effective
taxation system of the central state which, in its turn, used this surplus in
unproductive spheres, the most prominent of which was war making.
Between 1804 and 1913 the Ottoman Empire was involved in 13 major
wars aswell as in numerous insurrections by the various nationalities under
itsrule. Between 1914 and 1922 there was hardlyayear in which the
Empire was not at war. While the Anatolian population was around 15
million at the end of the 19th century, the standing army numbered as
much as 878,000 even at times of no apparent belligerence, and it was
estimated that if the occasion arose half a million reserves could be called
to arms (Kurmus 1981:95).
In the light of the above discussion, an emphasis on the predominance
of large-scale landownership and inegalItarian distributional patterns seem
implausible in explaining the "failure" of industrialisation in the Ottoman
case. Thus, the prematureness of postulating a close correlation between the
distribution structures at the basis of growth and opportunities for truly
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effective development (Mjøset 1992:50-1) also applies to the Ottoman case.
Just as both auto-centric (Germany) and dependent (Latin America)
development seems to have followed from cases of rather well-developed
structural heterogeneity; relatively egalitarian distributional patterns issued
in both successful (Scandinavia) and unsuccessful cases (Ireland) of
industrialisation. In the 19th-century Ottoman Empire relatively egalitarian
distributional patterns led to the persistenee of pre-capitalist relations in
agriculture and structural heterogeneity at the level of the economy, and
thereby limited the growth of the home market.
In addition to agricultural relations of production - smallholder structure
of agriculture and the role of Ottoman state in diverting resources away
from productive activities - a complex set of factors contributed to this
outcoine. Among these factors, the most important were the rivalry between
imperialist powers aiming to obtain "spheres of influence" in the
geopolitically strategic Ottoman Empire, the low level of capital formation
because of the judiciallimitations set by the Ottoman state to accumulation
of wealth, and the population heterogeneity in the Anatolian peninsula.
Conditions of inter-imperialist rivalry created a favourable atmosphere for
the survival of the Ottoman state while, at the same time, draining its
resources through increased military expenditures. Lack or insufficiency of
legal guarantees given to private property, on the other hand, retarded
accumulation of merchant capital and the emergence of the factory system.
Finally, ethnic, religious and above alllinguistic heterogeneity impeded the
formation of a homogeneous market for both labour and capital (see
Anderson 1992 and Gellner 1983 for the role of population homogeneity
in industrialisation). As we shall see in more detail in the'following chapter,
the concentration of the already scarce commercial and industrial capital in
the hands of non-Muslim subjects had an adverse effect on both the lev el
of investments and on the Muslim population's reactions to the
development of capitalist relations of production.
In the light of Brenner's (1977, 1985a, 1985b, 1986) theory on the
agrarian roots of capitalist development, egalItarian starting conditions
become only a special case of a more general theory of capitalist
development. Accordingly, pre-capitalist agricultural producers, because
they have nonmarket access to their means of subsistence, are not prone to
the market rationality of profit maximising and cost-cutting. Pre-capitalist
agriculture is, therefore, not characterised by perpetual productivity gains.
Successful industrialisation can not occur without the transformation of
these pre-capitalist relations in agriculture. Rather than being dependent
upon a relatively egalitarian land distribution, this transformation is
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primarily predicated up on autonomous processes of class structure changes
which emerge as the unintended outcomes of class conflicts.
As the case of early modern France versus England reveals,
transformations which are beneficial to agricultural producers in the short-
term - consolidation of smalllandholdings - can be detrimental to long-
term capitalist development. With the peasants' failure to establish freehold
controlover land in England, from the 16th century onwards landlords were
able to engross, consolIdate and enclose, to create large farms and to lease
them to capitalist tenants who could afford to make capital investments.
The emergence of the tripartite structure of capitalist agriculture constituted
by landlords, capitalist tenant farmers and wage labourers led to significant
inputs of capital, involving the introduction of new technologies and larger
scaleof operation, and this was the key to England' s subsequent successful
economic development (Brenner 1985a:49).IO
The contrasting failure of agricultural transformation in France followed
directly from the continuing strength of peasant landholdings in the early
modern period, while they were disintegrating in England. The economic
and political rights - to use the commons, to fix rents and to secure
hereditability - won by the peasants led to the predominance of petty
proprietorship in Franee which ensured long-term agricultural
backwardness. Technical barriers to improvement built into the structure of
smallholdings, development of a surplus extraction structure which tended
to discourage agricultural investment - in particular, the heavy taxation by
the monarchical state resulting from the mutual dependenee between strong
peasant property and absolutist state - and the subdivision of holdings by
peasants blocked agricultural modernisation.
The divergent paths taken by France and England in the early modern
period resulted in disparate agricultural structures: by the end of the 17th
century in France, 40-50 per cent of the cultivated land was still in peasant
possession, in England, by contrast, owner-occupiers at this time had no
more than 25-30 per cent of the land (Brenner 1985a:61). The "egalitarian"
structure implying most complete freedom and property rights for the rural
population in Franee meant a long-term failure of agricultural productivity
and a corresponding inability to develop the home market in France. It was
the absenee of such rights in English agriculture that facilitated the gradual
construction of mutually interdependent and mutually self-developing
agricultural and industrial sectors and the onset of economic development
(Brenner 1985a:62, 1985b:326).
Similarly, in the 19th-century Anatolia, it was the social-property systems
in agriculture which blocked the path towards industrialisation.
Geographical, demographie or commercial trends like the availability of
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uncultivated land, scarcity of labour or the expansion of external trade
gained significance only in connection with these historically developed
systems of social property relations and given balances of dass and state
forces. The priority given to property relations and consequently to the
outcome of dass conflicts in the explanation of the onset of
industrialisation does not imply a voluntarist vision of history. Far from
being the product of conscious design by any of the actors involved, the
emergence of capitalist agrarian relations and industrialisation should be
seen as "an unintended consequence of the actions of individual pre-
capitalist actors and especially the conflicts between pre-capitalist classes"
(Brenner 1986:26). Such a perspective on the transformation dynamics of
pre-capitalist agricultural relations requires an incorporation of political
factors into the analysis. There is an interdependent relationship between
the system's limited potential for long-term economic growth and what
Brenner calls "political accumulation" - that is, the build-up of a larger,
more effective military organisation and/or the construction of a stronger
surplus extracting machinery (Brenner 1985b:238).
A revers al in the "political accumulation" pattern in the beginning of the
19th century led to the consolidation of small peasant ownership in
Ottoman Anatolia. The long period of decentralised rule in the 17th and
18th centuries came to an halt with the implementation of the Tanzimat
reform programme of centralisation and Westernisation. The central state
reasserted its authority and broke the power of tax-farmers and local
magnates (ayans), and regained control of the peasants' surplus. The result
was a resurgence of small peasant proprietorship. After the historical detour
of tax - farming, small peasant ownership, whose rudimentary forms had
already existed in the timar system, was finally given de facto recognition
with the Land Law of 1858. Because the imposition of the Tanzimat
reforms meant higher taxes for the peasantry and more of the surplus going
to treasuryand increasingly less to ayans, the implementation of these
reforms met with some resistance. However, the incidence of unrest
remained low in Anatolia due to the prevalence of small family holdings
(Quataert 1991).
The persistence of peasant proprietorship and Its final consolidation in the
19th century was closely related to the form of evolution of the Ottoman
state. Enhanced by its infrastructural capacities and sustained by the balance
of power in the interstate arena, the Ottoman centralised state developed as
a class-like phenomenon - i.e. as an independent extractor of surplus - in
particular on the basis of its power to tax the land. The state had an interest
in limiting tax-farmers' rents so as to enable the peasants to pay more in
taxes - and thus in intervening against the ayans' control of the peasants.
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Peasants, on the other hand, when they gained freehold property, exposed
themselves to exploitation providing the financial basis for the autonomy
and strength of the state.11 The target of the limited peasant unrest in 19th-
century Anatolia was, therefore, the heavy taxation of the central state
which, ironically, had been instrumental in securing peasant ownership and
thus impeding capitalist development.
The consolidation of smallholding peasantry was retrogressive for long-
term economic development and consequently for the advancement of
industriaIIsation for a number of interconnected reasons. Firstly, the small
size of the peasant holding set definite limits to the advance of production
and to the application of technology. Secondly, peasant plots were
increasingly subject to heavy taxation by the Ottoman state. The state took
a large part of the agricultural surplus and spent it unproductively on the
financing of war. Thirdly, although the peasants sold part of their output on
the market, the reproduction of their means of production and subsistence
did not depend on it. The peasant proprietors or the sharecropper tenant
families employed on small farms were under relatively little pressure to
operate their plots as profitably or effectively as their potential competitors
in order to "hold their place" in the market for tenants or in the market for
goods. All that was necessary for them was sufficient output to provide for
subsistence and to pay the taxes.
In other words, the freeholding peasantry did not have to produce at a
competitive leve!, because they did not have to sell in order to reproduce.
In this way, small property tended to dictate individualisedand
unspecialised production. Rather than specialising, the peasants tended to
diversify their own production in order to produee as many as possible of
their own necessities on their own plots. Within such a structure, cash crops
did not dominate the market or the agricultural exports. Peasants increased
their output for market purehases merely by intensifying their labour -
rather than by applying productivity increasing techniques - in the
production of mainly subsistence products (cf. the theory of self-exploiting
peasantry in Shanin 1986). Finally, this generalised peasant proprietorship
blocked the creation of a home market for industrial goods which might
have been used for increasing agricultural productivity, and by inhibiting
the separation of agricultural producers from their means of production and
subsistence, retarded the generation of industrial and agricultural wage
labourers. In the absence of competitive pressures, productivity increases
in agriculture which might have issued in an upward spiral of
interdependent growth in agricultural and industrial sectors were not
realised. Though their efficacy declined through the impact of the imported
European goods, guilds organising urban industries continued their
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operations throughout the 19th century. The limited demand provided by
agriculture meant little pressure for innovation in the urban industry; hence
the continuing rationale of guilds limiting entry and output, and determining
methods of production.
N otes
1. Tanzimat was officially inaugurated in November 1839, by the reading of the Hatt-i
Hümayun (rescript) of Gü1hane, the charter which described the aim of the reform. It
continued to be implemented up to and beyond the reign of Sultan Abdü1hamid. Although the
Young Turks disassociated themselves in the 1910s from this 19th-century reform movement,
claiming that they had introduced a radical element into the reform, their policies were in the
mainstream of the Tanzimat (Mardin 1989:30).
2. The motivations underlying the commencement of the Tanzimat reforms is stil a matter
of dispute among the historians. The controversy arises with respect to assessing the relative
weights of the pressures of foreign imperial powers and the genuine reformist tendencies of
sections of the Ottoman bureaucracy. On the one hand, Tanzimat was in close conformity with
the legaL. and commercial preoccupations of Britain and France -hence explicit clauses in the
reforms protecting the rights of non-Muslim minorities especially with respect to private
property rights and judicial trials based on secular principles - on the other hand, these
reforms also included measures attempting to increase the administrative efficiency of the
Empire and to secure its financIal base. The initiation, adoption and the implementation of
the reforms took shape according to a balance of forces among three basic circles: the leaders
of the Ottoman bureaucracy, diplomats of the Great Powers, and the Muslim, Christian, and
Jewish communities to which the reforms were directed (Timur 1987: 10).
3. It would be wrong however to exaggerate the oppositionality between graduates of
medreses and graduates of modern schools as astruggle between traditionalists and
modernists. Therefore, I would dispute modernisation theorists' (e.g. Frey 1965:37-8) claim
that the Ottoman 19th century can best be understood as a power struggle between
"modernists" influenced by a Western-oriented, secular education on the one hand and a
"traditionalist" educated elite trained in medreses on the other hand. As we have already noted
many of the leading ulema were not onlysupporters but also active proponents of reform (cf.
Szyliowicz 1971:375). An important fador in the hostility of ulema to the new bureaucrats
was probably related to career considerations.
4. The fathers of about 70 per cent of the graduates of the Civil Service School, the primar
higher educational institution from which the bureaucrats were recruited, were civil or military
officials (Szyliowicz 1971:393). Non-Muslims on the other hand never made up as large a
share of thebureaucracy as of the population of the Empire. From the mid-19th century to
the 191Os, the proportion of Muslims in various ministries increased from around 75 per cent
to nearly 100 per cent. In istanbul, in the corresponding period, the non-Muslim population
declined from 50 to only 40 per cent. Only in the Foreign Ministry was the non-Muslim
representation higher, but even there Muslim bureaucrats were disproportionately represented
(Findley 1991: 102-12).
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5. A notable example in this regard was the failure of the attempts to institute a self-
governing municipality in Pera (the section of istanbul mainly inhabited by the non-Muslim
bourgeoisie) as analysed by Rosenthal (1980). Unwiling to sacrifice the privileges granted
to them through Western imperial powers - most importantly extraterritoriality - the
bourgeoisie chose short-term gains over long-term political effectiv~ness.
6. Not only were the tariff rates on imports kept at low levels (5 per cent ad valorem) until
W orId War I, but all exports from the Empire, among them exports of cotton c10th woven
with imported yarn, were subject to high tariffs (12 per cent ad valorem) until the 1860s.
Moreover, the external trade regime imposed by the imperial powers was not the only source
of discrimination against domestic manufacturers. In order to raise revenues, the central
government subjected domestically produced commodities transported over land from one part
of the Empire to another to a 12 per cent internal customs duty until 1860; those transported
within the Empire by sea were subject to a 4 per cent duty until1889 (Pamuk 1987a:113).
7. This position corresponds to Tily's (1983) argument in the proto-industrialisation debate.
Proto-industrialisation is defined as widespread industrial production in rural areas in the 17th
and 18th-century Europe. Its main sectors involved spinning and weaving of wool and linen,
and manufacturing of iron and wood products. Proto-industrial activities were based on the
part-time employment of the rural labour force in small-sized production units. While in
Mendels' (1972) model proto-industrialisation is seen as a forerunner of successful
industrialisation, Tily is critical of the attempts adding proto-industry as a missing link in the
transition from predominantly agricultural production to the Industrial Revolution. In Tily's
typologies of transition to capitalism, successful industrialisation ensues even when
deindustrialisation foiiows proto- industrialisation.
8. The stable wage gap between the US and Ottoman Empire in the 19th century provides a
stark contrast to the tendency of widening wage differentials in the 20th century . While the
Ottoman wages were around 30 per cent of the US wages on the eve of the First WorId War,
in 1974 Turkish wages were estimated to be around 18 per cent of the US wages; in 1980 the
ratio had dropped 10 per cent. Between 1913 and 1980, the ratio of metropole wages to
Ottoman/urkish wages increased from 2.5-fold to tenfold (Boratav, Ökçün and Pamuk
1985:393-4). The low industrial wage 1evels in the 19th century industrial economies as a
result of the prevalence of competitive forms of regulation were effective in generating this
trend. The high growth in industrial countries based on monopolistic regulation and a high
wage profile in the period after the Second W orId War was mainly responsible for the
widening wage gap.
9. Among the socio-structural, institutional and political factors constituting a development
promoting profile, Senghaas (1985) seems to ascribe a strategic explanatory role to moderate
- rather than gross - inequality in the initial distribution of the main resource - namely, land.
Both in his comparative discussion of the 19th century small exporter countries (1985 :95-138)
and larger countries (1985: 138-57), he stresses the importance of egalitarian land distribution
in the modernisation and diversification of the agricultural economy and the opening up of
the domestic market via promoting the transfer of agricultural surplus to productivity
increasing investments in agriculture rather than unproductive consumption. In Senghaas's
account of the transition from an export enc1ave to an auto-centric economy, the distribution
profie is fundamentally important. Widely dispersed export receipts result in a demand profie
that is oriented towards industrialisation thus serving to produce widely accessible mass
consumer goods leading to an opening up of the domestic market (1985: 163). Senghaas
briefly refers to the contrasting cases of the Balkan countries (1985:47) - e.g. Greece and
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Bulgaria - where relatively egalitarian land distribution patterns did not lead to auto-centric
development; he explicitly states that "where predominantly fragmentation of the land in too
small holdings prevails - that is, where export income per producer is very low (the Balkan
countries in the 19th century), dynamic development is inhibited despite broadly distributed
landed property, because fragmented land does not allow the production of surplus, therefore
remains undercapitalised and resembles a poor subsistence economy more than a
commercialised farming one" (1985: 164). By hindsight, Senghaas tentatively points out that
L 9th-century Anatolian agriculture verifies his hypothesis about the dose connection between
a stagnating agriculture (smallholdings with no productivity increases) and the improbability
of a more embryonic industrialisation to which he empirically refers usually by hinting to the
Balkans, to Galicia in Spain and to South Western Germany (personal communication with
the author).
10. This does not mean that this "dassic"English pattern was the only way for an agricultural
breakthrough leading to economic development. In Catalonia, during the same period, a
similar breakthrough was initiated by large-scale owner-cultivators also using wage-labour
(Brenner 1985a:49). In the 19th-century US the social basis of agricultural modernisation was
owner-operator famly farmers. These agricultural producers had retained the control of their
means of production but were, from the 1820s onwards, largely market dependent for their
means of subsistence. Through their market dependence, these owner-operator farmers had
to cut costs by purchasing agricultural machinery; they, thereby, created a demand for a
capital goods industry. Furthermore, because agriculture could only with diffculty supply a
sufficient labour force to industry, industrial wages rose. The growth of agricultural
productivity thus combined with the growth of the wages, on the one hand, increased workers'
purchasing power and thereby their demand for nonfood consumer goods, and on the other
hand, stimulated cost-cutting technical change in the industry as a whole (Brenner and Glick
1991:70-1). The self-sustaining spiral of growth between capital and consumer goods
industries and agriculture laid the foundations of US industrial supremacy in the 20th century.
11. The "weakness" of the Ottoman state vis-à-vis England, France, Germany or Russia in the
geopolitical arena did not decrease its "strength" in enforcing policies which tended to
strengthen its grip over the domestic economy through cash-taxing the peasantry and
perpetuating the craft organisation of industry by its control of the guilds. On the contrary,
as the external debt of the Ottoman Empire increased towards the end of the century, the
Western powers tended to support the Ottoman state's position vis-à-vis tax-farmers, and
encouraged its effective taxation of the peasantry. With the establishment of the Public Debt
Administration (PDA) - the foreign consortium managing the repaymentof Ottoman foreign
debt - the domestic strength of the Ottoman state seems to have been replaced by the salaried
agents of the PDA who collected some of the agricultural taxes directly. The change of the
destination of the agricultural surplus from one unproductive sphere - the Ottoman state -
to another - external debt payrnents to Western states or companies - meant liUle with
respect to the dynamics of agricultural structure. In other words, the state's relationship to the
nondevelopment of capitalist relations in Anatolian agriculture was not related to its external
"strength" or "weakness"; its contribution to the relative stagnation of agriculture was not
mediated by its transfer of surplus out of Anatolia but rather by its interconnection, with the
domestic dass structure. Thus, contrary to Wallerstein's emphasis on treating state forms and
strength as simple functions of positions in the world capitalist division of labour, economic
and political power were not perfectlY correlated (cf. Skocpo! 1973:31). Also compare this
argument with Brenner's discussion of the 17th-century Polish and Prussian state (1977:65-6).
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5. The nation-building phase
5.1 The emergence of Turkish nationalism
Printing had been introduced to the Ottoman Empire in 1727-29; after
stagnating for a long time, it expanded only in the first half of the 19th
century. The 1870s saw the emergence of a sizable vernacular press in
istanbuL. In the subsequent years, concomitant with theexpansion of
printing, the growth of journalism created a new readership in istanbul and
other large provincial towns (Mardin 1989:31). Towards the end of the
century, the newspapers and periodicals printed in Turkish (the vernacular
language of the bulk of the population in Anatolia) proliferated. The
increasing readership among the intelligentsia, educated in the newly
established modern schools and employed in the state administration and
milItary, contributed considerably to the spread of Turkish nationalist
sentiments in the state bureaucracy. Through their bilingual literacy -
particularly French - the vanguard of the bureaucracy came to see modern
Western culture and the models of nationalism it presented as a remedy to
the decline of the Empire.
By the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, the student
body of The Civil Service School (Mülkiye) and The Military Academy
(Harbiye) - the primary sources of civilian and military bureaucratic
recruitment - was increasingly drawn from Anatolia. The growing influx
of students from the interior Anatolian provinces was related to the
developments in communication and education that had been going on since
the mid-19th century. Most of these students were sons of local bureaucrats
and military officers. Bureaucratic recruitment was, in effect, exclusively
carried out from within the state bureaucracy itself, and the fact that
recruitment patterns had shifted to Muslims from official backgrounds and
from other parts than istanbul (Szyliowicz 1971:397) gave an additional
impetus to the growing influence of nationalism in the bureaucracy. In this
sense, the centralising and standardising administrative and educational
reforms of the 19th century facilitated both the emergence of a bureaucratic
stratum and created the infrastructural conditions of its subsequent nation-
building project.
The dead end of "Ottoman nationalism" - the aim of constructing a
pseudo-nation-state from among the subjects of the multinational Empire
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-led to the con vers ion of Ottoman intellectuals to Turkish nationalism. The
initial manifestation of Turkish nationalist sentiment among the
intelligentsia in the beginning of the 20th century was the search for a
Turkish national identity and the construction of a social unit y by the
"awakened" Turks. The movement was led by Gökalp, a sociologist who,
through a radical reading of Durkheim, advocated the creation of a Turkish
nation united by a solidaristie sentiment, organised in guilds articulating
their interests within a corporatist framework (ParIa 1991). Gökalp,
although later discredited as a result of his Pan-Turkist ideals, became the
intellectual mentor of the Turkish nationalist movement which subsequently
established the Turkish Republic. His advocacy ofa Turkish nation,
speaking the same language, sharing a common past, and united in its
religious, moral and aesthetic ideals (Gökalp 1923), had close parallels to
Fichte' sintegral nationalIsm in its rejection of individualliberties implicit
in liberal nationalism and in its glorifying the ascriptive and "primordial
sentiments" of the nation (Smith 1971: 16).
The accelerating imperial decline combined with the rise of nationalIst
,movements in the Balkansand the repressive rule of Abdülhamid prompted
the 1908 coup d' état which was organisedby a group of military officers
affiliated to Ittihat ve Terakki Teskilati, the Commttee of Union and
Progress Party (CUP), popularly referred to as the Y oung Turks. The
declared aim of the CUP military putsch was to protect the territorial
integrity of the Empire and to restore its constitutional government after a
three decade interrption brought about by the despotie sultan Abdülhamid
regime. The Y oung Turk seizure of power occurred in the con text of
mounting popular unrest which stemmed from widespread crop failures,
high food prices, declining standard of living among workers, mobilisation
among railroad and mine workers, and bread riots in a number of towns
and cities (Quataert 1979). The agitation of the Y oung Turk revolutionaries
were crucial in translating the economic discontents of the population into
popular unrest. Y oung Turk provocateurs in the higher echelons of the
provincial statebureaucracy played an active role in the initiation of riots
(Quataert 1986:483).
After the parliament and electoral process were reinstated following the
1908 takeover, the CUP dominated the parliament. Rather than being based
on a class mobilisation "from below", the CUP' s structure was composed
of military, bureaucratic, and intellectual cliques which "used the urban
crowd with consummate skill in their political manoeuvres" (Ahmed
1969:161-2). Turks now constituted half of the deputies in the parliament
and the proportion of non-Muslim deputies had declined relative to the first
parliament in 1877 - a trend which would continue until the dissolution of
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the Ottoman parliament in 1920. Under the increasingly repressive policies
of the CUP during the Balkan War and then during the First WorldWar,
the small opposition party, the Liberals (Osmanli Ahrar Firkasi) found it
harder and harder to contest the CUP. Although it was not officially
outlawed, by 1914 the Liberal Party was condemned to passivity. Towards
the final dissolution of the Empire, the already weak political opposition of
the Liberals - who favoured parliamentary democracy, administrative
decentralisation, more reliance on private initiative and a more Ottomanist
policy - was, under the harsh atmosphere generated by external military
threat, crushed by the modernising, centralising, nationalist, authoritarian
CUP (Özbudun 1987:335).
From around the 1860s, the non-Muslim religious communities of the
Empire were fastening to a newsense of identity promoted by their
churches. Turkish nationalism, being at the core of the Empire and most
closely associated with its ruling elite, developed belatedly and in part as
a reaction to these nationalIsms. The transition from the aim of creating an
Ottoman nation to the advocacy of forming a linguistically and religiously
"homogeneous Turkish nation was most discernable in the ideological
transformation undergone by the Y oung Turk regime. The initial liberal and
Ottomanist ideals, which the CUP cadres had inherited from their Y oung
Ottoman precursors, gave way to a repressive and ultranationalIst
orientation under external military threat and internal secessionist
movements. It was, in fact, the Y oung Turks' increasing association of the
two, the involvement of imperial powers in the nationalist movements of
the Empire - the rise of Balkan nationalism under the auspices of Russia
and growing English support to Arab nationalist movements - which led
to the proliferation of Turkish nationalist ideas. The CUP cadres began to
envis age a new Turkish state in place of the m,ultination Ottoman Empire.
With the rise of Turkish nationalism, agitation of the Y oung Turks to
consolidate the CUP regime led to disharmonious relations among the
Ottoman religious and ethnic communities. Under the conditions of
,,' economIc"strife,secessionist Balkan nationalism and external military
threat, the potential for violence against Ottoman Christians were kept alive
by the CUP' s policies. The dictatorial centralism of the CUP regime did not
stop the decline of the Empire. Increasingly bent in the direction of
nationalism, the CUP furthered the repression of the subject nationalities of
the Empire. The fact that the Empire had lost most of its territories lying
outside its Anatolian heartland by 1913 precipitated the decision of the
Germanophile Y oung Turk faction to enter the First W orId War against the
Entente in an attempt to recapture the former Ottoman territories and to
rejuvenate Ottoman imperial ideals. The defeat in the War led to the
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disintegration of the Empire. The perceived threat the Armenian minority
presented in the War with Russia led to the killing and forced deportation
of the largest non-Muslim minority in Eastern Anatolia in 1915 (Melson
1991). This facilitated, however, to the dismay of most CUP cadres, the
subsequent realisation of the newly found Y oung Turk ideal of the creation
of a homogeneous Turkish nation in AnatolIa.
The Young Turk regime's policies did not correspond to the interests of
a particular class; they more closely reflected the detachment of the CUP
from the bourgeoisie and tax-farmers. The Y oung Turk resistance to
Abdülhamid' s regime had found some initial support among provincial
notables whose position had been deterioratingin the face ,of the
increasingly effective central rule of the Sultan. The formation of PDA in
1881 had probably also weakened the notables' fiscal hold as tax-farmers
when the PDA' s salaried agents collected agricultural taxes on behalf of the
foreign consortium (Quataert 1991:42). But the subsequent rule of the
y oung Turks did not strengthen these initial relations. The CUP remained
above all an urban movement based on the intelligentsia and bureaucrats in
i the big cosmopolitan cities of the Empire - Salonica, istanbul, izmir. With
its growing nationalist orientation following 1913, the CUP becamei
increasingly hostile to the Christian bourgeoisie.
Under the "national economy" programme, CUP policies were aimed at
creating a Muslim Turkish bourgeois class. Nevertheless the enrichment of
individuals, those within the bureaucracy or those with informallinks with
the bureaucratic cadres through war-time profiteering, exacerbated the
dependence of the nascent Muslim bourgeoisie on the state bureaucracy.
The inevitable outcome of the CUP' sinvolvement in the economy was
widespread corruption. Patronage became one way to enrich loyal party
members and to create a Muslim bourgeoisie (Ahmed 1988:272). With the
abolition of the Capitulations and the suspension of foreign controlover
state finances by the PDA, CUP policies increased sovereignty over the
domestic economy. This increased national sovereignty was provided by the
outbreak of the First World War: only then did the Porte find the
opportunity to abrogate the Capitulations unilaterally without the fear of
foreign intervention. With the boost this provided to the nationalist
sentiment, the CUP cadres set about the task of Turkifying the Ottoman
state and society: Turkish was declared to be the language used in all
official communications, and a decree was issued requiring all shop signs
to be in Turkish (Toprak 1982).
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5.2 The formation of the Republie
Before the defeat in the First World War, the CUP leadership had began to
lay the basis for the defence of Turkish national rights against the policies
of the Entente and the Christian minorities through a future armed strugg1e.
This attempt found its definitive expression in the National Pact (Misak-i
Milli) - resolutions adopted by the nationalist representatives in the last
Ottoman parliament in 1920. In effect, the National Pact demanded the
preservation of the Ottoman territories with a MuslIm majority - with the
exception of Arab provinces under occupation where a plebiscite was
demanded - as an indivisible and independent whole within the armistice
boundaries established at the end of the W ar.
When the pressure of the Entente powers on istanbul increased with the
arrests of key figures of the nationalIst movement and the eventual closure
of the last Ottoman parliament in 1920, the centre of nationalist agitation
shifted from the capital to provincial centres. In Eastern and Western
Anatolia, and particularly in those areas which were most threatened by
Armenian and Greek territorial claims respectively, "societies for the
defenceof national rights" were established. The driving force and control
of these organisations were local CUP branches; of ten, however, large
landowners and religious dignitaries were recruited as figureheads to
emphasise the national and nonpartisan character of the movement (Zürcher
1984:88-93). Rather than being representative, these organisations were
packed with local CUP leaders trying to mobilise the Muslim population
through meetings and mass demonstrations.
In spite of the initial role the CUP played in the organisation of the
national resistance, the movement was dominated by the followers of
Mustafa Kemal from 1919 onwards. Mustafa Kemal had been a member of
the CUP since its inception in spite of his stringent criticism of the policies
of the CUP leadership. As a successful general with a nationwide
reputation, having extensive ties with CUP cadres without being c10sely
identified with the policies of the wartime CUP leadership, Kemal made
use of the networks of the CUP in the army and the provincial
administration in his successful organisation of the dispersed resistance
movement. As he became less dependent on CUP resources, he gradually
outflanked the CUP structures. As the Y oung Turk leadership had fled the
country following the defeat in the War, the CUP cadres were dispersed
and lacked the emerging centralising thrst of the Kemalist movement.
With the establishment of Anadolu Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk-u Milliye
Cemiyeti (Association for the Defence of the Nationalist Rights of Anatolia
and Rumelia) (ADNR), a nationwide congress of "the societies for the
defence of national rights" with Mustafa Kemal as its president, the
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resistance movement became centralised and gained momentum. Under the
external threat of Greek invasion andwith the support of former CUP
generals and officers in the army Kemal' s leadership was gradually
consolidated. The first indications of a transition from a nationalist
resistance movement towards the creation of a nation-state came with the
establishment of Büyük Millet Meclisi (Grand National Assembly) in
Ankara in 1920 when British troops occupied istanbul and disbanded the
Ottoman parliament.
Following the final victory over the Greek invasion army in 1922, which
strengthened his position immensely, Kemal started to make his bid for
absolute civilian power. Soon after the Sultanate was abolished by the
National Assembly, he founded Cumhuriyet HaIk Firkasi, the Republican
People's Party (RPP) to succeed ADNR. In the years following the
establishment of the new Republic in 1923, the victorious nationalist
resistance evolved into a movement aspiring to radically modernise Turkish
society. The new regime undertook a momentous secularisation move: in
1924 the Caliphate, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the medreses, and the
ulema hierarchy were abolished. The training of state employees conducting
religious services were placed under the auspices of the government and
suffered a sharp decline. The disestablishment of Islam continued in 1926
with the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code (Toprak 1981:54). In 1932 the
Arabic call to prayer was made illegaL.
The new movement dominated by Kemal and organised in the RPP had
eliminated its rivals within the nationalist movement and had given way to
a monolithic one-party state by 1926 (Tuncay 1981). The struggle for
power, ending with the dominance of Kemal and his followers, only
slightly revolved around programmatic differences between rival factions.
Rather the power struggle was between "those who laid claim to authority
independent of Mustafa Kemal on account of their status as resistance
leaders or as former CUP leaders, and those who were prepared to accept
his authority unquestioningly" (Zürcher 1984: 119). The gradual elimination
of rival power centres had come with the British occupation of istanbul
when the CUP leadership lost its freedom of action. Later in 1920-21 the
meagre left-wing resistance seeking closer ties with the newly established
Soviet Union was crushed. This was followed by an unsuccessful bid for
power by the former war-time CUP leadership. In 1923, via the means of
rigged election laws, the liberal opposition to Kemal in the Assembly was
removed. Lastly , in an atmosphere characterised by hesitant popular
opposition to the disestablishment of Islam and more importantly under the
martiallaw imposed in Eastern Anatolia following the Kurdish rebellion in
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1925, Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Firkasi, the Progressive Republican Party
(PRP) was closed.
The closure of the PRP, the opposition party led by some of the leaders
of the nationalist resistance movement, marked the beginning of the
uncontested rule of the RPP. Contrary to the subsequent claims of official
Kemalist historiography, the PRP was not involved in the Kurdish uprising,
neither was this small opposition reactionary: its programme did notplea
for a larger role of Islam, for a return of the Caliphate or for any other
attempt to reverse the constitutional changes that had taken place between
1922 and 1924. The only difference of some substance was related to
economic policy prescriptions; the PRP, during its brief life, laid more
emphasis on the elimination of state influence,decentralisation, free trade
and use of foreign capital (Zürcher 1991: 107 -8). The drastic suppression of
the PRP opposition was not, however, related to its advocacy of the
principles of classical liberalism. The PRP was a potentially dangerous
competitor to Kemalist RPP not because it represented a diametrically
opposed ideology, but because it was made up of the very same groups
which formed the core of the nationalist movement from which the RPP
had issued: "there was no room at the top for (an) opposition that tried to
mobilise support from the main sources of Kemalist strength" (Frey
1965:335).
In the two decades following its taking of power in 1908 in the Ottoman
Empire, the nationalist movement had sought to safeguard the Muslim parts
of the Empire and, opposing extreme external military threat, had
established a nation-state in Anatolia. During the proeess, through an
elimination of alternative power centres within the movement, Mustafa
Kemal and his followers had instituted political dominance in the newly
foundedRepublic. Rather than bein g an expression of class mobilisation,
the power struggle had been a factional fight within the nationalist
movement itself. The Kemalist RPP' s dominance meant the beginning of
a centralist tradition which would put more emphasis on the effectiveness
of the state to force through reforms. Although not much of an economic
policy was evolveduntil the implementation of étatisme in the early 1930s,
the RPP' s initial declared policywas' one of self-reliance and the necessity
of having an indigenous industry. While avoiding popular mobilisation and
restoring the centralist thrust of the 19th-century Ottoman state, the RPP
under the leadership of Kemal, who wielded a mild form of Führerprinzip,
became an instrument of authoritarian modernisation.
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5.3 The nature of the Turkish revolution
The sharp decrease in the Christian population of AnatolIa during the First
World War and in the immediate aftermath of the Independence War had
two important consequences for the subsequent path of the Turkish
economic and political regime. 
1 On the one hand, it diminished the ethnic
and religious heterogeneity which had undoubtedly contributed to the slow
growth of the infrastructural powers of the state and retarded the
development of a domestic market sustained by a linguistically
homogeneous population.2 On the other hand, the departed or perished
Christian minorities probably contained 90 per cent of the pre-First World
War bourgeoisie (Keyder 1987:69); their elimination increased the absence
of bourgeoisie influence on the subsequent Kemalist rule and contributed
to its class-aloofness. The rise of the nationalist sentiment had,
unintentionally, played a decisive influence in the determining the balance
of forces between the classes and state bureaucracy.
The particular nature of the proeess leading to the decrease in population
heterogeneity - its violent form under the exigencies of the international
war - added to the centralist and repressive thrust of Turkish nation-
building. Now predominantly Muslim, the ethnic and religious mosaic of
the newly founded Republic went deeper; in addition to small ethnic groups
(most notably Laz, Arab, and Circassian), the Alevi Muslim religious sect
comprised about 15 per cent of the population (Andrews ed. 1991).3 More
importantly, the linguistically distinct Kurdish population comprising as
much as 15-20 per cent of the population, largely living in Eastern
Anatolia, presented the greatest barrier to the nation-building programme
of the Kemalist regime. Ethnic diversity was perceived as a danger to the
integrity of the state, and the Kurds, as the largest ethnic group, constituted
the most serious threat. The use of Kurdish language was forbidden, family
and village names were Turkicised, all external symbols of Kurdish ethnic
identity as well as Kurdish cultural heritage were suppressed.
In the 1930s, following the Kurdish rebellions, large numbers of Kurds
were deported to Turkey's Western provinces while other ethnic groups
(Circassians, Laz, and immigrants from the former Balkan territories of the
Ottoman Empire) were settled in Kurdish districts. These assimilation
policies were backed up by a new official historical doctrine according to
which Kurds were originally Turks who had lost their language by
historical accident (Bruinessen van 1978). The final assimilation policies of
Turkish nationalIsm was related to its "Ottoman nationalist" origins. As we
have seen, Ottoman nationalism had been transformed into Turkish
nationalism under the pressure of events leading to secessions from the
Empire. When the nation-state was finally established in Anatolia in the
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1920s, the Ottoman nationalist ideal of unit y between Muslim and non-
Muslim communities was forcefully applied this time to the Kurdish
Muslim ethnic community.
Theviolent repression of the Kurdish rebellions in the 1930s, together
with the effects of assimilation policies, effectively subdued the Kurdish
nationalism until the 1970s and 1980s when Kurdish nationalism, which
until then had remained restricted to a limited circle of intellectuals only,
established a mass base. The repression of the ',' Kurdish language and
identity in the earIy years of the Republic not only laid the foundations of
the subsequent restrictive policies of the Turkish state, but it also prevented
a considerably large part of the population benefitting fully from the
educational system of the'RepublIc,.thus contributing to the growing scale
of the regional disparities in AnatolIa.
These conditions surrounding the formation of the Republic continued to
haunt the state bureaucracy. The necessity for having a "strong" state in
order to defend the Republic against the "external and internal enemies"
trying to "divide and rule" the country became a pillar of the ideology of
the Republican bureaucracy. The state repression exercised on the pretext
of maintaining "unit y" was an important apology for the continued
existence of regressive legal practices preventing an effective articulation
of dass and group interests. As we shall see in the next chapter, this
resulted in the avoidance of institutionalised linkages between the state and
the society, and inhibited the realisation of the state's subsequent strong
development drive.
The roots of this ideology must be sought in the Y oung Turk era. Despite
their claims to the contrary, most of the RPP cadres, including Kemal
Atatürk - who later adopted the last name Atatürk, "the father of Turks"
following the laws introducing last names - had their origins in the CUP,
though not in its ruling factions. The Y oung Turks' devastating experience
of the final disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the Kemalist cadres '
Independence War against the Greek invasion of Western Anatolia in the
aftermath of the First W orId War contributed to the formation of a unique
blend of outlook in the state bureaucracy of the newly founded Republic.
Being at once the descendants of the ruling stratum of a former empire and
the victors of an "independence" war, their nation-building project was
characterised by a conceit of popular classes, ethnic and religious
minorities, and a forceful modernisation of the political, social and
economic institutions of the Republic "from above" in order to reach "the
leve! of Western civilisation".
The mediation of three important particularities characterised Turkish
nation-building and drew it close to the "revolution-from-above" route to
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capitalist industrialisation described by Moore (1967).4 Firstly, the relative
weakness of tax-farmers vis-à-vis the Ottoman state charted in the previous
chapter undermined any substantial role which might have been played by
this agrarian landed class in this period. Secondly, the elimination and
expulsion of the majority of the Armenian and Greek populations between
1914- 24 diminished the already meagre strength of the bourgeoisie, most
ofwhich was Christian. Thirdly, the state bureaucracy's - both military and
civilian factions - perceived threat to the territorial integrity of the Empire
and their own political survival, reaching an all time peak in the period
between the 1912-13 Balkan Wars and 1919-22 Independence War against
the Greek invasion, strengthened the autonomous action of the bureaucracy:
between 1908 and 1922 there was hardlyayear when the Empire was at
peace. These intern al - related to the class, ethnic and religious structures
within the Empire - and external - related to geopolitical relations in the
interstate arena - conditions increased the lIkelihood of bureaucratic action
autonomous from classes and foreign powers, and determined the
subsequent character of the RepublIcan regime.5
Theworkability of the bureaucracy' sindependent action was further
increased by additional factors which permitted the reproduction of the
bureaucracy as a distinct social stratum without discontinuities. On the one
hand, the Ottoman bureaucracy survived intact through the process leading
to the final disintegration of the Empire: the Empire was never colonised,
nor did it become an informal empire with the bureaucracy totally
subordinated. On the other hand, the structure of landownership in the 19th
century, the predominance of small independent peasant proprietors and
relatively few large landowners, provided a secure financial and political
base for the reproduction of the state bureaucracy while at the same time
detaching it from the particularistic interests of agrarian classes.6 Finally,
the increasing recruitment of bureaucratic cadres from the modern
educational institutions, which were established during the 19th-century
reforms, generated a cultural gap between the members of the state elite
and the bulk of the AnatolIan population. The "Westernised" members of
the bureaucracy began to see themselves as "enlightened despots" who
would bring Western values and life-style to a predominantly Muslim
population, if ne ed be by dictatorial means.
The causes of the belatedness of Turkish nation-building which, as will
be argued, consequently constituted one of the primary reasons for the
failure of the subsequent late-industrialisation attempt were related to the
independence/dependence of religious institutions and the conditions for the
development of a distinctive linguistic standard - the two major cultural
dimensions identified by Rokkan (1975) to explain the variations in nation-
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building in Europe.7 The institutional integration between the central
Ottoman state and the Arabic cultural and lingual predominance in the
Islamic heritage led to the consequent subsumption of the Turkish language
in a subordinate position in the Empire and to the subsequent retardation
of Turkish nation-building until the beginning of the 20th century, in spite
of the early state formation of the Empire.8 The discrepancy between the
dominance of the Turcoman heritage in the Ottoman dynast y and the
cultural dominance of Arabic andPersian in the Ottoman realms retarded
the emergence of Turkish nationalism until the late 19th century. In this
context, the effect of Islam corresponded to the regressive role played by
Roman Catholicism in, Southern Europe,and the influence of Arabieand
Persian as religious scripts corresponded to the role of Latin in Rokkan's
model.
The multilIngual religious community (ümmet) was bound together by
Arabic. The sacred language of writtenArabic created a community out of
signs, not sounds. Given the institutional integration between the Ottoman
state and Islam, the status of Arabic in Islam as a script-language offering
privileged access to an ontological truth (Anderson 1991:13-19, 36),
blocked any possible breakthrough of Turkish as a language-of-state. Even "
when it emerged by the late 19th century, Turkish nationalism had
developed primarilyas a reaction to the ideologies of the secessionist
nations in the Balkans. Being at the core of a multiethnic Empire, the
Turkish state elite found it difficult to make the ideological transformation
towards the advocacy of a Turkish nation-state. Correlatively, being the
native readers of the official vernacular, the Turkish speaking bureaucracy
of the Empire was the last elite group in the Ottoman dynastic realm to
develop a self-conscious nationalism (cf. Anderson's (1991:78) argument
about Austria-Hungary).
The late proliferation of the Turkish vernacular language can thus be
explained by the relatively belated nature of three factors: territorial
consolidation, spread of printing, and industrialisation (Rokkan 1980). With
secessions from the Empire in the B alkans and Arab provinces, the
overlapping between the spatial spre ad of the Turkish language and the
territory of the state was only achieved in the second decade of the 20th
century. The absence of social mobility resulting from the lack of
widespread industrialisation and stagnation of printing until the first half of
the 19th century also contributed to the late emergence and anchoring of a
standardising elite dialect. Whereas the print-languages had created unified
fields of communication below Latin and above spoken vernaculars, and
had given fixity to "national" languages in Europe by the 17th century
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(Anderson 1991:44), a similar stabilisation of Turkish as a print language
was only achieved by the late 19th century.
The ethnic and linguistic diversity of the Anatolian population together
with the insistence of the state bureaucracy in promoting the "Ottoman"
officialese composed of a mixture of Turkish, Persian and Arabic languages
in Arabic orthography blocked the unification of the Anatolian population
around a standard medium of communication. The emergence of a national
script came only with the aggressive language reforms of the early
Republican regime which proliferated Turkish written in the Latin alphabet
through a bureaucratie centralist system of mass education. Through the
imposition of compulsory Romanisation and discarding of Arabic
orthography, the KemalIst reforms sought to heighten Turkish national
consciousness at the expense of Islamic identification.
The inability to break with the "Ottoman" language due to the
institutional integration of Islam with the Ottoman state delayed the
legitimation of Turkish as a national vernacular standard used as the
language of worship as well as of state craft. This was, of course, also
related to the extent of ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity in Anatolia
whose origins dated back to the conditions of Turkic invasions between the
1 lth and 13th centuries, which has been identified as the most recent mass
immgration in European history (Vryonis 1971). As a result, in the Turkish
case the passage from state-building to nation-building was long-drawn, and
a unified culture was not developed well before the era of mass politics. In
a fashion which bre aks with the simple unilinearity posited by
modernisation theory, the lateness ofnation-building (Phase Il in Rokkan's
periodisation), resulted in the more or less synchrony of Phase Il and Phase
ILL (era of mass politics) processes.
The Turkish nation-state was thus not only late in achieving sovereign
status, it was also left with on ly a minimum time to build up its institutions
before it was faced with disruptive pressures from the outside - inter-
imperialist rivalry over the Ottoman state, the First World War, the 1930s
World Depression, the Second World War - as well as from the inside -
mass mobilisation basedon ethnic and religious c1eavages enhanced by
rapid means of communication. In contrast to the low levels of overall
mobilisation at the time of early nation-building in Europe, the increased
infrastructural capacities of the state as weii as of the civil society Tesulted
in the violent form taken by Turkish nation-building and in the first "ethnic
cleansing"g of the 20th century.
Turkey approached the ideal-type of an "endoglossic" (having language
standards growing from within) homogeneous nation-state only towards the
mid-20th century as a result of the Kemalist reform drive. This cultural
107
unification - with the exclusion of Kurdish speakng population - was
achieved through the disestablishment of Islam, the language reforms and
schools of mass education, and was brought about by the centralist, secular,
and authoritative KemalIst regime. One consequence of the lateness of
nation-building was that religious cleavages became a permanent feature of
mass politics in the second half of the 20th century. Another consequence
was that redistributive welfare arangements (Phase IV in Rokkan' s
scheme) were never entrenched in Turkey. Rather than being an outcome
of a simple progression of stages, the consolidation of Phase IV in the
OECD zone was contingent upon the post-Second World War upswing of
the world economy which was in turn underpinned by national institution-
alised compromises between, capital and labour, and a mutually, sustainable
Fordist spiral of growth between mass production and mass consumption.
When the mass politics finally began to articulate the redistributive
demands towards the end of the 1970s in Turkey, the international economy
was already in downswing and the Western countries had begun to contract
their welfare states: Turkey, in away, had missed the favourable inter-
national prerequisites supporting the post-Second World War welfare states
in Western Europe.
Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) observations that cultural, lInguistic and
religious, rather than functional cleavages, characterise the early phasesof
nation-building also applIed to the Turkish politics of the first half of the
20th century. This period witnessed conflicts between the centralising and
secular state, and religious, linguistic forces in the periphery rather than
conflicts based on class cleavages. Thus, the brief oppositions of the Liberal
Party in 1908, the Progressive Republican Party in 1924, and the Free Party
(Serbest Firka) in 1930, although they were expressions of an intern al
power struggle within the state bureaucracy itself, found it hard to resist the
temptation of appealing to the sentiments of the peripheral-Islamic
opposition to the Y oung Turk CUP or the Kemalist RPP regime.
In contrast to the nation-building construets of modernisation theorists
(Deutsch 1966) where the self-propellant processes of social mobilisation,
linguistic assimilation, spread of mass media and mass ". education bring
about nations through an endogenous evolution, the Turkish nation-state
was built by the active intervention of the state bureaucracy. The national-
ism of the state elite entered as an independent variable into the process of
nation-building. Recognising the functional necessity of a literate and
numerate society, and a mass, standardised education system in an
industrialage - both sustained by a linguistically homogeneous state -
nationalism became the banner of the nation-building project of the
RepublIcan state bureaucracy. Kemalist bureaucracy saw economic growth
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as dependent upon cultural modernisation and cultural modernisation upon
effective political authority; effective political authority had to be rooted in
a homogeneous national community (Huntington 1968:348-57).
Thus, through a transformation of the Y oung Turk nationalism which had
developed in reaction to the secessions from the Ottoman Empire, the early
Republican nationalism was related to the Kemalist state bureaucracy' s
perception of the "backwardness" of Turkish society: Republican national-
ism, in this sense, fitte d Gellner's (1983) characterisation of nationalism as
a manifestation of the uneven global development of modernisation and
industrialisation.lO Through the working of a demonstration effect -
whereby Western nation-states presented positive models - and the
perceived necessity of meeting the threats of degradation and dependency
these nations presented, nationalist ideology became a stimulant for intra-
societal development in an attempt to overcome Turkey' s "backward"
position in the intersocietal arena. It was little wonder that nationalism
became the tenet of the early Republican state bureaucracy, the central actor
at the intersection of these intersocietal and intrasocietal arenas. 
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Finally, the Turkish nation-state was not merely an "invention" of the
state bureaucracy prepared by the improvements in communications,
administration and education in the 19th centurx and dictated by the
requirements of linguistic homogenisation or the overcoming of industri al
backwardness in the international arena. The prior existence of a Turkish
ethnic core in Anatolia notonly played a vital part but also provided a
point of departure for the nation-building project of the bureaucracy.12 The
Turkish ethnie by providing a sense of common historical culture and life
st yle, common myths of descent, shared historical memories, an association
with a recognised territory and a sense of solidarity increased the feasibility
of the nation-bùilding project.13 The absence of this common "language"
and symbolism provided by ethnicity in the Kurdish regions of Anatolia
hampered the spread of controls by the bureaucracy and constituted a threat
to the very fabric of state power and to the territorial basis of its
jurisdiction, hence resulting in the attempts of the Kemalist regime to
"form" one Turkish ethnie in AnatolIa and to assimilate the Kurdish ethnic
identity. The prospect of a Kurdish ethnic secession would have called the
whole enterprise of nation-building into question. To apply Smith's (1986:
258) words on Third World postcolonial nationalIsm to the 1920s Turkey:
to subtract any part of the population which was to make up this would-be
Turkish nation would have notonly encouraged other secessions, it would
also have undermined the whole ide a of a new, composite "nation".
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N otes
1. The Ottoman population within the present-day borders of Turkey was 15 millon in 1906.
10 per cent of this population was Greek, 7 per cent Armenian and 1 per cent Jewish. By
1924, the size and the composition of the Anatolian population had changed dramatically. In
1927, the total population was 13.6 millon and 18 per cent of the Muslim population was
kiled between 1914 and 1922. By then, non-Muslims accounted for 2.6 per cent of the
population, there were only 120,000 Greeks and 65,000 Armenians left. 1.3 millon
Armenians were either kiled or forced to migrate mostly during the 1915-16 period. The
Greek population suffered less in terms of deaths: 1.2 million Greeks either fled or migrated
to Greece. Thus, one-quarter of the 1913 population of Turkey were no longer there in 1925:
compared with the 18 per cent of the Muslim population who had perished, only one-sixth
of the non-Muslim population remained (Karpat 1985, Keyder 1987:69, 79). The only non-
Muslim minority who emerged from the strife of the period intact was the Jewish minority.
One of the possible reasons for this immunity was that the Jewish population was already
quite small and was mainly confined to istanbuL.
2. Anderson (1992:6) has argued that in a highly interconnected world economy it is of ten
ethnically and religiously homogeneous countries that do the best. In Europe he points to the
experience of Finland, Norway and Austria by comparison with Italy, France and United
Kingdom. In Asia he refers to South Korea, Thailand and Japan, by comparison with India,
Indonesia or Sri Lanka. The reason for the divergent patterns of development in countries
with homogeneous populations compared with the countries with heterogeneous populations
is that in homogeneous countries the sense of national solidarity is especially strong, making
it easier for the political and economic leaders to ask for sacrifices without .expensive
coercion, to develop smoother industrial relations, and effectively to seek specialised niches
in the international division of labour. Conversely, domestically troubled countriesface
political difficulties in bending and renovating the national economy to the requirements of
international environment.
3. Although Aleviism has affinities with Shiism - the predominant Muslim sect in Iran -
Alevis are fundamentally distinct from Shiites especially in religious practice. More closely
Aleviism is a synthesis of the pre-Islamic, shamanistic beliefs of 10th-century Turkic nomads
and Persian Shiism. The fact that the religious practices of Alevis are outside the established
religious institutions and distinct form Sünni practices has led to the stigmatisation of Alevis
as "heretics". Precisely for this reason, Alevis supported the secular reforms of the Republican
regime in a way the predominant Sünni population did not. However,with the subsequent
evolution of state policies, Sünni Islam became a kind of quasi-official religion financed and
controlled by the state. Thus, for example, the state began to finance the building of mosques
or the wages of imams - the leaders of congregational prayers in mosques - both activities
irrelevant to Alevi religious practices. The building of mosques in Alevi vilages with
motivations of "preserving the unit y of the nation" was, in particular, perceived to be
extremely offensive by the Alevis.
4. Moore uses the "revolution-from-above" concept to describe the trajectory of societies that
experienced fascist dictatorship on their path to modernisation. On this route, which applies
most paradigmatically to the case of Germany and Japan, the bourgeoisie never gains
sufficient strength to establish political and cultural supremacy. Instead, the landed aristocracy,
maintaining its dominance over the bourgeoisie, uses the state mechanism to effect a modern
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industrial transition. The other two routes identified by Moore are the cases of "bourgeois
revolutions" resulting in Western parliamentary democracies (Britain, France, USA) and
"peasant revolutions" that became communist dictatorships (Russia, China). In Moore's
comparative scheme, these three routes are differentiated causally by the strength of bourgeois
impulse and peasant revolutionary potential. While the bourgeois impulse is strong in the
bourgeois revolution and weak in the peasant revolution paths, it is of medium strength in
revolution-from-above. Peasant revolutionary potential, on the other hand, is low in bourgeois
revolutions (except in the French Revolution where it is high) and in revolution-from-above,
whereas it is high in peasant revolution cases. Trimberger's (1978) account providesan
elaboration of revolution-from-above model by looking into the conditions of autonomous
bureaucratic action in more detaiL. Through an analysis of the Japanese Meiji Restoration and
the Turkish Kemalist periods, Trimberger contends that bureaucratic autonomy is possible
only if the bureaucracy is not bound to the landowner dass of the old regime - an important
divergence from Moore's original use of the revolution-from-above concept which accords
a primar role to astrong, labour-repressive landed upper dass (Skocpol 1973:23).
Furthermore, motivations related to the assertion of national strength in the interstate arena
in the face of an external threat to territorial integrity enhances bureaucratic autonomous
action. Here, in the application of the revolution-from-above scenario to Turkey, I date the
beginning of the Turkish revolution, earlier than in Trimberger' s account, to the CUP takeover
in 1908.
5. With the exceptiÒn of some modifications, my approach to the characterisation of Turkish
nation-building is similar to Trimberger's (1978) further theorisation of Moore' s revolution-' '"
from-above construct. This approach must be differentiated from Keyder's (1987, 1988:160)
which locates the autonomy of the state bureaucracy vis-à-vis the bourgeoisie and the agrarian
dasses in its distinctive dass character by virtue of its constituting one side of the surplus
extracting relationship in the Asiatic Mode of Production (AMP). Apart from the problems
related to the characterisation of the Ottoman system as an example of AMP (cf. Anderson
1974), this approach reduces the state to its role in relations of production. The contras ting
approach of Skocpol (1979) and Mann (1986a, 1986b) which is' the one adopted here,
however, derives the autonomy of the state from its dual character rooted in the internal social
structure and the external geopolitical arena. This approach is better suited to analyse the
dynamics of the nation-building phase because it allows a theorisation of intern al conflcts not
related to relations of production (e.g. conflcts related to ethnicity and the bureaucracy's
efforts to create a linguistically homogeneous nation-state) as well as a better incorporation
of external geopolitical relations in the interstate arena into the constitutive dynamics of the
state.
6. The obvious historical analogy to the position of the state bureaucracy here is Louis
Bonaparte's rule through a bureaucratised state analysed by Marx (1962). For Marx,
Bonaparte' s rule corresponds to a balance of dass power between the bourgeoisie and
peasantry. The essential element underpinning this rule is the peculiar character of
smallholding peasant property; the isolated, self-sufficient nature of their production predudes
the formation of an effective political organisation among them. Due to their fragmentation,
freeholding peasants are incapable of enforcing their dass interests: "they cannot represent
themselves, they must be represented ... their representative must appear as an authority over
them ... the political influence of the smallholding peasants therefore finds its external
expression in the executive power subordinating society to itselt' (1962:334). But the analogy
between the Bonapartist and Y oung Turk/Kemalist regimes with respect to the autonomy of
the state bureaucracy, which is sustained by an agrarian structure predominated by freeholding
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peasantry, should not be carried too far. For Marx, Bonaparte's rule was an exceptional
situation of political balanee of c1asses. In the Turkish case, however, the bureaucracy's rule
was neither exceptional nor did it correspond to a c1ass balance. It rather derived from the
logic of a belated industrialisation and nation-building process characterised by the weakess
of the large landed c1asses and the bourgeoisie. Under the Turkish transition to capitalism,
then, the role of the state was contrary to the assumptions of orthodox Marxist state theory:
the Y oung TurkiKemalist state did not conform to the characterisation of the state as "the
executive committee of the bourgeoisie" in Marx and EngeIs' concise phrase; the bourgeois
personneI did neither control the strategic parts of the state (Miliband 1969) nor did the
ultimately conditioning effects of capitalist economIc structures constraint the state
bureaucracy to serve the objective interest of the economically domInant c1ass (i.e. the
bourgeoisie) (Poulantzas 1973). The Turkish state's action was nonc1ass-conditioned - this
perspective on the character of the Turkish state is similar to Skocpol's (1973) analysis of the
role of the state in the 17th-century English Revolution and in the 19th-century Japanese
revolution-from-above. To argue that the state action was "capitalist" because it effected a
transition to capitalism and bourgeois domInation in the long run, while also acknowledging
the fact that there was no strong bourgeois c1ass at the beginning of this transition, involves
a confusion of causal and functional explanation (cf. Elster 1985:3-48). A more correct
assessment, according to the perspective adopted here, wil be that the state bureaucracy
undertook the project of nation-building, warding off external threat, and the late
industrialisation attempt independently of c1ass political capacities, but that it consequently
found itself unable to prevent socioeconomIc and political changes that undermined its
dominance vis-à-vis the bourgeoisie in the second half of the 20th century.
7. It is impossible to do justice here to the richness of Rokkan's (1975)
comparative/typological map studying variations of nation-building in Europe. Although there
are some methodological problems involved in the transformation of Rokkan's typologies to
causal explanations for the trajectory of single cases (Kommisrud 1992:229-30, Abrams
1982: 170-1), his work undoubtedly provides valuable insights for the isolation and
identification of threads running through the "empirical chaos" of state formation and nation-
building in Europe andelsewhere. Rokkan identifies an ideal-typical sequence of four phases
with respect to state and nation-building. The first two of these phases correspond to centre-
generated thrusts through the territory, the first miltary-economic, the second cultural; the
third and fourth phases open up opportunities for the periphery, the third through symbolic-
cultural and the fourth through economIc means. In Rokkan's model, phase I covers the initial
state-building process. It is a period of political, economIc, and cultural unification at the elite
level: cultural bonds are established between local power-holders, institutions are built for the
extraction of resources for common defence and for the maintenance of intern al order. Phase
Il corresponds to nation-building. It increasingly brings the masses into the system: conscript
armies, compulsory schools and emerging mass-media create channels of contact with the
central elite. The peripheral pöpulations' feelings ofidentity with the political system develop
although not without a protracted conflct with the already established identities such as
religious sects or peripheral languages. Phases ILL and IV broadly cover the era of mass
politics. Phase ILL brings the active participation of the mas ses into the workings of the
territorial political system through the organs of representation and through the formation of
organised parties for the mobilisation of support and the articulation of demands. Finally,
phase IV witnesses the growth of agencies of redistribution, the building of public welfare
services and the development of nationwide policies for the equalisation of economic
conditions. Rokkan notes that this ideal-typical sequence finds its c10sest fit in the histories
of the older Western European nations; it applies less c10sely to the secessionist nations
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obtaining sovereignty after the Napoleonic Wars. In the latter cases, phases Il, ILL and IV
either come in very dose succession or coincide with each other chronologically. Rokkan
explains the variations with respect to the timing and conditions of these phases in different
European countries by using four master variables. Through a provisional generalisation from
the European experience, he identifies these variables guiding the processes of state and
nation formations as: 1) independence-dependence of the city network; 2) the leve! of
concentration in the rural economy and the character of integration between rural and urban
economy; 3) independence-dependence of religious institutions; 4) conditions for the
development of a distinctive linguistic standard (1975:584-5, 592). Re uses the first two of
these variables related to the economic sphere to explain the conditions of state-building
(Phase I), while the last two, related to culture, are employed in the analysis of nation-
building (Phase Il). As we tried to emphasise in our narration in Chapter Two, the initial
thrust of the early Ottoman state formation from the 14th to the 19th centuries can be
accounted for more satisfactorily by concentrating on the geopolitical conflcts in the interstate
arena - a major aspect neglected in Rokkan's model (Kommsrud 1992:232-3) ~ rather than
by emphasising the lack of powerful autonomous cities or the character of integration between
the rural and urban economy in the Ottoman expansion zone. Innovations in militar
technology and infrastructural capacities were gradually adopted by the Ottoman Empire and
gained momentum in the 19th century mainly through the external necessities of warfare.
Centralised taxation and administrative efficiency - the pilars of state formation - were
manifestations of the response of the state bureaucracy to the exigencies of conflcts in the
inter state arena. Rokkan's cultural variables related to the nation-building phase, however, can
be successfully employed to explain the lateness of Turkish nation-building.
8. Ottoman state-building was synchronous with European state-building which Rokkan dates
from the 15th to the 18th centuries. Turkish nation-building, on the other hand, followed the
post-Napoleonic secessionist nation-states - the latest nation-building efforts Rokkan analyses
in his comparative/typological map - by nearly a century. In Western Europe the attempt to
wield state power on the basis of a particular ethnicity was long-lived and tacit - it predated
the era of nationalism. In Turkey, on the other hand, nationalism wasa catalyst in the process
of creating a nation-state. The age of nationalism in the Americas was between 1760 and
1830, and in Europe between 1820 and 1920 (Anderson 1991:47-65). The emergence of the
Turkish nation-state in the 1920s placed it in an intermediate category between post-
Napoleonic War secessionist nations in Europe and 20th-century postcolonial nation-states
with respect to timing.
9. The term widely used with respect to the war in Bosnia-Rercegovina in 1992-93 was first
coined following the Armenian "genocide" in the 1 9 1 Os and Greek - Turkish exchanges in the
1920s (Kaldor 1993:96).
10. Gellner explains theemergence of nationalism as an outcome of industrialisation. In his
account, occupational mobility is a major imperative of industrialism: the more fluid the
social structure, the more unitary is the culture it requires of its agents. But the advent of
industrialism is not undifferentiated, it hits a world which is ethnically and linguistically
divided. The later a region comes to industrialisation, the more it risks subjugation to those
which arrived earlier; the result is nationalism: the spre ad of the drive to create states whose
territories roughly coincide with ethnical boundaries. Gellner's theory of nationalism has been
criticised for its economic functionalism and neglect of the "overpowering dimension of
collective meaning that modem nationalism has always involved: that is, not its functionality
for industry, but its fulfilment of identity" (Anderson 1992b:205). An elaboration of Gellner's
argument, however, shows that it provides a valuable insight to the explanation of the roots
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of Turkish nationalism. Rather than being a result of indigenous industrialisation, nationalism
shaped the identity of the Republican state bureaucracy because it gave a hope of future
industrialisation. As such, nationalism was inseparable from the uneven development of
industrialisation among nations, it became the only feasible way of entering into the
developmental race.
11. A central point in Gellner (1983:73-5) is the distinction between early-industrialising
integrative nationalisms based on mobility within a linguistic unit, and late-industrialising
secessionist nationalisms based on genetic or deep cultural "counter-entropic traits" like race,
language - i.e. those which refuse to "blur" in the assimilative pressures of industrial culture.
While the emergence of Turkish nationalism at the beginning of the 20th century is an
example of the former, it may be argued that Kurdish nationalism of the late 20th century is
an example of the latter. In a more detailed typology Gellner (1983:88-109) distinguishes
between three distinct classes of historical nationalism. In the first case, what he calls
"Habsburg" nationalism (e.g. Balkan nationalisms), power-holders have privileged access to
a central high (literate ) culture and the powerless are education-deprived, and share folk
cultures. The intellectual awakeners of the powerless ethnic group eventually lead the
formation of a nation-state. In the sec ond type, the case of "classical liberal Western
nationalism" (e.g. unification nationalisms of 19th-century Italy and Germany), the differential
access to power and education does not coincide with ethnical divisions and state formation
is bu ild upon an already existing fully effective high culture. In the third species, "diaspora
nationalism", the ethnic group in question (e.g. Jews, Greeks, Armenians) is economically
superior and culturally identifiable but politically and militarily weak, and territorially
dispersed. The tragic consequence of this brand of nationalism, Gellner notes, has range d from
genocide to expulsion. Turkish nationalism approaches the first case in this typology with
some important qualifications. It mainly developed in mutual opposition to both Balkan
nationalisms and Greek and Armenian diaspora nationalisms. Its chief promulgator, the
Ottoman civilian and military bureaucracy was, in fact, in a power-holding position with a
privileged access to Ottoman high culture. But when Balkan and Arab nationalism
undermined its political power as well as its cultural anchoring, it sought a redefinition of its
power-base and cultural roots through the formation of a nation-state.
12. This is also the argument Smith (1986) puts forward against the "reconstructive"
approaches of Anderson (1983) and Gellner (1983). While Gellner and Anderson see
nationalism not as the awakening of nations to self-consciousness but as the invention of
nations where they do not exist, Smith emphasises the prior formation of ethnic communities
which influence and condition the success of the attempts to build nations.
13. This is, of course, not to deny that much of the "historical culture" of the Turkish ethnie
was "reinvented" to serve the needs of nation-building. Kemalist historiography, for example,
set out to "prove" that the population of Anatolia, as far back as the fourth millennium B.C.,
had descended from the "Turkic" peoples of Central Asia or emphasised the exclusively
Turkish character of the Ottoman administrative elite since the inception of the Sultanate in
the 14th century, neglecting the "multinational" descent of administrative cadres through the
devsirme system.
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6. The rise and demise of the one-party
rule
6.1 The dynamics of state-led industrialisation
The initial economic policies of the newly found Republic could not break
radically with the Ottoman governments' disinterested attitude towards
industrialisation. Both the ravages of a decade of uninterrpted wars and
external constraints inhibited the formulation and implementation of a stable
set of policies until 1930. The sharp demographie decline had wiped out
almost all of the Christian merchants, who provided most of the
commercial activity during the Ottoman period, as well as leading to a 20
per cent reduction in the agriculturallabour force. With the foundation of
the Turkish Republic and the PDA's loss of its control, most of the
prospering industries of the late 19th century - most notably silk and
tobacco proeessing - which had been under the partial administrative
control of the PDA and were mostly owned by the Greek and Armenian
minorities, had declined in the absence of foreign organisation, capital, and
Armenian and Greek entrepreneurs. The Lausanne Treaty had imposed the
Ottoman free trade regime on the Republic and had precluded the adoption
of protectionism deemed necessary by the state bureaucracy.
By the time the effects of the World Depression hit the Turkish economy,
the weak industrial structure was still very much that of 1915. The
composition of the"industrial output was basically unchanged between 1915
and 1927, the years of the last Ottoman and the first Turkish Industrial
Censuses respectively. In 1927, close to 80 per cent of the value produced
in industry came from the production of wool and cotton yarn, clothand
raw silk, flour and tobacco proeessing. The predominance of the textiles
and food processing sectors in the industrial structure was also visible in
the sectoral distribution of the labour force; of the 237,000 workers in the
manufacturing industry, over 70 per cent were concentrated in these two
sectors. Moreover, reflecting the overwhelmingly small-scale nature of the
industrial activity, close to 50 per cent of the labour force was working in
establishments employing four or less workers (Ökçün 1970, DiE 1969).
The coincidence of two factors with the World Depression resulted in the
state's undertaking of a more active role in the governance of the economy
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from 1930 onwards. Firstly, when the restrictions brought by the Lausanne
Treaty, which had frozen the Turkish customs tariffs at the 1916 Ottoman
tariff scale, ended in 1929, the government embarked on a restrictive trade
regime. The average protection rate was increased from 13 per cent to 46
per cent (Kurmus 1978). Secondly, the first instalment of the Ottoman debt
scheduled for 1929, comprising as much as 10 per cent of the annual export
earnings of the RepublIc, exacerbated the effects of the currency crisis
brought about by the Depression. Although the government subsequently
suspended the repayments, the initial pressure on the currency due to the
beginning of debt payments and plunging exports due to Depression elIcited
the depreciation of the lira (Boratav 1988:36-7). The fall in the value of
currency, in turn, increased the importing merchants' debt and led to
widespread bankrupteies in the commercial sector (Keyder 1987 :96).
Faced with the disruption of the economy largely brought about by the
currency crisis, the bureaucrats sought to minimise the external dependence
of the domestic market through a "disassociative" trade policy. The share
of exports and imports in GNP fell from 1 1 to 8 per cent and 15 to 7 per
cent, respectively (Boratav 1988:56). Following the adoption of restrictive
external trade and the creation of the Central Bank, which took over the'
functions of controlling and concentrating foreign exchange transactions
from the Anglo-French Ottoman Bank, foreign trade registered an export
surplus for the first time in 1930. The positive balance of trade between
1930 and 1947 - apart from 1938 - has been an exceptional period in the
record of Turkish foreign trade, which has been negative ever since 1947
(DiE 1991:292-4).
The initial defensive mechanisms against the Depression in controlling
foreign trade and foreign exchange transactions began to be complemented
by policy instruments which aimed at rapid industrialisation via state
intervention from 1932 onwards. The Republican regime thereafter revived
the CUP' s practices on the role of the state in economic engineering.
Inspired by the interwar example of Italy, Soviet Union and Germany, and
constrained by the effects of the World Depression, étatisme (devletçilik)
became the pillar of Kemalist ideology.l Accordingly, heavy state
intervention was necessary in a backward society as Turkey and the state
would assume those responsibilities that private enterprise could or would
not. Thus, the Kemalist state bureaucracy, in effect, perceived the
international economic conditions of the early 1930s as an historical
opportunity for industrialisation.
The new strategy was first formulated in the First Five- Year
Industrialisation Plan (1934), which was an explicit allusion to the Soviet
experience, and the first of such attempts by a developing country outside
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the Soviet Union (Barkey 1990:48). The investment projects in the first and
second Plan, which was interrupted by the Second World War, were
concentrated in the bu ilding of factories producing flour, sug ar, textiles, and
intermediary goods such as copper, ceramics, chemicals, paper, iron and
steel. Although the bulk of the investment capital was devoted to the
development of basic consumer goods industries - food processing and
textiles sectors - in these plans, KemalIst cadres, believing that the
country' s well-being, power and security depended on heavy
industrialisation, also accorded a central place to intermediary goods
industries such as paper, cement, chemical, and iron and steel. With the
spin-offs they would create in other sectors, it was hoped that these sectors
would provide the backbone of industrialisation (inan 1972). A common
characteristic of these investments was their scale, whose capital
requirements were beyond the capabilities of the bourgeoisie.2
Simultaneously with this industrialisation drive, the state continued the
ambitious railway construction projects it had started in the latter half of the
1920s, and launched an all-out campaign of nationalisation, which had
begun earlier by the nationalisation of cabotage (1926) and the Régie
Coi'nteressé des Tabacs (1925) - the main intermediary between the
merchants and tobacco producers. Throughout the 1930s the government
purchased the foreign investments in publicservices, mining and railways.
We can give a broad characterisation of the étatiste period by
concentrating on the credit system, wage relations, and forms of
competition between the firms - the three major areas defining a mode of
regulation. The credit system was under close government supervision and
interest rates were, in principle, fixed by the state. Correlative to its
emergence as the main productive agent through the ownership of State
Economic Enterprises (SEEs), the state also financed the industrial
investments through the banks it established or promoted. The two state
banks, Sümerbank within industrial production and Etibank within mining,
became vast conglomerates incorporating both financing and produetion
activities.
Despite a de facto monopoly of state ownership in heavy industry, in
many sectors large state enterprises existed side by side with medium and
small-sized private industries. The links between the industrial bourgeoisie
owning these firms and the state was provided by the semiofficial Is
Bankasi, which held as much as 38 per cent of the deposits in the national
banks in 1937 (Keyder 1987:106). Although private capital owned the
majority of its shares, Is Bankasi was an officially promoted bank; it was
founded under the auspices of Atatürk by Bayar, an ex-CUP person, who
would later oppose the heavy state interventionism of étatiste policies and
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become president following the Democratic Party (DP) victory against the
RPP in 1950. The centrality of the bank in financing medium-size
investments in étatiste years heralded the post-1946 conflicts between the
state bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie as well as gave indications about the
extent of the symbiosis between the two. Is Bankasi had intricate and
strong links, albeit through clientelistic rather than institutionalised
channeIs, with public banks and SEEs; its board of directors consisted
entirely of deputies, and the board of directors in all the firms in which the
bank held shares inc1uded high level bureaucrats and deputies. The state-
owned industrial credit banks, although established specifically to advance
long-term loans to private industry, never operated satisfactorily. Instead,
Is Bankasi allocated credits to industrialists; but rather than based on long-
term planning, its financing decisions were directed by favouritism.
With respect to the competition between the firms - the second major
area of étatisme's mode ofregulation - oligopolistic policies were basically
used as a means of increasing capital accumulation. In the case of SEEs,
this often took the form of monopoly pricing. The SEEs, however, could
not behave as true monopolists because they incorporated into their
decisions the goal of providing higher employment, often to the political
clientele of the RPP. Giving priority to maximising physical output and
maintaining high employment (Birtek 1985:414), the state industries
sacrificed the objectives of profitability, thus, hampering their chances of
increasing productivity through increased capital investments. Private firms,
on the other hand, safe behind protective walls, maximised their profit
without any concern for the level of output and employment. The
government often responded positively to the demands of industrial
capitalists to organise cartels in order to prevent overproduction and to
safeguard high profit rates. With the formation ofsector-based associations,
private firms sought to fix prices and to avoid competition (Tekeli and ilkin
1982:220).
In terms of wage relations, étatisme restricted workers' consumption and
organisation. The shift of the internal terms of trade in favour of the
manufactured goods meant that as the price of wheat, the principle wage
good, declined industrialists could afford to lower workers' wages.
Paternalistic laws regulating industrial relations in state industries, based on
Italy's 1935 law, were generalised to all of the work force in 1936. This
legislation outlawed strikes, guaranteed stable wages, Improved working
conditions, prohibited lock-outs, and limited the political rights of labour.
In 1938, politicalliberties were further restricted by the prohibition of any
P olitic al organisation that professed the defence of any specific class
interest. As aresult, 56 hour working weeks became the norm (Berberoglu
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1980: 120) and workers' wages declined by 25 per cent between 1934 and
1938, and by a further 75 per cent between 1939 and 1946 (Keyder
1987:104-5, Birtek 1985:419).
As Kurth (1979) has noted with respect to 19th-century German and
20th-century Latin American late industrialisations, there was an "elective
affinity" between the dynamics of étatiste late industrialisation and the
Kemalist political regime. Unlike the experience of the economically and
politically liberal regime of the early industrialiser England with its light
textiles industry and uncontested international competitiveness, the late
industrialising Turkey in the 1930s, faced with the need for heavy state
intervention, rapid industrialIsation based on heavy industries, surplus
transfer fromconsumption and protectionism, developed an authoritarian
type of rule.
As a result of the industrialisation drive, the size of the manufacturing
work force grew rapidly to reach 427,000 by late 1940s (Berberoglu
1980:109). The industrial production as percentage of GNP rose from 9 per
cent in 1929 to 16 per cent in 1943 (Bulutay, Tezel, and Y11d1nm 1974).
This level would be unchanged until the beginning of the second
industrialisation drive in 1961 (DIE 1991). At a time when growth in the
world economy was stagnating, the annual growth rate of the Turkish
economy reached 7 per cent on the average (Boratav 1988:55). An
important feature of étatiste industrialisation, which set it apart from the
1960s Import Substituting Industrialisation (ISI), was that industrial
expansion had taken place simultaneously with the elimination of the trade
deficit and with a significant fall in imports as percenage of GNP (Boratav
1981:179).
The success of the state-led industrialisation drive of the 1930s and
1940s, despite Its resulting in the formation of an industri al base,was short-
term and partiaL. A major reason for the long-term failure of the industri ali-
sation attempt was related to the techno-economic requirements of 20th
century late industrialisation. As its emphasis on the techno-economic
paradigms of 19th-century Kondratiev waves - textiles and iron and steel
- showed, étatiste industrialisation relied not on newly emerging but on
borrowed technologies. However, it did not stress the institutional arange-
ments which would allow it to incrementally improve the borrowed
technology. 
3
Instead étatisme reduced industrialisation to the transfer of what Amsden
(1992:57-8) has called alpha technology - machinery, equipment and
designs. A notable characteristic of the Kemalist industrialisation polIcies
was their underestimation of beta technology - the supporting institutions
such as the educational systems improving the technical skills of the
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working class or the administrative capacities of the managerial staff, and
preferential state policies disciplining SEEs or private firms towards
increasing their technological capabilities - which, as we shall see below,
was ultimately related to the lack of the "embedded autonomy" of the
Kemalist state.
Unlike the examples of successful European late industrialisation in the
19th century, Turkish étatisme did not envis age a well-developed system
of higher education with linkages to industrial production; nor did it
discipline private or public enterprises through autonomous state action (as,
for example, the South Korean or Taiwanese states did in the 1960s). As
the decades following the 1940s would reveal, once the stage of easy
substitution requiring lIttle fixed capital was passed, and as further
development required increased mechanisation, the cost of investments and
imported capital goodsincreased at an unforseen rate (cf. Lipietz 1987:61)
in the absence of any indigenous technological capacities necessary to
generate further adaptations of the initially imported technology.
In terms of the domestic market, the industrialisation strategy was not
geared to the expansion of the home market. Keeping workers'
consumption to a minimum and transferring surplus from agriculture
through shifting terms of trade, it was essentially based on an extensive
regime of accumulation which had already begun to be outdated in the
centre of the world economy in the 1930s. Two major sources of
accumulation in étatiste industrialisation were high prices paid by
consumers of industrial goods due to high protection rates and low prices
paid to farmers by the state (Boratav 1981: 183). More importantly, étatisme
did not connect industri al development to the objectives of increasing
agricultural productivity. Of course, the problem was not a simple matter
of choice of the wrong industries for investments; the lImited domestie
market would not have sustained Fordist mass consumption industries or
industries producing agricultural machinery, which might have been
established by an act of foresight in the 1930s. However, the nature of the
industrialisation strategy neglecting agricultural producers comprising as
much as 80 per cent of the population did not involve any mo ve in the
direction of expanding the domestic market. Turkey' s limited size precluded
the viability of an industrialisation strategy neglecting agricultural sector' s
demands (cf. Lipton 1977:122).
The timing of the Kemalist industrialisation attempt within the world
economy conjuncture determined the outer boundaries of its achievements.
On the one hand, the collapse of the world economy in the 1930s decreased
the peripheralisation pull of the core countries and enabled industrial
development in partial "delinking" from the world economy. On the other
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hand, the contraction of the world trade decreased the viability of étatiste
policies which depended on the export of raw materials to finance the
import of capital goods. In this sense, the 1930s World Depression gave an
opportunity for the implementation of étatisme by leading to a decrease in
the export of manufactured goods from advanced capitalist countries, but
it also limited its eventual success.
6.2 The state and socio-institutional relations in agriculture
As we have seen in the sketch of agrarian socio-institutional relations in
19th-century Anatolia in Chapter Four, the recentralisation of the 19th
century effectively combatted the "feudalising" tendeneies of provincial
landlords, ayans and tax-farmers of the earlier two centuries. The
RepublIcan regime inherited this agrarian structure characterised by the
predominance of small independent peasant holdings. The revolution-from-
above of the Kemalist bureaucracy was achieved with minimal support
from the weak landed interests. The formation of the Republic, however,
was followed by a closer collaboration of the bureaucratic elite and large
landlords with the bureaucracy as the dominant partner. One reason for this
alliance was dictated by the nature of the modernisation programme. The
Kemalist conception of modernisation involved mainly the adoption of
Western political and cultural institutions; it was an attempt to remould the
society by starting with the peasant masses. However, the RPP leadership
made lIttle effort to broaden the party' s popular base and to enlist the
support of the peasant mas ses to effect this modernisation. On the contrary,
its cultural reforms "from above" (e.g. banning religious dress and religious
associations ) aiming to establish a national identity at the expense of the
entrenched popular Islamic identity, alienated the peasantry from the state.
Therefore, support of local notables was essential for maintaining law and
order in the countryside and enabling the central leadership to devote its
energies to the programme of Westernisation. It was almost as if in return
for the support notables gave to the modernisation efforts, they were
allowed to retain their land and local influence, as evidenced by the
conspicuous absenee of land reform in the étatiste period, though given the
abundance of small-sized holdings land reform never became a mass
demand. Other benefits accruing to the landlords were the abolition of the
tithe (the asar tax), the final legal recognition of their private land
ownership through the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code, and their
acquisition of sizable landholdings formerly held by the Greek and
Armenian minorities (Özbudun 1976:43-4).
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Due to the land distribution pattern, however, landlords remained
subordinate to the bureaucracy. The weakness of landed interest allowed the
state bureaucracy to adopt the industrialisation policies of the 1930s and
1940s in collaboration with the now enfeebled bourgeoisie. Although the
volume of agricultural production and the area under cultivation increased
during étatisme, the lack of effective linkages between industrial and
agricultural production meant that the use of machinery and the increases
in productivity in agriculture remained limited. The result was the
continuing low rate of marketisation inherited from the 19th century. The
entire period between 1929 and 1945 was characterised by the closure of
isolated villages as declining prices of agricultural products resulted in a
stagnation implying substantially decreased levels of economic integration
with both national and world markets (Keyder 1987:129).
Government control of agricultural commodity markets was achieved
through direct and indirect price support policies and the state' s trading
monopolies. The state had monopoly on buying and marketing tobacco and
wheat, the former a major export commodity and the latter a strategic
commodity influencing the standard of lIving of the peasantry and the urban
working class, and thereby determining the trade-off between wages and
profit margins in the industry. Although the state had no trading monopoly
on agricultural inputs for the newly established industries (e.g. cotton, sugar
beet), the size of the public ownership within the textiles and sugar
industries equipped the state with quasi-monopolist powers to act as the
price leader (Boratav 1981: 178).
In the second half of the 1930s, owing to its monopoly on wheat
purehasing, the state kept the prices paid to the wheat producing peasants
lower than the world price, and by doing so accumulated a surplus through
the export of wheat (Keyder and Birtek 1975). This surplus transfer from
agriculture to industry was further accelerated by a general reversal of the
terms of trade in favour of industri al products: between 1929 and 1934 the
general price leve! of agricultural commodities against the prices of
industrial goods deteriorated by 25 per cent and kept their low level
throughout the étatiste period. Hence, low prices paid by the state to the
independent peasantry, in particular to wheat farmers, constituted an
important source of capital accumulation. Under the World Depression
during which the world market prices of Turkey' s five major export crops
(hazelnuts, figs, grapes, cotton, and tobacco) fell between 50 and 70 per
cent (Margulies and Y11d1Z0glu 1987:273), the effects of this price policy
alienated the peasants from the state.
The major blow to the agricultural producers, however, came with the
Second World War. Not only were peasants conscripted in massive
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numbers - most of the one million conscripts were taken from the
agriculturallabour force - and their animals and products requisitioned but
the stable prices offered to the farmers also remained far below the
inflationary trend. The drastie shift in the state's policies against agriculture,
together with the war-time profiteering of merchants and industrialIsts,
caused bitterness in the peasants and further estranged the peasantry who
were already hostile to the RPP' s authoritarian secularism. This would
contribute decisively to the peasantry' s support of the postwar opposition
party.
6.3 The party system and state-society relations
During the one-party regime extending until 1946 - the year of the first
competitive elections in the Republican period - there were two brief
periods involving an opposition party. Although the cadres of both parties
had emerged from the RPP' s own ranks and shared its modernising and
secularist outlook, the RPP did not tolerate any criticism of its policies in
both instances. As we saw in the previous chapter, the quick suppression
of the opposition of the Progressive Republican Party in 1924-25, marked
the beginning of the one-party rule. Similarly, the summary banning of the
Free Party (Serbest Fzrka) in 1930, which defended a less interventionist
approach in the face of the worldeconomic crisis, marked the beginning of
étatisme. However, the Kemalist regime continued to adhere to
parliamentarianism. General suffrage for men was introduced in 1923, and
for women in 1934.
Republican parliamentarianism was not only based on a single party, it
was extremely tutelary as well. Nomination by the RPP automatically
meant election to the Grand National Assembly, and nominations were
firmly controlled by the top leadership of the party, especially by Atatürk
himself (Frey 1965:431-3). Adherence of the RPP to electoral principles in
spite of its authoritarian character was relaíed to legitimation purposes. A
radical heir to 'the 19th-century modernisation drive while at the same time
c1aiming to have made a break with the Ottoman past, the Kemalist regime
retained as its ideal a Western-st yle national, republican, secular and
democratic state institutionalised in the form of regularly held elections and
a theoretically all powerful National Assembly (Özbudun 1981) - a fact
which explains the relatively smooth transfer of power to the opposition
Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) following the second multiparty
elections in 1950.
As the social backgrounds of the deputies indicated, like its precursor the
CUP, the RPP was essentially a cadre party of government officials and to
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a min or extent also of local notables (mostly large landowners). The state
bureaucracy's influence within the party, however, remained dominant and
landowners were only co-opted to increase the legitimation of RPP rule
(Frey 1965:89-98, 133-4). Despite its avowed "populism", a conspicuous
characteristic of the RPP' s politics was avoidance of popular mobilisation:
the party, rather than encouraging collective representation, co-opted its
political clientele to its structure. Neither its modernising reforms nor the
elections were preceded by intense campaign activities; the use of party or
government controlled press for mobilisation was also limited (Özbudun
1987:340).
Even if the bureaucratic elite had favoured social mobilisation, an
adequate platform for it was absent, given the prior evolution of the
Ottoman state and classstructure and the experience of Kemalist
revolution- from-above. As Keyder (1987: 109) has noted, unlike in Latin
America (e.g. Brazil and Argentina) there was no threat of foreign capital:
a potential comprador bourgeoisie (i.e. Greek and Armenian merchants and
industrialists) had already been ousted; there had never been strong interests
tied to large landownership; and neither the international context nor the
economy allowed a revanchist military adventure.
The lack of mass mobilisation during the Kemalist nation-building meant
theabsenee of institutionalised linkages mediating between the state and the
society. Rather than underwriting a unilateral dominance of the state over
the civil society, this brought about a situation whereby societal groups -
the sparse and dispersed large landowners and the weakened commercial
and industrial bourgeoisie - increasingly encroached upon the state,
projecting their interests onto its institutions and thereby weakening state
power. 4 Thus, contrary to its general identification as a "strong" repressive
state and in view of Mann's distinetion between the despotic and
infrastructural powers of state, the Kemalist state was "soft" due to its low
infrastructural powers in penetrating the society. Transposing Merquior' s
(1986:281) characterisation of the 1930s Brazilian state to Turkey, the
Kemalist authoritarian state was not necessarily authoritative.
The encroachment of societal groups upon the state took place through
dyadic patron-client relations rather than institutionalised channels
expressing collective interests. This meant a low level of institutionalisation
at the political sphere. The autonomy and coherence of political
organisations and procedures remained limited (cf. Huntington 1968:8-24).
Although the reach of party politics and the scope of mass participation
remained limited in the one-party period despite the party' s "populistic"
ideology, the RPP made systematic use of patronage to increase the
legitimation of its rule (Sayan 1977:106-7, Özbudun 1981). The de facto
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clientelism - the mode in which the client offers his/her political support
in exchange for various services - and the avowed "populism" - the mod e
in which the political leadership is hostile to strongly institutionalised
intermediary levels - of the RPP' s rule were the two sides of the same
coin. Both were incorporative political modes (Mouzelis 1986) in which
participation in the political arena was established in a more or less
dependent/vertical manner. In this sense, Turkey did not diverge from the
pattern represented by parliamentary societies with "late-late" capitalist
development (e.g. Balkan and Latin American countries). Jf populism
remained limited, this was due to the single-party character of the Kemalist
regime: with the transition to multiparty democracy, the DP increasingly
made use of populist incorporative modes for the mobilisation of the
peasantry against the RPP.
The large extent of clientelism was related to the belatedness of Turkish
nation-building. The heterogeneity of Turkish society in the initial stages
of nation-building with its ethnic (Turkish versus Kurdish), religious (Sünni
versus Alevi), and regional c1eavages provided an ideal setting for the
proliferation and influence of clientele networks. In a socIal and political
context where the tasks of nation-building were combined with responding
to or warding off the demands of the population at large - the
concatenation of Phase Il (nation-building) and Phase ILL (mass politics) in
Rokkan' s scheme - the Kemalist cadres increasingly relied on clientelistic
networks in an attempt to legitimate their nation-building and modernisation
programme.
The circumstances of the RPP' s origins - the fact that it enjoyed access
to state' s resources and patronage at the time of its founding - also
crucially influenced its subsequent recourse to clientelism.5 Although the
RPP' s origins went back to the ADNR, the congress of "the societies for
the defence of national rights" during the Independence War, the relatively
swift success of the war against Greece did not compel the nationalist
movement to mobilise a substantial mass following'or to build a strongly
institutionalised party organisation before taking power. Consequently, the
RPP was founded by the Kemalist elite after the latter had liquidated the
Ottoman regime and taken the decisive steps towards the establishment of
the new nation-state. Approaching the ideal-type of an internally mobilised
party in Shefter's (1977) typology, the RPP made extensive use of the
patronage at its disposal to increase the following for its rule.
In the absence of strongly organised agrarian and/or urban upper classes
- a consequence of the 19th century Ottoman agrarian structure and the
nationalist revolution-from-above resulting in the flight and deportation of
the Christian bourgeoisie - there did not exist what Shefter (1977:412-3)
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has termed a sufficient "constituency for bureaucratic autonomy" which
would have prevailed over the competing "constituency for patronage" .
Thus, despite (or because of) its over-centralism and aloofness from class
rule, the Kemalist state had neither the infrastructural powers for intensively
penetrating the society nor did it possess the bureaucratic autonomy which
would have excluded a patron age system and ensured the public benefits
to be allocated according to a set of general procedures guided by étatiste
policies. Not confronted with a strong constituency for bureaucratic
autonomy ~ landowners and/or the bourgeoisie - the RPP had no incentives
against taking advantage of its patronage access (cf. Shefter 1977:421-2).
The state bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie coalItion underpinning the
étatiste industrialisation excluded the peasantry and the working class from
political decision-making by inhibiting collective representation of their
interests, and lowered their incomes through agricultural price policies and
restrictive labour legislation in an attempt to maximise industrial
accumulation potential. The state, however, could not discipline the
bourgeoisie as successfully as it disciplined the peasantry and the working
class; and therein lay the reasons for the eventual failure of étatiste policies.
Unable to attain bureaucratic autonomy, the relations of the bureaucracy
with the bourgeoisie bore the mark of clientelist modes.
The state's involvement in the economy during the 1930s and 1940s did
not limit the domain of private capital; rather étatiste policies involved a
division of labour between the spheres of public and private enterprises.
While undertaking directly those investments beyond the capacities of the
weak industrial bourgeoisie, the state, in effect, supported private
accumulation and strengthened the bourgeoisie. Rather than being an
outcome of deliberate long-term planning and strategic policies directed at
specific industries, the state support was the Tesult of the symbiosis between
the bureaucracy and bourgeoisie in the absenee of a powerful organised
bourgeois influence - again a consequence of the ethnic dislocations of
Turkish nation-building. Where the Turkish bourgeoisie was weak, it was
deemed necessary to create one via the enrichment of particular individuals
through state support (Boratav 1981:170).
The symbiotic re1ationship between the bourgeoisie and bureaucracy,
despite the authoritarian rule of the latter, reduced the autonomy of the state
in industri al policy. Under the protectionist trade regime, only raw materials
entering as inputs to manufacturing were exempt from the import quotas
announced monthly by the government. "Factories" produeing import
substitutes with minimal value added and obtaining high profits were
established by "industrialists", and the monthly announcement of quotas
resulted in intense politicking by importers in order to benefit from the
126
,"raw materials" exemption (Keyder 1987: 103). The operation of the quota
system, by politicising state' sinvolvement in the economy, impeded the
autonomy of state industrialisation policies.
A similar development took place in banking. As we observed in the case
of Is Bankasi, given the centrality of the bureaucracy in the governance of
the economy, capitalists actively sought to appoint prominent political
figures to the board of directors of private banks. These banks became a
substitute for institutionalised relations between the state and the
bourgeoisie. They acted as influential lobbies through which deals were
struck between private interest groups and individual bureaucrats. Likewise,
directors of the firms in which these banks held shares included
bureaucrats: in 74 per cent of all firms established between 1931 and 1940
the founding entrepreneurs were bureaucrats (Keyder 1987: 106).
Inescapably, the use of state resources for private accumulation contributed
to the generalisation of the atmosphere of profiteering in the political
circles.
Retrospectively, the eventual failure of étatiste industrialisation was an
outcome of the lack of "embedded autonomy" of the Kemalist state (Evans
1989).6 The Turkish state in the 1930s and 1940s corresponded, more
closely, to an intermediary case between the two polar ideal-types of
developmentaZ and predatory states. In the absenee of bureaucratic
autonomy, which could successfully integrate étatiste policies with
discipline over business performance, the bureaucracy-bourgeoisie coalition
easily degenerated into situations where industrialisation goals were reduced
to private interests.
Thus, the Kemalist state was not a strong one in the sense that it did not
have sufficient bureaucratie autonomy and capacity to enter into
institutionalised interactions with the autonomous power centres within the
civil society. In comparison to the developmental states which had
embedded autonomy, it had higher despotic powers in that it regulated
economic and political activity without institutionalised negotiations with
societal groups, but it had lower infrastructural powers in that it was unable
to penetrate society and implement policies through processes of negotiation
and cooperation (see Figure 6.1).7
The reasons for the lack of the embedded autonomy of the Kemalist state
were related both to the low administrative capacity of the bureaucracy and
to the weakness of the constituency for bureaucratic autonomy - the
bourgeoisie. Well established meritocratic recruitment patterns and long-
term career rewards which might have enhanced a coherent bureaucratic
organisation were absent. More importantly, the virtual absence of an
industrial bourgeoisie seriously impeded the strategic selectivity of the
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Figure 6.1
Position of states in the despotic-infrastructural power continuum
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Infrastructural power
state' s industrial policies. Instead, the large size of the public sector under
étatisme, combined with pervasive subsidies and controIs, nurtured the
proliferation of clientelistic relations and limited the state' s capacity for
effective intervention in the economy.
The ideology of nationalist solidarity which denied the existence of
conflicting class interests both blocked the emergence of institutionalised
channels 0f interest representation and undermined the power base of the
bureaucracy. In terms of both administrative structure and ideological
underpinnings, the contemporaneous experience of Italian fascism provided
a model to the Kemalist bureaucracy in this regard. Thus, the predominance
of particularisticrelations between the bureaucracy and bourgeoisie at the
expense of institutional linkages found its counterpart in the denial of
collective representation to the working class and the peasantry in the name
of a nationalist ideology. Rather than being merely a pretext for the
exploitation of the peasantry and the working class, the strength of this
nationalist ideology derived from the almost one-century-long project of the
state bureaucracy.
Ottoman bureaucratic reformism was prompted by the external military
weakness of the Empire, and Turkish nationalism had become a means of
saving the Anatolian heartland and overcoming the "backwardness" of
Turkish society through authoritarian modernisation and industrialisation.
But the OttomanfTurkish bureaucracy's long-lasting project was not guided
by purposive-rational action alone; its Westernisation, secularism, and
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nationalism was a cognitive response to the final crisis of the Ottoman
Empire, and was part and parcel of the bureaucracy's identity. Thus, the
Republican nationalist elite saw economic development and industrialisation
on the one hand, and Westernisation and secularisation on the other hand
as inseparable processes. In an effort to impose the elements of its own
id en tit y onto the society at the expense of the popular Islamic identity of
the latter, the bureaucracy contributed to the final demise of its
industrialisation programme.
Conceit and distrust of the popular classes lest they might undermine its
Westernisation programme, led the bureaucracy to pre vent the emergence
of collective working class or peasant interest organisations which might
have sustained a growth dynamic based on mass production and
consumption, if not during the World Depression and the War, then
certainly during the post-war era of Fordist growth in Western Europe and
North America. Instead, due to this cultural aberration or identity rift
between the bureaucracy and the popular classes, the integration of the
industrialisation objectives with popular mobilisation was delayed until the
197 Os.
One area where the objectives of industrial transformation and cultural
modernisation conflicted was the educational policies. The proliferation of
lycées constituted the P ill ar of educational reforms in the 1930s. The
Kemalist ideologues described the main function of Republican lycées as
providing "general culture" rather than the acquisition of technical skills
(Öztelli 1974:81-5). Thus, the industrialisation objectives were, in effect,
subordinated to the objectives of culturally transforming the Turkish society
through Westernising and secularising reforms. Rather than generating a
coupling between the educational institutions and the industry, the
educational strategies of Republican governments were designed to supply
administrators or teachers to the bureaucracy who would effectively
contribute to the cultural modernisation of the society.
The most forceful "colonisation" of the "life-world" of the AnatolIan
peasantry, of course, had come with the secular reforms. In its Kemalist
version, laicism meant more than an institutional separation of Islam from
the state; it became a way of intervening in the "popular Islamic" conduct
of the masses. As we have hinted in Chapter Two, the Islam integral to the
Ottoman state apparatus and the "popular Islam" deriving from the
Byzantine- Turcoman cultural synthesis had, in fact, two distinct and
separate domains (cf. Vryonis 1971 and Keyder 1987:10, 87-9). While the
former was part of the judicial and administrative system of the Empire, the
latter was articulated with pagan cults, accounts of the legendary heroes and
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mystical sects, and was inseparable from the identity of the Anatolian
peasant.
Seeing economic modernisation as inextricably linked to the
Westernisation of the culture, Kemalist secularism continued its reforms
disestablishing the Islam organised in the Ottoman state (e.g. abolishing the
Caliphate, Seyhülislam, Seriat) by attempts aiming at the transformation of
this identity (e.g. banning the religious dress, mystical sects, pilgrimage to
the graves of legendary heroes). The bureaucracy's candidate for filling in
the ideological vacuum was nationalism. Accordingly, the identity provided
by belonging to the same nation - the meaning found in belonging to a
national unit - would give the alternative means of social cohesion. Thus,
the new homogenising pull of nationalist solidarity became a cover for
eradicating both class-based and potentially religion-based associations.
The bureaucracy' s nationalism, as a catching up strategy for "latecomer
nations" became the driving force behind the industrialisation attempt while
it, at the same time, inhibited the realisation of the industrialisation attempt
by preventing the emergence of interest mediation forms which might have
underwritten its success through an expansion of the domestic market.
Contrary to "productivist" accounts, it was not its position within the
production relations or the "objective" requirements of industrial
accumulation alone which conditioned the bureaucracy towards attempting
to effect an industrial transformation at the expense of the popular classes.
The bureaucracy' s "meaning system" or the "representation of reality both
to itself and to others" while acting as the "subject" of societal
transformation - its nationalism, Westernism, and secularism - resulted in
its suppression of "alternative meaning systems" which might have formed
the basis of a "collective representation of a different reality" (cf. Jenson
1990). When a "space" was opened in the dominant "nationalistic
discourse" of the bureaucracy by the end of the Second World War, the
opposition to RPP quickly ensued.
The changed international climate at the end of the Second World War
underlined the transition to multiparty democracy in 1946 and the electoral
victory of the DP in 1950. Just as the World Depression had been an
important catalyst contributing to the rise of étatisme, the ascendency of the
US in the international arena had a catalytic role in the revers al of the
étatiste commtment. Internal political developments hastened this change
and determined its particular nature. The industrial development of the
étatiste years had strengthened the bourgeoisie. Both in terms of its size and
the extent of its accumulation, it was no longer the weak class it had been
in the early years of the Republic. Especially the war-time profiteering of
merchants had taken substantial proportions and subsequently became an
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important factor in the breakdown of the bureaucracy-bourgeoisie alliance
at the root of étatisme. Following the end of the War, the Associations of
Commerce, the major representative organs of the bourgeoisie at the time,
increasingly began to attack state interventionist policy on the grounds that
it retarded economic development by the misallocations and the
bureaucratic inefficiency of the SEEs.
In an attempt to win the support of the peasantry, which had been the
main victim of the state-led industrialisation and war-time austerity
measures, against the growing criticisms of the bourgeoisie, the RPP
leadership pushed for a land reform in 1945. The reform stipulated a
redistribution of land to the poor peasantry in order to end sharecropping
and to narowly limit the size of landholdings. 8 Although the reform was
subsequently shelved, it alienated the landlords from the RPP for good and
resulted in the defection of a faction from the party. The dissent in the RPP
following the disagreement over the issue of land reform later crystallised
into the Democratic Party (DP).
A factor which greatly facilItated the RPP' s initial tolerance of the DP
was that it was founded by former RPP members with good republican and
secularist credentials. The DP' s leadership was perceived not as a counter
elite that would betray the Kemalist legacy but as a part of the Kemalist
elite itself. Although it did not win the first multiparty election in 1946, its
unexpected success led to the RPP' s assimilation of the DP' s criticisms as
much as possible. Heavy state interventionism was abandoned, and the
severity of antireligious polIcies was toned down. An alliance with the
emerging hegemon US was actively sought through discarding Turkey' s
neutrality, entering the War in 1945, becoming a member of the postwar
Bretton Woods institutions - the IMF and the World Bank - in 1947, and
recei ving the Marshall Aid. The authoritarian thrust of the RPP, however,
resulted in a broad coalition of social forces including the bourgeoisie,
landowners as well as the small peasantry rallying for the DP, which won
the 1950 election.
N otes
1. Kemalist cadres imitated some of the institutional arrangements of these authoritarian
regimes. The antiliberal attitude defending dirigisme in the inter-w ar years was, however, a
more general phenomenon which was not limited to fascist or Stalinist policies. Responding
to a similar macroeconomic environment characterised by the breakdown of the international
economy, even the New Deal exhibited similarities with Turkish étatisme. Etatiste policies
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were one of the first examples of what was to become a fairly general pattern in the Third
World nationalist states in the L 960s and 1970s.
2. The experience of European late industrialisers in the 19th century (e.g. Germany in the
1850s, and Russia in the 1880s) also exhibited increased state intervention in industrial
produetion and financing. Gerschenkron regards the increase of government intervention in
sequentially later industrialisations as a consequence of the shortcomings of institutional actors
in the capital market. While the gradual character of English industrialisation based on textiles
had eased the pressure for developing specialised credit institutions for the provision of long-
term capital to industry; the scarcity of capital, the greater scope of the industrialisation
movement arising from the big development differential with the leading countries, the larger
plant sizes, the concentration of the industrialisation effort on branches with higher ratios of
capital to output necessitated a close interlocking between industry and banks and the state
in later industrialisations. Thus, in these cases, industrialisation began with heavy industry and
the state compensated for the handicaps in capital accumulation. Moreover , the
industrialisation drive was financed by the state of ten at the expense of urban or agrarian
consumption demands.
3. Amsden (1992), drawing on the experience of late industrialising NICs in the latter half
of the 20th century (e.g. Taiwan, South Korea) distinguishes between the conditions of late
industrialisation in the 19th and 20th centuries. While the L 9th-century US and German
industries leapfrogged ahead of England by their ascendency in the newly emerging most
dynamc techno-economic paradigms (i.e. iron and steel, or electrochemical industries), 20th-
century late industrialisation is predicated on borrowing technology and then improving it
incrementally. Consequently, in Amsden's formulation, 19th-century leaping to the world
technological frontier can no longer work in the 20th century; leading enterprises in 20th-
century industrialisation,must not only be passively subsidised, but the state must actively
trigger technological innovation through disciplining subsidy recipients, enhancing the
technical capabilities of the work force, and coupling higher education institutions to the
industry .
4. The proponents of O'Donnel's (1973) Bureaucratic Authoritarian state formulation (e.g.
Barkey 1990) reach similar conclusions as to the crisis of ISI in Turkey in the 1970s. A
notable characteristic of the ISI's crisis, however, was that the encroachment of the
bourgeoisie up on the state took place not through particularistic channeIs, but via the
diverging demands of commercial and industri al organisations representing the collective
interests of the various "sections" of the bourgeoisie.
5. Shefter (1977:414-22) makes a distinetion between "internally mobilsed" and "externally
mobilised" parties. Internally mobilsed parties are those which are founded byelites who
occupy positions within the prevailng regime; externally mobilised parties, on the other hand,
are established by outsiders who do not hold positions and these parties do not enjoy access
to state patronage at the time of their founding. While externally mobilsed parties are not in
a position to distribute particularistic benefits, and thus rely upon establishing a network of
mass organisations not fuelled by patronage; internally mobilsed parties do not develop such
an organisational structure, but attempt to win support by distributing benefits through local
notables and politicians. In this sense, the longer the party is without political power, the
stronger the non-clientelist party organisation.
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6. Evans (1989) connects the differential effectiveness of the Third W orId states as agents of
industrial transformation to the differences in their intern al structures and external ties to the
society. On the one end of the spectrum, he locates the most effective developmental state
(e.g. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) characterised by "embedded autonomy" which joins well-
developed, coherent bureaucratie internal organisation with dense public-private ties and
institutionalised linkages. Developmental states foster long-term entrepreneurial perspectives
among private elites by increasing incentives to engage in transformative investments
according to a set of general, universalistie rules. Unlike the democratie corporatism of
Scandinavian countries which include organised representation of labour in their embedded
networks (Katzenstein 1985), the East Asian developmentalist states conform to a pattern of
"authoritarian corporatism" which only includes institutionalised cooperation between state
elites and business groups. On the other end of the spectrum, the least effective, predatory
or "klepto-patrimonial" state (e.g. Zaire) combines undisciplined intern al structures with
external ties ruled by the "invisible hand" of the market or "rent seeking". Such states extract
large amounts of otherwise investable surplus and provide liUle in the way of industrial
transformation .
7. I am indebted to Kristen Nordhaug for drawing the parallels between Mann's despotic
versus infrastructural power dimensions and Evans' s embedded autonomy formulation at a
talk titled "Politisk Regime og Økonomisk Utvikling: om problemstilingen i en
sammenliknende studie av Taiwan of Elfenbenkysten" at the Department of Administration
and Organization, University of Bergen on 8.4.1992. See also Önis 1991: 123-4 for the
linkages between Mann's conceptualisation and embedded autonomy.
8. As we have seen in Chapter Four, due to labour shortages being a perennial problem in
Anatolian agriculture, there had never been a popular demand for land distribution. Because
of the abundance of independent small owners, and the absence of a sizable landowner class,
land reform never became as thorny an issueas in Latin America. In the absence of an
expressed demand for it by its potential beneficiaries, the proposed land reform was an
attempt of the state bureaucracy dominant in the RPP at forging a new alliance with the
poorer peasantry against the growing challenge of the bourgeoisie (Keyder 1987: 126).
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7. Conclusion: An overview of the Turkish
trajectory
7.1 Divergent paths of development: Lessons for development
theory
A central assumption of modernisation theory was that international
linkages to states and markets of developed industrial societies had positive
long-term effects. This assumption was the institutional counterpart of the
neoclassical emphasis on the beneficial free play of the market forces. The
assertion that external lInkages play a contributory role in initiating
developmentwas complemented by the basic contention that the major
determinants of self-sustained growth were to be found within the
developing countries themselves. Once diffusion had cleared away
traditional obstacles to deve1opment, growth unfolded in an evolutionary
fashion. To these was added theassumption that in the long run, economic
development fostered the increase of both democratic participation and
egalitarian income distribution.
That it did not do so, provided the basic point of departure of
dependency theory. The dependency paradigm argued that national
economic disengagement from adv ane ed industri al countries was necessary
to achieve the objectives of development, democracy and equity.
Dependency theory and Wallerstein' s historical version of it hel d that
incorporation into the world capitalist system encouraged specialisation in
the production of primary export commodities, which resulted in the
predominance of the external over intern al economic linkages. Associated
with such enclave growth was the emergence of social groups which
benefited from this development pattern.
In response to the challenge posed by the Newly Industrialising Countries
(NICs) to the dependency theory, a newer intellectual tradition, drawing on
the writings of Cardoso and Faletto, argued that the term "dependent
development" would be more suitable to account for the development
pattern of the NICs. This new school recognised a more complex and
contingent relationship between dependency and economic growth, and
sought to understand the ways in which the interaction of domestic and
foreign c1asses, and institutions influenced development. However less
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deterministic compared to the dependency theory, this dependent
development school, too, remained wedded to several of the key
assumptions of the traditional dependency theory. Central among these was
the assumption that development in the dependent countries, even if it
emerged, tended to be politically exclusionary and economically
unequitable.
Jf the industrialisation of the Latin American NICs in the 1960s and
1970s forced a reconsideration of dependency while essentially confirming
this school' s basic assumptions, the experience of the East Asian NICs
posed a fundamental challenge to the dependency paradigm. Though
authoritarian in nature, the East Asian states enhanced full employment,
continued increases in real wages, and maintained low levels of economic
inequality. The East Asian NICs' development became the subject of
divergent interpretations. While some observers regarded the East Asian
states' policies as an assertion of the neoclassical virtues of open, market-
directed strategies of economic growth (Balassa 1981), others emphasised
the impact on the growth of strategies pursued by the strong,
developmentalIst states (Amsden 1992, Deyo ed. 1987, Wade 1990).
Consequently, the crisis in development theory and suggestions for its
transcendence became a recurrent theme in the recent years (e.g.
Vandergeest and Buttel 1988, Corbridge 1990).
A common denominator in the suggestions for the transcendence of the
impasse in development theory has been a stronger emphasis on middle-
range theorising about the complex interrelationships between international
and national, exogenous and endogenous development contexts on the one
hand, and between state and market on the other. The narowing of the gap
between modernisation and dependency approaches has paved the way for
a convergenee of Weberian and Marxian theorising around meso-concepts
incorporating both instrumentalist and interpretive analyses of class and
state action in a comparative framework (Vandergeest and Buttel 1988).
This, in turn, has led to a revival of an intellectual tradition (e.g.
Gerschenkron, Polanyi, Moore, Hintze) combining historical sociology and
sociology of development (Evans and Stephens 1988).
Gerschenkron had emphasised that economic development took on
divergent paths depending on the timing of industrialisation. Polanyi had
attempted to disclose the institutional underpinnings of the dominance of
market exchange and had integrated the interplay of classes within society
and the interplay of states in the interstate arena in to a single analysis.
Moore had examined the links between economic models and political
forms as expressions of dass and state strengths. Finally, Hintze had
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stressed that the interplay of states in the international state system had a
central influence on the intern al development of individual states.
In more recent versions of this "Marxified W eberian" (Mann 1986b: 1 11)
tradition, Skocpol and Mann have argued that state structure and capacity
can not be reduced to a reflection of class forces and must be brought back
as an independent actor into the analysis -due to the external structuring
provided by the interstate arena. In a similar vein, Amsden and Evans have
analysed the successful late industrialisation of East Asian NICs as
conditioned by the autonomous action of the state. They have associated the
effective operation of markets with the presenee of strong, interventive
states and market failure with the lack of bureaucratic autonomy. Thus, if
one consequence of the convergence of the paradigms of modernisation and
dependency approaches has been an emphasis on the autonomy of the state
which is enhanced by the confluent endogenous and exogenous influences;
the other has been the rejection of the binary opposition between the
political rationality of the state and the market rationality of the civil
society.
Senghaas and Menzel have applied the challenge that the late 20th-
century development of NICs presented to development theory to the study
of 19th-century developments in the European periphery. Seeing the history
of industrialisation in Europe as a "microcosm of world history that
encompassed all facets of the problem of catching up by the Third World
today", Menzel (1992:44-5) has noted that similarly to the experiences of
the NICs in East Asia and Latin America in the 1970s, the Scandinavian
countries in the 1890s, the Soviet Union in the 1930s, and the South
European countries in the 1950s can all be considered to have been NICs.
Breaking with dependency convictions, Senghaas and Menzel have
emphasised that comparable world market positions did !ead in the 19th
century, and can lead in the 20th century both to auto-centric and dependent
development. In their scenario of auto-centric development, democratic
participation and egalitarian income distribution is a sine qua non of
successful development. Their multicausal analyses focusing on the
complex interrelations between successful late industrialisation, socio-
institutional relations, and political regimes have pointed towards a
convergence of the agendas of historie al sociology and development theory.
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7.2 Determinants of the outcome of Turkey's late
industrialisation attempt: Approaching a multicausal
explanation
The rejection of the binary opposition between the political rationality of
the state bureaucracy and the market rationality of the civil society provided
a departure point for our analysis. We contested the state versus civil
society model shared by the modernisation and dependency approaches to
Ottoman/Turkish development. Instead, we stressed the particular
intermediations - geopolitics and the requirements of late industrialisation
attempt - which boosted the territorially centralising thrust of the state
while making it vulnerable to the encroachment of particularistic interests
emanating from the society.
Contrary to the discourse of Orientalism which regarded the
Ottoman/Turkish state as omnipotent and civil society as primordial or
absent, we introduced a distinction between the despotic and infrastructural
powers of states. We underlined that the infrastructural reach of the
Ottoman state was weak similarly to the pattern represented by European
absolutist states until the 18th century. While the acquisition of
infrastructural capacities was more balanced between the state and civil
society in Western Europe in the 19th century, the geopolitical balance of
power in the interstate arena, and the objectives of late development
resulted in the OttomanfTurkish state' s acquiring a disproportionate part of
society' s capacity for infrastructural coordination. The necessities of a
centrally coordinated milItary commc;md and the late industrialisation
attempt favoured the form of territorial centralIsation "advocated" by the
state. From this perspective, the problem with the Kemalist state was that
it had high despotic but low infrastructural powers: it lacked embedded
autonomy. It could not set up the institutional framework within which it
could successfully resist particularistic demands and strike the bargains
underpinning the sustenance of its industrialisation policies.
Contrary to Wallerstein's world-system paradigm, which essentially
argued that international market patterns defined Anatolian social structure,
and that internal class and state relations were dictated by a division of
labour on a world scale, we emphasised that changes in trade routes or
trading interests could not have transformed economic and social structures
because foreign trade absorbed only a limited portion of the preindustrial
productive capacity. Prior to the 19th century, the Ottoman system, with its
low level of infrastructural capacities, did not have the coherent economic
structure which could be disrupted by the alleged emergence of a world-
economy from the 16th century onwards.
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Rather than being an outcome of unmediated responses to outside
economic stimuli, the processes which the world-system approach dubbed
"incorporation into the worId-economy" and which we studied as belated
industrial transformation and nation-building, were the result of a complex
combination of global developments and locally specified systems of class
interactions and power structures. The outcomes of the Celali uprisings of
the 17th century and the subsequent symbiosis between tax-farming and
freeholding peasant property placed the 17th and 18th century rural
Anatolia in an intermediate category between the two regressive agrarian
structures represented in Brenner' s typology by the early modern French
and East European patterns.
A subsistence-based agricultural economy in Anatolia lasted well into the
first half of the 20th century. The fundamental pillar underpinning the
solidity of this agrarian structure in the 19th century was the symbiosis
between the central Ottoman state and the "pulverised" freeholding
peasantry whose roots dated back to the prebendal timar system of the 15th
century and whose solidity was not broken with the strengthening of tax-
farming in the 17th and 18th centuries. In an effort to stand against the
increasingly menacing external military threat in the 19th century interstate
system, the Ottoman state supported the consolidation of freeholding small
peasant proprietorship while channelling the agricultural surplus it extracted
to the nonproductive spheres of military expenditure and foreign debt
repayment. The result was both a technical stagnation in an agrarian
structure which was not geared to capitalist competitive pressures, and a
nondeveloping industrial production in the absence of widespread "free"
wage labour. The peasantry's commtment to thesocialorder of the Empire
reflected in its relative acquiescence and lack of political mobilisation
enhanced the autonomy of the Ottoman state, and increased its centralist
thrust which manifested itself in the opposition to the countervailing
economIc power of the largely non-Muslim commercial bourgeoisie.
Ethnic differentiation within the bourgeoisie and its reluctance towards
political mobilIsation, prevented the convergence of interests between the
state bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie. During the nation-building phase in
the first quarter of the 20th century, the predominantly non-Muslim and
non- Turkish composition of this bourgeoisie led to a lack of bourgeois
interest articulation. The bureaucracy effecting the transition from the
Ottoman imperial state to the Turkish nation-state through a revolution-
from-above undertook an aggressive cultural modernisation pro gr amme
which was followed by a state-led industrialisation drive in the 1930s under
the impact of W orId Depression. In a conscious attempt to close the gap
with Western Europe, the traditional symbiosis between the state and
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peasantry was attempted to be abrogated. Nevertheless, the industrialisation
attempt at the expense of agriculture did not prove successful. Finally,
étatiste economic policies were revers ed with the DP' s rise to power in
1950, which established the political dominance of an alliance of large
landholders, smallholding peasants and the bourgeoisie.
The historical exposition we have provided suggests a host of conditions
that might influence whether late industrialisation attempts succeed or not:
the external structuring of the state in the interstate arena, the socio-
institutional relations in agriculture which ultimately determine the size of
the intern al market and the industriallabour force, the education level, the
ethnic composition of the population, the conditions of nation-building, and
so forth. We have attempted to provide a summary of our major findings
circumscribing the "failure" of Turkish late industrialisation based on
Senghaas' s analytical scheme in Table 7.1. The confluence of these
multiple determinants around the role of the state in the OttomanfTurkish
case directed our attention to the actions of the state bureaucracy. We
diagnosed this collecti ve actor as being the primary initiator of the late
industrialIsation attempt, and as being the ultimate barier to its success.
The analysis of the Turkish trajectory pointed towards an elaboration of
Senghaas's hypotheses on specifically two points: socio-institutional
relations in agriculture and the nature of nation-building. In view of the
Turkish experience, we argued that both of these areas were intimately
related to the external structuring of the state in the geopolitical arena.
With respect to the interrelations between economic development and
income distribution, we have dismissed a general positive correlation
between successful industrialisation and egalitarian land distribution. The
experience of the 19th-century aborted industriaIIsation attempt of the
Ottoman Empire pointed towards a revision of the postulate that a relatively
equal land distribution is generally conducive to economic development
through the creation of a domestie market. While this postulate held true
in the explanation of the diyergent development trajeètories of the
Scandinavian and Latin American countries, as the negative effects of the
"pulverisation" of landholdings in Anatolia showed, it did not work below
a certain threshold. Below this threshold, the scenario of auto-centric
development was not realised. As Senghaas' s reference to the development
history of the Balkans and Brenner' s analyses on the divergent paths of
industrial development in early modern England and France showed; when
the land was splintered, the agricultural surplus and therefore the means to
invest in productivity increasing investments remained low - the result was
little demand for consumer goods. The resulting high degree of subsistence
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production led to a shortage of wage labour. Thus, the development of a
mutually supporting growth spiral between the production and consumption
requirements of agriculture and industry was blocked.
The consolidation of small peasant proprietorship was ultimately related
to the form of political accumulation. The external structuring of the
Ottoman state in the 19th century geopolItics - its strategic position in the
inter-imperialist rivalry - enhanced the intern al strength of the state
bureaucracy. The Ottoman state jealously defended peasant freeholding -
the fiscal basis of its political rule - against foreign capital and local
landlords.
Our exposition underlined the role of popular Islam as a primary
determinant of Anatolian culture and emphasised the Helleno- Turcoman
synthesis defining the early economic and political structure of the Ottoman
Empire. We drew attention to the institutional integration between Islam
and the Ottoman state, and stressed the role this integration played in
postponing the formation of the Turkish nation-state. Drawing a paralleI to
Rokkan' s analysis of divergent outcomes of nation-building in Southern and
Northern Europe, we likened the effects of Islam in the core nationality of
the Ottoman realms to the regressive effects of Roman Catholicism in
Southern Europe. The belatedness of Turkish nationalIsm resulted in the
late development of infrastructural capacities deemed necessary for
successful industrialisation. The creation of a linguistically homogeneous
national space was only achieved in the 1920s, and even then the ethnic
heterogeneity of Anatolia - the existence of a sizable Kurdish population
- contradicted the Kemalist ideal of a unitary Turkish nation.
Rather than seeing bureaucracy solely in terms of its position in the
relations of produetion or in instrumental action contexts, we drew atten ti on
to the normative and cognitive context of the bureaucracy's actions through
the analysis of its nationalist ideology. The legacy of Turkish nation-
building was contradictory: it emerged, on the one hand, as a re action of
the state bureaucracy to the Ottoman/Turkish society' s backwardness with
the aim of achieving national development through strengthening normative
cohesion; on the other hand, the necessarily exc1usionary character of the
bureaucracy' s nationalist outlook seriously impaired the chances of the
success of its industrialisation attempt. Given the disproportionately large
representation of Greeks and Armenians within the bourgeoisie, the ethnic
conflicts of Turkish nation-building which left the new Republic
predominantly Muslim, resulted in a drastic reduction of entrepreneurial,
capacities at a time when the Kemalist bureaucracy adopted the aim of
rapid industrialisation. During the étatiste industrialisation attempt, the
Kemalist state was not strong or autonomous enough to discipline the
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bourgeoisie. The conditions of Turkish nation-building - the Kemalist
revolution-from-above in virtual autonomy from the social c1asses and the
RPP' s internally mobilised party nature - enhanced the political dominance
of the state bureaucracy, but these conditions also paved the way for its
subsequent lack of embedded autonomy identified by Evans as the hallmark
of 20th-century developmental states. As the bourgeoisie was weak, the
bureaucracy actively sought to create one. This process, rather than
enhancing the bureaucratic autonomy of the industrialisation policies,
strengthened clientelism.
Concomitant with the 19th-century centralisation measures in the form
of reforms in the army, administration, and education was the formation of
the state bureaucracy as a distinct social stratum. By perceiving the position
of the Empire in the interstate arena as "backward" , the bureaucracy
gradually adopted the legal and secular Western principles and eventually
a nationalistie ideology in organising the state and its relationship with
society. These new principles gradually undermined the Islamic hegemonic
ideology which had been sustaining the Ottoman model of development
prior to the 19th century through such institutions as guilds,vakifs, and
medreses. Once the element ofconsent to the ideologicalhegemony of
Islam was gone, the modernising reforms of the bureaucracy involved more
and more coercive forms. In attempting to resolve the crisis of the Ottoman
model of development, the state bureaucracy found its new legitimation
basis in the nationalist ideology. But the prior ethnic heterogeneity of
Ottoman Anatolia and the large extent of overlapping between ethnic and
class differentiation - i.e. the predominantly non-Muslim composition of
the Ottoman bourgeoisie - proved detrimental to the further evolution of
the étatiste model of development established in the aftermath of the
national revolution.
The exit of the Christian bourgeoisie from the stage as a result of the
violent conflicts of nation-building, and the subsequent hegemony of
bureaucracy became dysfunctional in the perpetuation of the state-led
industrialisation drive of the 1930s and 1940s. Thus, the response of the
bureaucracy to the exigencies of 19th- century international context ended
"unintentionally" in a blind alley. On the one hand, a dichotomous structure
of culture emerged between the secularising, Westernising, and nationalist
ideology of the bureaucratic elite, and the popular Islam of the peasant
masses. On the other hand, the Y oung Turk and the Kemalist revolution-
from-above led to a drastic weakening of the bourgeoisie. Rather than
resulting in a generalised dominance of the state over the society, the
complex intermingling of these cultural and class-related factors, impeded
the growth of the infrastructural powers of the Republican state. The state
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bureaucracy implicitly fostered an anti-industrial culture by giving priority
to the objectives of cultural modernisation in its educational institutions.
Given the weakness of the bourgeoisie and the intent of the bureaucracy to
invade the popular Islamic life-world of potentially self-organising public
spheres, the channels of communication between the state and society were
severed. Hence, in the absence of institutionalised linkages between the
state and social classes of the kind found in democratic corporatist or
developmentalist states, the industrialIsation policies of étatisme were
channelled to particularistic domains.
In the historical exposition we have followed in this study, we have used
comparisons as a way of contextualising the specific points made with
respect to the Ottoman/Turkish development trajectory. Rather than being
a rigorous application of the comparative method, our approach was
directed towards disclosing the dynamics of a single case - the Turkish late
industrialIsation attempt. The testing of the specific interrelations we have
hinte d between the socio-institutional relations in industry and agriculture,
and the nature of the political regimes deri ving from geopolitics and nation-
building, will hopefully be provided by a convergence of the paradigms of
historical sociology and sociology of development and future single and
comparative case studies.
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